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This thesis investigates the role of financial reporting enforcement in the decision making 
of financial statement preparers and auditors. Enforcement bodies are governmental or 
private agencies that have the authority to review audited financial statements of listed 
corporations. Enforcement, in general, describes the supervision of listed firms by such 
agencies with the objective of ensuring compliance with accounting standards. Prior lit-
erature indicates that the introduction of enforcement mechanisms is associated with pos-
itive capital market effects such as increasing liquidity. Moreover, error announcements 
by enforcers result in significant negative market reactions for the censured firms. Hence, 
enforcement provides additional incentives for firms to prepare error-free financial state-
ments. Moving beyond capital market effects, it is the aim of this thesis to provide evi-
dence on the direct effects of enforcement on the decision making of involved stakehold-
ers. This thesis includes three studies which examine the influence of enforcement on 
disclosure and accounting choices of managers and auditors. 
The first study “Firm Disclosures about Enforcement Reviews”, in a descriptive and ex-
ploratory investigation of the annual reports of German firms subject to enforcement scru-
tiny from 2006 to 2016, finds that managers voluntarily disclose information about en-
forcement reviews even when the reviews are still ongoing. Content analyses reveal that 
these disclosures are potentially associated with strategic considerations. For instance, the 
study provides weak evidence that market reactions to error announcements are mitigated 
by pre-emptive voluntary disclosure about the ongoing reviews. 
The second study “Auditor Conservatism in the Presence of Financial Reporting En-
forcement” utilises an experimental design to test whether the likelihood of being subject 
to an enforcement review increases an auditor’s tendency to require conservative account-
ing choices from his/her client. The findings suggest that the expectation of an enforce-
ment review and its likelihood are not associated with more conservative behaviour by 
the auditor. However, auditors who were directly affected by enforcement reviews in the 
past are more likely to make more conservative decisions. 
The third and final study “The Role of Enforcement in Shaping Conservative Accounting 
Choices” tests and finds in a cross-country setting that substantive changes in enforce-
ment regulation are associated with increases in accounting conservatism. Moreover, 
findings suggest that the impact of enforcement on accounting conservatism is stronger 
 
 V 
for firms with weak corporate governance than for firms with strong corporate govern-
ance. 
In conclusion, this thesis supplies evidence that enforcement plays a significant role in 
the decision making of both managers and auditors. It influences managers’ disclosure 
and accounting choices, while it may have an impact on auditors’ accounting choices if 
auditors have had direct experience with enforcement reviews in the past. The thesis’ 
findings suggest that the strengthening of enforcement institutions is associated with 
higher accounting conservatism. Increasing the frequency of enforcement reviews, on the 
other hand, may enhance auditor conservatism as it will result in more auditors having 
been directly affected by enforcement reviews. 
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1.1 Motivation of the thesis 
In recent years, International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) have been adopted 
by the vast majority of countries in the world. As of 2018, IFRS are required for all or 
most domestic public companies in 144 countries around the globe (IFRS-Foundation, 
2018). For instance, the European Union (EU) mandated that its member states require 
all firms listed on EU-regulated markets to adopt IFRS in their group accounts in 2005 in 
the context of the so-called International Accounting Standards (IAS) Regulation (Regu-
lation (EC) No. 1606/2002). The main objectives of adopting a common set of accounting 
standards across the EU were to increase investor transparency and comparability and 
reduce firms’ cost of capital. Moreover, regulators stated that IFRS adoption “should lead 
to more efficient capital allocation and greater cross-border investment, thereby promot-
ing growth and employment in Europe” (McCreevy, 2005). 
In order to achieve these goals, it appears essential that consistent compliance with IFRS 
be ensured across EU member states. Hence, as in many other countries around the world, 
the EU accompanied IFRS adoption by mandating that its member states install govern-
mental or private bodies charged with the enforcement of accounting standards. These 
enforcement mechanisms significantly vary in structure, responsibilities, rights and budg-
ets across countries. However, in most cases, they are charged with reviewing already 
audited financial statements and publishing the errors found therein. The publication of 
error announcements serves the “name and shame” purpose of enforcement. Error an-
nouncements are associated with significant negative market reactions for the respective 
firms (Hitz et al., 2012). This should create incentives for firm managers to avoid prepar-
ing erroneous financial statements in the first place and, hence, error announcements are 
believed to improve accounting quality and the consistency of IFRS application. Conse-
quently, both IFRS adoption and the implementation of enforcement institutions in many 
countries around the world have significantly changed the financial reporting environ-
ment. 
Prior literature provides a vast amount of evidence on capital market effects associated 
with enforcement, particularly with regard to substantive changes in enforcement or en-
forcement actions such as error announcements. Additionally, several studies investigat-
ing the capital market effects associated with IFRS adoption find that positive capital 
market effects are mainly found in jurisdictions with strong enforcement of accounting 
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standards. For instance, Daske et al. (2008) find for a sample of 26 IFRS-adopting coun-
tries that market liquidity and equity valuations increase while firms’ cost of capital de-
creases when IFRS are adopted. These beneficial capital market effects, however, only 
occurred in countries with strong legal enforcement. In a similar vein, H. B. Christensen 
et al. (2013) investigate the liquidity effects of IFRS adoption by examining a large sam-
ple of 56 IFRS-adopting and non-IFRS-adopting countries with and without substantive 
changes in enforcement regulation. They find significant positive liquidity effects only in 
those IFRS-adopting countries that, at the same time, implemented new enforcement in-
stitutions or strengthened already existing ones. Moreover, they find the same positive 
effects in countries that did not adopt IFRS but that had substantive enforcement changes. 
Hence, the positive capital market effects of enforcement are well established. 
In addition to capital market effects, enforcement also has direct effects on the decision 
making of involved stakeholders such as managers, auditors and investors. Such direct 
effects might, at least to some degree, drive capital market effects. It is therefore important 
that they are investigated to understand what is observed in capital markets. For instance, 
Ernstberger et al. (2012) find that the introduction of a two-tier enforcement mechanism 
in Germany in 2005 led to decreasing levels of earnings management. This represents a 
direct effect of enforcement on managers’ decisions and an improvement of accounting 
quality. 
However, most studies on the impact of enforcement on stakeholders’ decision making 
are found to investigate the effects of enforcement actions such as error announcements. 
As error announcements result in significant negative market reactions for the censured 
firms (Hitz et al., 2012), enforcement reviews are likely to put increased pressure on man-
agers and auditors as they may be blamed for a review’s negative outcome. In fact, prior 
studies find increased turnover of top management (e.g., Arthaud-Day et al., 2006; Col-
lins et al., 2009; Desai et al., 2006; Land, 2010; Wang and Chou, 2011), members of the 
board of directors (Johnstone et al., 2011) and audit committee members (Srinivasan, 
2005; Carver, 2014) at the censured firms following enforcement actions. Moreover, 
Mande and Son (2012) and Brocard et al. (2018) find that firms are more likely to change 
audit firms after censure by an enforcement institution. 
While many studies have been conducted on the impact of enforcement on the decision 
making of stakeholders (e.g., managers) after an error announcement, little is known 
about the direct effects on their decision making when enforcement reviews are still under 
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way and the outcome is not yet certain. I aim to provide exploratory evidence on this 
matter with this thesis. Specifically, in a novel angle of enforcement research, I examine 
managerial disclosure decisions pertaining to ongoing and concluded enforcement re-
views. In addition, I aim to add more evidence to the streams of literature on the direct 
effects of the presence of enforcement bodies and of substantive changes in enforcement 
on accounting properties (e.g., Ernstberger et al., 2012). In that vein, I focus on investi-
gating the association between enforcement and accounting choices by both managers 
and auditors. 
1.2 Objectives and structure of the thesis 
As outlined in the previous section, the adoption of IFRS and the implementation of en-
forcement mechanisms in many countries around the world significantly changed the fi-
nancial reporting environment. These developments are investigated in broad literature 
streams and, interestingly, most positive capital market effects associated with IFRS 
adoption are predominantly found in countries with strong legal enforcement or in con-
junction with substantive changes in enforcement (e.g., Daske et al., 2008; H. B. Chris-
tensen et al., 2013). Hence, I focus on enforcement in this thesis and aim to supply more 
insights into this seemingly important supportive channel of IFRS adoption. I aim to in-
vestigate the direct effects of enforcement on stakeholders’ decision making, as these 
might be the very effects that partly drive capital market effects. I believe that it is espe-
cially fruitful to examine the effects on the decision making of managers and auditors. 
These particular stakeholders prepare and audit financial statements and therefore have a 
direct impact on accounting quality. Specifically, the objectives of this thesis are to: (1) 
document the role of ongoing and concluded enforcement reviews in managerial deci-
sions with respect to voluntary disclosure; (2) test whether auditors employ more con-
servative decision making when the likelihood of an enforcement review is high; and (3) 
test whether accounting, on average, becomes more conservative following substantive 
changes in enforcement regulation. 
My thesis consists of three studies that use different methodological approaches to inves-
tigate the role of enforcement scrutiny in the decision making of financial statement pre-
parers and auditors. The first study, “Firm Disclosures about Enforcement Reviews”, ex-
amines managers’ voluntary disclosures in their firms’ annual reports about ongoing and 
concluded enforcement reviews in the German setting. The objective of this exploratory 
and mainly descriptive study is primarily to establish the existence of such managerial 
Introduction 
 4 
disclosures of enforcement reviews and to test whether the decision to voluntarily disclose 
enforcement reviews is driven by specific strategic considerations. Hence, the study spe-
cifically investigates the influence of enforcement on managerial decisions. The second 
study, “Auditor Conservatism in the Presence of Financial Reporting Enforcement”, uses 
an experimental design to test whether auditors employ more conservative decision mak-
ing when the likelihood of being reviewed by an enforcement body is high. Finally, the 
third and last study, “The Role of Enforcement in Shaping Conservative Accounting 
Choices”, utilises a broad cross-country setting with staggered changes in enforcement 
regulation in an archival empirical approach. The objective addressed in this study is to 
investigate whether accounting, on average, becomes more conservative after substantive 
changes in enforcement have occurred. This would indicate more conservative decision 
making by financial statement preparers. Figure 1.1 outlines the overall aim of my thesis, 
its specific objectives and how they are addressed in the included studies.  
In conjunction, the three studies included in this thesis provide an overview of the role 
played by enforcement institutions in the decision making of managers and auditors. The 
second and the third study focus on the conservatism of auditors and managers, while the 
first study explores managers’ voluntary disclosure about enforcement reviews. Such vol-
untary disclosure could serve as a potential substitute for conservatism (Gietzmann and 
Trombetta, 2003; Hui et al., 2009). The first study follows an exploratory and mainly 
descriptive approach in order to show what steps are openly taken by managers as a re-
sponse to enforcement. The experimental approach of the second study then supplies in-
ternal validity to the thesis by investigating auditors’ decisions in an audit case where 
only the likelihood of an enforcement review is manipulated. Finally, external validity of 
the thesis is achieved with the archival empirical approach taken in the third study where 





Figure 1.1:    Objectives and structure of the thesis 
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In the following paragraphs, I elaborate on the three specific research objectives followed 
in this thesis and how they are addressed in the respective studies. 
Study 1: Firm Disclosures about Enforcement Reviews (Chapter 2) 
Voluntary disclosure is always associated with costs. These costs include direct costs of 
the preparation and publication of disclosure as well as indirect costs such as proprietary 
costs which occur when market participants, such as competitors, use the information 
contained in the disclosure for their advantage (Wagenhofer, 1990). Hence, managers will 
only engage in voluntary disclosure if its benefits outweigh these costs (e.g., Depoers, 
2000). Intuitively, managers have incentives to voluntarily disclose good news. For in-
stance, Lev and Penman (1990) find that managers make good news disclosures when 
their firms are doing well in order to distinguish themselves from poorly performing 
firms. Moreover, incentives also exist to voluntarily disclose bad news (Skinner, 1994). 
In some cases, it might be sensible for managers to pre-emptively disclose bad news to 
partly bring negative market reactions to the bad news forward by walking down market 
expectations. 
Hitz et al. (2012) show that error announcements equal bad news to investors as they 
result in significant negative capital market effects. Error announcements represent man-
datory disclosures imposed by enforcement institutions. As soon as a firm’s financial 
statements are under review by an enforcement body, the managers will most likely be 
under increased pressure as the possibility of an error announcement becomes obvious. 
Thus, they will consider the costs and benefits of informing investors about the ongoing 
enforcement review through voluntary disclosure. Disclosure theory holds that managers 
have a number of potential incentives to disclose information about ongoing enforcement 
reviews. Consequently, the first study of this thesis aims to, firstly, establish the existence 
of such voluntary disclosures and, secondly, investigate in what manner and with what 
potential strategic reasoning managers carry out such disclosures. Thus, the study focuses 
on the role played by ongoing and concluded enforcement reviews in managerial deci-





Study 2: Auditor Conservatism in the Presence of Financial Reporting Enforcement 
(Chapter 3) 
Auditors’ decision-making behaviour, in general, and their conservatism, in particular, 
are influenced by a variety of external factors. As auditor conservatism has a direct impact 
on reporting choices in the financial statements under audit (Hackenbrack and Nelson, 
1996), it is relevant to broaden the understanding of what drives auditor conservatism. 
Mora and Walker (2015) define conservatism as “the inclusion of a degree of caution in 
the exercise of the judgements needed in making the estimates required under conditions 
of uncertainty”. Prior literature provides several factors that seemingly increase auditors’ 
willingness to include a higher degree of caution. To be specific, the most important fac-
tors that drive auditors’ decision-making behaviour and that could potentially induce 
higher caution are accountability (e.g., Lord, 1992; Johnson and Kaplan, 1991); risk of 
client loss (e.g., Nelson and Kinney Jr, 1997); reputation risk (e.g., Rich et al., 1997; 
Skinner and Srinivasan, 2012); and litigation risk (e.g., Kida, 1980; Krishnan and Krish-
nan, 1997). As enforcement is connected to all of these factors, this could indicate that a 
high likelihood of being subject to an enforcement review will lead auditors to employ 
more conservatism. This research question is addressed in the second study of this thesis. 
Moreover, this experimental study examines whether past experiences with enforcement 
reviews will lead auditors to employ more conservatism and whether higher-rank auditors 
are more profoundly influenced in their decision making than lower-rank auditors. 
Study 3: The Role of Enforcement in Shaping Conservative Accounting Choices (Chapter 
4) 
Regulation (EC) No. 1606/2002 required EU member states to impose IFRS adoption on 
firms listed in EU-regulated market segments as of 2005. Moreover, EU member states 
were required to implement enforcement institutions to enforce correct and consistent 
IFRS application. This is one of many examples of IFRS adoption and substantive 
changes in enforcement. Many other countries around the world enacted similar regula-
tions and these events and their consequences have been extensively studied ever since. 
However, while a large amount of evidence is available with regard to capital market 
effects associated with IFRS adoption and substantive enforcement changes (Brügge-
mann et al., 2013), evidence of the influence on accounting properties, such as conserva-
tism, is scarce and quite inconclusive (Leuz and Wysocki, 2016; Hitz et al., 2018). 
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Conservatism theory (Watts, 2003a) as well as agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976) in conjunction with prior literature hint at enforcement being a potential driver of 
accounting conservatism. Hence, substantive changes in enforcement should, in theory, 
increase accounting conservatism. This is important as conservatism “is critical to con-
straining manipulation and fraud” (Watts, 2003b). My third and final study aims to in-
vestigate this specific research question in a broad cross-country setting with staggered 
substantive changes in enforcement, and thereby add to the scarce and inconclusive liter-
ature stream on the effects of enforcement on managerial accounting choices which ef-
fectively translate into accounting properties. 
1.3 Summary of the thesis 
The thesis comprises three studies on the direct effects of enforcement on the decision 
making of financial statement preparers and auditors. The first study examines voluntary 
disclosures of firm managers about ongoing and concluded enforcement reviews (Chapter 
2). The second study uses an experimental design to investigate whether auditors employ 
more conservative decision making when the likelihood of being subject to an enforce-
ment review is high (Chapter 3). Finally, the third study of this thesis utilises a broad 
cross-country setting to investigate the role played by substantive changes in enforcement 
regulation in shaping conservative accounting choices (Chapter 4). 
Study 1: Firm Disclosures about Enforcement Reviews (Chapter 2) 
The first study examines the existence, determinants and potential strategic incentives of 
voluntary firm disclosures about ongoing and concluded enforcement reviews. In the Ger-
man institutional environment, the two-tier enforcement mechanism is quite active and 
rather transparent, allowing for the desired analyses. It is mandated that firms disclose 
error announcements once the enforcement institutions establish that their financial state-
ments contain material errors. Hence, mandatory disclosure of enforcement reviews only 
exists when enforcement bodies find erroneous accounting. 
However, strategic incentives may exist for firm managers to inform investors about on-
going enforcement reviews for several reasons. Without taking into account the likelihood 
of an adverse outcome of the enforcement review, voluntary disclosure of the review 
could serve as an attempt to signal the managers’ commitment to transparency and, con-
sequently, their management quality (e.g., Hughes, 1986; Teoh and Hwang, 1991; Wang 
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et al., 2008). As increased transparency reduces information risk, which is priced, inves-
tors may value such commitment (R. Lambert et al., 2007). Moreover, if managers think 
that it is unlikely that an enforcement institution will censure them, they may want to 
disclose information about the review to show their confidence and hence signal the high 
quality of their financial reporting (Trueman, 1986). Lastly and potentially most im-
portantly, managers also have incentives to inform investors about ongoing enforcement 
reviews when they deem the risk of being censured to be high. For instance, this could 
serve as a means to manage and walk down market expectations (Skinner, 1994). By 
preparing the market for future adverse news, potentially the market impact of an error 
announcement could be softened. Additionally, managers could strategically time the dis-
closure of the ongoing review together with unrelated good news to minimise the market 
impact (Acharya et al., 2011; Beyer et al., 2010). 
In an exploratory and mainly descriptive approach, this study conducts content analyses 
of all annual reports published by firms subject to the German enforcement mechanism 
from 2006 to 2016 in order to identify those firms that decided to opt for this as yet un-
explored means of disclosure. Moreover, multivariate analyses are carried out to investi-
gate determinants of the decision to undertake voluntary disclosure with regard to ongo-
ing enforcement reviews. Using event study methodology, this study also examines 
whether pre-emptive disclosures on ongoing reviews that eventually resulted in error 
findings help to mitigate future negative market reactions to the error announcements. 
The study finds that firms do, in fact, disclose information about enforcement reviews. 
While disclosures of ongoing enforcement reviews are a rather rare phenomenon (one out 
of 13 cases), disclosures of concluded reviews occur more frequently (one out of four 
cases). Content analyses provide evidence that the format of disclosures about ongoing 
enforcement reviews is potentially associated with the eventual outcome of the review, 
which is in line with managers using these disclosures in a strategic manner. The multi-
variate analyses support this notion as such disclosures appear to be more likely for con-
tentious reviews. The study provides weak evidence that market reactions to error an-
nouncements are mitigated by pre-emptive voluntary disclosure of ongoing reviews. 
Taken together, the findings of this study show that managers deem enforcement reviews 
to be associated with certain risks and they believe it to be reasonable to inform investors 
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about ongoing reviews that they expect to result in error findings. Hence, ongoing en-
forcement reviews have a direct effect on managers’ decision making with respect to vol-
untary disclosure. 
Study 2: Auditor Conservatism in the Presence of Financial Reporting Enforcement 
(Chapter 3) 
The second study investigates how enforcement scrutiny influences auditors’ decision 
making. More specifically, it examines whether auditors make more conservative deci-
sions when the likelihood of being subject to an enforcement review is high. As enforce-
ment bodies review firms’ financial statements that have already been audited, enforce-
ment scrutiny is likely to put pressure not only on firm managers but also on auditors.  
Prior literature shows that firms are more likely to switch audit firms after error announce-
ments have occurred (Brocard et al., 2018). This risk may lead auditors to employ more 
conservative decision making with respect to accounting choices. Consequently, the sec-
ond study examines this research question by carrying out an experiment with 72 prac-
tising auditors. In the experiment, the auditors are confronted with an audit case on the 
recognition of provisions for possible litigation costs. Towards the end of the experiment, 
they must decide whether to require the fictitious client to recognise a provision for liti-
gation costs (more conservative accounting choice) or to disclose a contingent liability in 
the notes (more aggressive accounting choice). Moreover, this study investigates whether 
auditors affected by enforcement reviews in the past are more likely to make conservative 
decisions and whether higher-rank auditors are more affected by the enforcement review 
likelihood than lower-rank auditors. 
The study’s findings suggest that auditors already employ fairly conservative decision 
making in the first place and are not significantly influenced by the likelihood of an en-
forcement review. However, those auditors affected by enforcement reviews in the past 
are more likely to opt for the conservative accounting choice irrespective of the current 
enforcement review likelihood. The study does not find evidence in support of higher-
rank auditors being more affected than lower-rank auditors by the enforcement review 
likelihood. 
In conclusion, the increased likelihood of an enforcement review itself does not exert 
sufficient pressure on auditors for them to become more conservative. Once an auditor 
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has actually been affected by an enforcement review in their professional career, they 
become more aware of the actual risks associated with enforcement and, in the future, are 
more likely to employ more conservative decision making. Hence, according to these 
results, enforcement significantly influences auditors’ decisions only once they have been 
directly confronted with enforcement themselves. 
Study 3: The Role of Enforcement in Shaping Conservative Accounting Choices (Chapter 
4) 
The third and final study investigates whether substantive changes in enforcement regu-
lation lead to higher levels of accounting conservatism in a broad cross-country setting. 
This would indicate a direct effect of enforcement on the decision making of managers 
who prepare the financial statements and potentially also on the auditors involved. Both 
conservatism theory (Watts, 2003a) and agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) sup-
port the hypothesis of increasing conservatism following changes in enforcement regula-
tion. 
Using parts of H. B. Christensen et al.’s (2013) identification strategy allows this study 
to utilise a rich setting of staggered changes in enforcement in 56 IFRS-adopting and non-
IFRS-adopting countries around the globe. Conservatism is measured by C_Score, a firm-
year measure developed by Khan and Watts (2009) and based on Basu (1997). By carry-
ing out multivariate analyses for a set of different country and control groups, this study 
supplies evidence on whether enforcement increases accounting conservatism. Further-
more, the study examines whether a firm’s corporate governance strength has an influ-
ence on the effect enforcement may have on conditional conservatism. 
The study, in fact, finds that substantive changes in enforcement regulation are associated 
with increasing levels of accounting conservatism. These findings, however, only hold 
for a sample of non-IFRS-adopting countries. Moreover, enforcement’s effect on con-
servatism is predominant in firms with weak corporate governance. 
In conclusion, these results represent and constitute direct effects of enforcement on the 
decision making of firm managers and potentially also on auditors with respect to the 
preparation of financial statements. Moreover, these findings can be understood in a po-
tentially more meaningful way. García Lara et al. (2011, 2014, 2016) show that conserv-
atism supports efficient capital allocation, and reduces information asymmetry and the 
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cost of capital. As enforcement seems to increase conservatism, it may well be a signifi-
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2 Firm Disclosures about Enforcement Reviews 
Jörg-Markus Hitz and Henning Schnack1,2 
Accounting in Europe (Forthcoming)3 
Abstract: This paper provides descriptive evidence on voluntary firm disclosures related 
to enforcement reviews. Our analyses are set in the German institutional environment, 
where firms are mandated to disclose error announcements if enforcement institutions, 
after conclusion of the review, formally establish financial statements to contain material 
errors. We find that firms provide voluntary disclosures about ongoing enforcement re-
views on rare occasions while they opt to disclose information about concluded reviews 
more frequently. Content analyses reveal that the format of disclosures about ongoing 
reviews is potentially associated with the eventual review outcome, which is consistent 
with firms deliberately using these disclosures. This interpretation is supported by addi-
tional multivariate analyses of disclosures relating to ongoing reviews, which turn out 
more likely for contentious reviews. Analysis of market reactions provides weak evidence 
that investors price these disclosures, as negative market responses to the disclosure of 
error findings are mitigated. Hence, our paper provides a novel angle on the growing 
literature on accounting enforcement and yields insights into firm-level incentives for 
strategic disclosures. 
 
JEL Classification: C21, G34, M41 





Acknowledgements: For helpful comments and suggestions, we thank an anonymous reviewer, the 
associate editor, Stephanie Müller-Bloch, participants at the 40th EAA Annual Congress in Valencia, Spain 
in May 2017 and at the Macquarie University Conference on Contemporary Accounting Research in 
Sydney, Australia, in March 2017. For valuable research assistance, we thank Anna Schlüter and Viktoria 
Schefer. All remaining errors are our own. 
                                                 
1  Georg-August Universität Göttingen, Faculty of Economic Sciences, Chair of Accounting and Auditing, 
Platz der Göttinger Sieben 3, 37073 Göttingen, Germany. 
2  This study was conducted in cooperation with Jörg-Markus Hitz.  
3  The Version of Record of this manuscript has been published and is available in Accounting in Europe 
2018: https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17449480.2018.1519320. 
Firm Disclosures about Enforcement Reviews 
 14 
2.1 Introduction 
This paper presents exploratory empirical evidence on firms’ disclosure choices pertain-
ing to pending or concluded investigations by enforcement authorities. A growing body 
of literature provides evidence that “enforcement matters”, that is, the introduction of 
enforcement bodies in charge of reviewing financial statements, for example, in member 
states of the European Union, has substantially altered the reporting environment and 
firm-level disclosure incentives. For example, H. B. Christensen et al. (2013) show that 
the introduction of IFRS for listed firms in the European Union coincided with significant 
positive capital market effects (increases in liquidity), particularly in those EU member 
states which had concurrently implemented the mandate to install enforcement institu-
tions. The finding of positive capital market effects is consistent with increased transpar-
ency, or quality of disclosures, suggesting that incentives for managers to provide com-
pliant, high quality financial statements may have increased under the auspices of en-
forcement institutions. Consistent with this, Hitz et al. (2012) find evidence that capital 
market participants, on average, react negatively to the disclosure of error findings estab-
lished by enforcement institutions in Germany. This finding illustrates the potential ef-
fectiveness of the “name and shame” mechanism, which aims at providing capital market 
deterrence for managers to abstain from reporting misconduct. Taken together, this liter-
ature demonstrates that the activities of enforcement institutions are one out of many fac-
tors shaping reporting incentives by managers. 
Interestingly, no paper has so far investigated firms’ reporting choices with respect to 
enforcement activities as such. Given the documented relevance of enforcement for cap-
ital market and reporting outcomes, information on both ongoing enforcement activities 
and on past reviews may be of interest to market participants. This renders said infor-
mation a potentially relevant object for firm disclosure choices. For example, firms may 
voluntarily decide to divulge information on an ongoing investigation in order to prepare 
markets for a potentially adverse outcome. Also, firms may regard an enforcement inves-
tigation that was concluded with no error finding as a signal of good accounting quality, 
which they may want to share with the investment public. 
Given the void in the extant literature on enforcement, our paper provides exploratory 
evidence on enforcement disclosures. In our main analyses, we employ content analysis 
of one major disclosure outlet, the annual report, to take stock of firm disclosures about 
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ongoing and concluded enforcement investigations, thereby shedding light on the perva-
siveness or relevance of these disclosures, and their characteristics. In additional analyses, 
we focus on disclosures related to ongoing enforcement reviews and their underlying ob-
jectives. First, we use a determinants analysis to compare characteristics of disclosure 
firms with firms that exerted their “right to remain silent”. Second, we include into our 
analyses the capital market perspective, to investigate whether disclosures about ongoing 
reviews potentially mitigate the market impact of an eventual error announcement.  
We stage our analyses in the German setting, where enforcement institutions are both 
quite active and relatively transparent. Our first set of analyses is based on a keyword 
search of all annual reports published by firms that were subject to enforcement during 
the period 2006–2016, to identify firms that chose to disclose information about ongoing 
or concluded enforcement reviews. We find that voluntary enforcement disclosures do 
indeed occur. Firms decide to provide disclosures about ongoing enforcement reviews in 
about one out of 13 cases (7.5%), while they opt to disclose information about concluded 
reviews more frequently, in roughly one out of four cases (24.0%). These proportions are 
comparatively larger for firms that were eventually censured for erroneous reporting. 
Content analyses reveal that disclosures about ongoing reviews differ substantially with 
respect to volume, disclosure location and the board tier responsible for disclosure when 
conditioning on the outcome of the review (error finding, no error finding). Also, com-
pared to reviews that are not covered in annual reports, enforcement reviews that are sub-
ject to disclosure are, on average, longer in duration, and do more often result in errors 
that were established by the securities regulator, which indicates particularly contentious 
reviews. These findings indicate that users of financial statements may glean relevant 
information about potential outcomes of ongoing reviews from analysing pertinent dis-
closures. Moreover, this evidence is broadly consistent with managers using enforcement-
related disclosures in a deliberate manner to convey information to market participants.  
Our first set of additional analyses reveals that the probability for firms to opt for volun-
tary disclosure about an ongoing review increases when the review is relatively conten-
tious (i.e., it was taken over by the securities regulator BaFin). In contrast, there is no 
evidence that the severity of the error is associated with the disclosure decision. This may 
hint at deliberate disclosures by the respective firms, potentially to reveal to the market 
their assessment of the likelihood of an error finding. Also, we do not find evidence that 
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firms with positive earnings surprises systematically opt for or against enforcement-re-
lated disclosure. Hence, our findings provide no evidence that firms strategically attempt 
to “hide” bad news.  
Our second set of additional analyses investigates market reactions to error announce-
ments in order to further explore one particular disclosure motive: preparing the market 
for “bad news”. We corroborate prior findings of average negative market reactions to 
disclosure of error findings established by enforcers. However, consistent with enforce-
ment-related disclosures being priced, we find weak evidence that the market reactions 
are smaller when firms embraced their right “not to remain silent” while the review was 
under way, hence mitigating the impact of an eventual adverse review outcome. 
While descriptive in nature, our findings are important as they identify a disclosure choice 
that a substantial number of firms deliberately embrace. Hence, we contribute to the lit-
erature on strategic disclosures. Also, we provide an additional angle on the literature on 
the enforcement of accounting standards. Finally, our results should be of interest to reg-
ulators and managers too, as they alert to motives and potential consequences of a disclo-
sure choice that so far has received little attention. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Sections 2.2 and 2.3 provide back-
ground information on the German enforcement setting and the theoretical background, 
respectively. Section 2.4 reports findings from the content analysis of enforcement-re-
lated disclosures, while Section 2.5 focuses on determinants and consequences of ex ante 
disclosures of ongoing enforcement reviews. Section 2.6 concludes. 
2.2 Background: Enforcement of IFRS in Germany 
The German enforcement system was legally established in 2004 and went into operation 
in June 2005. Establishing this mechanism was a direct response to the European Union’s 
Regulation (EC) No. 1606/2002, widely known as the IAS Regulation, which requires 
firms listed on regulated stock markets of its member states to prepare financial state-
ments under International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) as of January 1st 2005. 
Paragraph 16 of the IAS Regulation states that member states should create enforcement 
mechanisms that secure the correct application of IFRS. The German enforcement mech-
anism is organised in a two-tier structure, and consists of a private body called Deutsche 
Prüfstelle für Rechnungslegung e.V. (DPR), the Financial Reporting Enforcement Panel 
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(FREP) on the first tier, and the federal securities regulator Bundesanstalt für Fi-
nanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BaFin) on the second tier. Subject to enforcement oversight 
are all recent (individual and consolidated) annual financial statements and the manage-
ment reports of firms publicly traded on an EU-regulated stock exchange. In 2007, Ger-
many adopted legislation to incorporate the EU transparency directive. Ever since then, 
interim financial statements have also been subject to the enforcement mechanism’s scru-
tiny, yet upon indication only. 
On the first level of the two-tier structure of this enforcement system, the FREP conducts 
reviews of recently published financial statements either (a) reactively, that is, as a result 
of specific indications by third parties, or gleaned from the media, or upon request by the 
securities regulator BaFin, or (b) proactively, based on random / risk based sampling (Hitz 
et al., 2012). The FREP’s mandate is to review financial statements and conclude whether 
they contain material errors. If the review follows third party indications, the FREP fo-
cuses on the specific treatment suspected to be erroneous. In contrast, random reviews 
typically have a broader scope and focus on firm-specific issues that hold a significant 
error risk. To that end, FREP releases on an annual basis a list of relevant accounting 
issues that their random-sampling investigations will focus on in the following year. This 
list also adopts the very fields that the European securities regulator ESMA identifies for 
enforcement scrutiny. 
Firms under review are expected to provide any pertinent information requested by FREP, 
such as the long-form report and the summary of unadjusted audit differences (Berger, 
2010). If the firm refuses to cooperate, the case will be directly referred to the second tier 
institution of the enforcement mechanism, the securities regulator BaFin. In cases where 
the FREP concludes that the financial reports contain one or more material errors, the 
firm may decide whether it agrees with the FREP’s decision or not. 
As the second tier institution of the German enforcement mechanism, the securities reg-
ulator BaFin carries out its own investigations in cases where firms do not cooperate with 
FREP, or, more importantly, in cases where firms contest an error finding established by 
FREP. For any error finding established by either FREP or by BaFin, the securities regu-
lator enacts disclosure of error findings. To that end, BaFin orders firms to publish error 
findings via specific press releases on the electronic platform of the federal registry (Bun-
desanzeiger) and in at least two daily financial newspapers. This disclosure regime is at 
the heart of the German enforcement mechanism, which relies on adverse publicity to 
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effect market based penalties such as negative stock price reactions (“name and shame”, 
see Hitz et al., 2012). 
One important feature of the German enforcement mechanism is that any reviews under 
way, either by the FREP or by BaFin, are conducted without notification of the public. 
Both institutions are legally bound to secrecy about any ongoing or concluded review. 
Hence, the only mandatory channel of disclosure of firm-level information on enforce-
ment action is the mandatory disclosure of an error finding upon conclusion of a review. 
In its annual activity report, the FREP periodically informs on review activities and out-
comes. From these reports, it can be gleaned that since its introduction in 2005, the Ger-
man enforcement mechanism has, on average, reviewed financial statements of more than 
a hundred firms per year, which represents a significant fraction of Germany’s publicly 
traded firms. As of 2016, with the enforcement mechanism being in place for twelve 
years, these numbers add up to 1,239 concluded reviews, out of which roughly 90% 
(1,111) are based on random reviews. Out of the total number of reviews performed, 
roughly one out of five resulted in the disclosure of an error finding (247, or 19.9%), with 
a declining trend in recent years.  
2.3 Theoretical background: Voluntary disclosures about enforcement reviews 
As outlined in the previous section, the activities of the German enforcement institutions 
entail mandatory disclosures for firms that, upon conclusion of the review, have been 
found to have prepared erroneous financial statements. Hence, the disclosure framework 
does not mandate any disclosure of ongoing reviews, nor of reviews that have been con-
cluded without an error finding. As a result, only a small fraction of enforcement activities 
is observable. Figure 1 illustrates how this disclosure environment creates two potential 
points or periods in time where firms may decide to voluntarily disclose information on 
enforcement activities: while the review is under way or after conclusion of the review. 
Distinguishing reviews which eventually resulted in observable enforcement action, as 
documented by the publication of an error finding, results in a total of four types of en-
forcement-related disclosures (Figure 1). Note that only after the conclusion of a review 
that resulted in an error finding are firms mandated to divulge the fact that they have been 
subject to an enforcement review (type III in Figure 1). Yet, even in those cases, managers 
may decide to voluntarily report supplementary information via disclosure channels other 
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than the error announcement. For example, while the format of an error finding is man-
dated by the securities regulator, a firm may decide to report on the error finding, for 
instance, in the annual report, and provide supplemental information, such as how the 
error has been addressed, or whether the firm agrees with the error finding. 
Figure 2.1:     Taxonomy of enforcement-related disclosures 
    
Ongoing review Concluded review 
  
Error finding I: Voluntary disclosure III: Mandatory disclosure 
No error finding II: Voluntary disclosure IV: Voluntary disclosure 
This figure identifies four principal cases of voluntary disclosures about enforcement 
reviews, by (1) differentiating disclosures about ongoing reviews from disclosures about 
concluded reviews, and (2) differentiating reviews that resulted in an error finding from 
those that did not. 
 
In the remainder of this section, we briefly discuss potential disclosure incentives for the 
various classes of voluntary disclosures about enforcement reviews, pointing out potential 
firm-level perspectives on the “right not to remain silent”. First, we address incentives to 
divulge details on ongoing review activities (disclosure types I & II, Figure 1). Naturally, 
firm managers are not only informed of the ongoing review. The review is conducted as 
a communication between the enforcer and the firm, based mostly on written correspond-
ence, and managers involved will typically have an idea of the quality of their financial 
statements and any potential errors they contain. Hence, as the review proceeds, the man-
agers will form their own assessment of the likelihood that enforcers will eventually es-
tablish errors. This is a piece of private information which is of potential relevance to firm 
outsiders such as investors, and managers may strategically decide whether and how to 
disclose it.  
Disclosure theory suggests various incentives for firms to disclose or to withhold infor-
mation about ongoing enforcement reviews. For one thing, managers may decide to in-
form the market of an ongoing enforcement review, in an attempt to signal their commit-
ment to transparency and hence their management quality (e.g., Hughes, 1986; Teoh and 
Hwang, 1991; Wang et al., 2008). Investors may value such a commitment, as increased 
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transparency reduces information risk, which is priced (R. Lambert et al., 2007). A related 
motive may be signalling (Trueman, 1986), that is, the attempt by managers to shape their 
disclosure in a way that credibly conveys their private assessment of a low risk of an 
adverse outcome of the enforcement review.  
Managers may also have incentives to inform markets about ongoing enforcement re-
views when the risk of getting censured by enforcement institutions is high. For one thing, 
managers may attempt to manage market expectations, that is, to prepare the market for 
a potential adverse outcome, in order to “soften” the market impact of an official error 
finding (Skinner, 1994). Also, managers may strategically time the disclosure of the pend-
ing review (Acharya et al., 2011; Beyer et al., 2010), to minimise market impact. For 
instance, if annual earnings turn out to exceed market expectations, managers may decide 
to factor into the earnings announcement or annual report information on the enforcement 
review with the expectation of investors being distracted by the earnings surprise, or put-
ting more weight on the positive news (DeAngelo, 1988). 
Once an enforcement investigation has been concluded without an adverse ruling, the 
firm also has the choice to divulge that information (disclosure type IV, Figure 1). As the 
majority of errors established by the German enforcement bodies pertain to financial 
statements with a qualified audit opinion, the information that an enforcement review has 
yielded no error findings potentially conveys additional information on the high quality 
of a firm’s financial statements, and hence of its overall disclosures. Firms may hence 
decide to communicate that information in an attempt to reduce information asymmetry 
with investors. 
Taken together, theoretical reasoning based on disclosure theory suggests that firms may 
decide to disclose information on ongoing enforcement reviews, or on a concluded inves-
tigation, based on firm-specific trade-offs of the potential costs and benefits of these dis-
closures. However, it is an open empirical question whether firms actually make such 
enforcement-related disclosures. We know of no prior literature investigating this ques-
tion. Hence, in Section 2.4, we conduct an exploratory analysis using content analyses of 
annual reports to establish whether enforcement-related disclosures take place, to what 
extent, and in what shape. In additional analyses presented in Section 2.5, we then inves-
tigate whether observable enforcement-related disclosure choices vary in a systematic 
way that is consistent with some of the disclosure motives we have outlined. To that end, 
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we first conduct a determinants analysis to infer characteristics of firms that opted to re-
veal details of an ongoing enforcement review, relative to firms that embraced their “right 
to silent” (Section 2.5.1). In a second set of analyses (Section 2.5.2), we then include the 
market perspective, using event study methodology to investigate whether disclosures 
related to ongoing enforcement reviews potentially mitigate market reactions to the even-
tual disclosure of error findings, consistent with the notion of walking down market ex-
pectations. 
2.4 Empirical evidence on enforcement-related disclosures 
Given the hitherto unexplored nature of enforcement-related disclosures, our first objec-
tive is to provide exploratory evidence whether disclosures about ongoing or concluded 
enforcement reviews take place, and, if so, investigate attributes of these disclosures. We 
focus our analysis on one important disclosure channel, the annual report, which includes 
both mandatory sections such as the annual financial statements and the management re-
port, and voluntary sections containing, for example, the CEO’s letter to shareholders, or 
additional financial and non-financial information. 
2.4.1 Sample selection and research design 
Panel A of Table 2.1 details the sample selection procedure for our content analysis of 
annual reports. We derive our sample of firms from the entire population of firms listed 
on EU-regulated stock market segments in Germany between 2006 and 2016 as these are 
the very firms whose financial statements are subject to enforcement scrutiny in the re-
spective time frame.4 We identify sample firms based on coverage data which the securi-
ties regulator BaFin discloses on a yearly basis. This procedure yields a total of 9,613 
firm year observations. We exclude firms domiciled outside Germany (1,672 observa-
tions) and firms that have listed debt securities only (676 observations). Also, 1,816 ob-
servations were eliminated because annual reports were not available, for instance, due 
to bankruptcies, or delistings. This procedure yields a final sample of 5,449 annual re-
ports.
                                                 
4  We exclude annual reports for the year 2005, as the enforcement mechanism went into operation only in 
the middle of the year, and only seven reviews were undertaken. 
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Table 2.1: Sample selection 
Panel A: Sample for descriptive analyses 
Year  2006  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011  2012  2013  2014  2015  2016  ∑ 
Population  1122  1074  1030  966  915  874  825  751  756  685  615  9613 
Based outside of Germany  227  213  173  152  143  146  136  126  168  147  41  1672 
Debt instruments  116  67  64  56  58  59  55  54  55  47  45  676 
No annual report (AR) available  298  245  221  203  173  137  121  104  103  98  113  1816 
Adjusted sample  481  549  572  555  541  532  513  467  430  393  416  5449 
Panel B: Sample for determinants analysis 
Error announcements   21  35  37  23  31  27  18  15  13  12  15  247 
Based outside of Germany  0  2  3  5  2  2  2  5  1  0  0  22 
Debt instruments  0  1  2  2  0  1  3  0  1  0  0  10 
Repetitive/corrective disclosure  0  2  2  2  0  1  0  1  0  0  0  8 
Respective AR not available  2  9  5  6  2  4  4  0  0  3  0  35 
Relevant error announcements  19  21  25  8  27  19  9  9  11  9  15  172 
Data missing for determinants analysis  2  3  2  1  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  9 
Sample for determinants analysis  17  18  23  7  27  19  8  9  11  9  15  163 
Disclosure firms  3  3  1  6  0  1  0  4  1  3  0  22 
Non-disclosure firms  14  15  22  1  27  18  8  5  10  6  15  141 
Panel C: Sample for market based tests 
Relevant error announcements  19  21  25  8  27  19  9  9  11  9  15  172 
Data missing for event study  5  5  8  5  1  1  1  2  1  2  0  33 
Sample for event study  14  16  17  3  26  18  8  7  10  7  15  139 
Data missing for market based determinants model  0  6  6  2  3  5  1  1  0  2  8  34 
Sample for market based determinants model  14  10  11  1  23  13  7  6  10  5  7  105 
This table displays the identification of the population of firms subject to the German enforcement mechanism in the years 2006 to 2016. As Panel A shows, firms based outside of Germany as well as those only listed with 
debt instruments are excluded from the population under investigation. Also annual reports were not available anymore for a number of firms (e.g., due to insolvencies). Panels B and C show how we arrive at the samples 
for the determinants analysis and the market based tests. For reasons of comparability, the year 2006 in Panels B and C includes two error announcements published in 2005. 
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Annual reports were collected from the websites of the respective firms. To identify en-
forcement-related disclosures, we conducted for each annual report an electronic keyword 
search using the following keywords related to enforcement investigations: “Enforce-
ment”, “review of financial statement” (“Bilanzkontrolle”), “Securities regulator” (“Bun-
desanstalt”), “BaFin”, “review panel” (“Prüfstelle”), “FREP” (“DPR”), and “error” 
(“Fehler”). We then categorised enforcement-related disclosures according to the four 
categories outlined in Figure 1, that is, we established for each disclosure observation 
whether (1) it related to an ongoing review or a concluded review and whether (2) the 
review outcome was an error finding, or not.5 Hence, we also documented whether firms 
that were mandated to disclose error findings via error announcements (Type III firms, 
Figure 1) additionally chose to provide pertinent information or comments in their annual 
report.  
2.4.2 Frequency and types of enforcement-related disclosures 
Table 2.2 reports the findings on the (relative) frequency of enforcement-related disclo-
sures. Panel A reveals that in 65 cases, firms chose to report about an enforcement review 
while it was still under way. In comparison, Panel B reports that in 207 cases, firms de-
cided to include into their annual reports information about recently concluded enforce-
ment reviews. In 28 (16+12) out of these 207 cases, firms had previously provided dis-
closures about the review while it was still under way. This indicates that almost one out 
of two firms (28 out of 65) which decided to report about an ongoing review also provided 
disclosures upon conclusion of the review. 
Compared to the number of 863 reviews conducted during the sample period, findings in 
Table 2.2 suggest that disclosures about concluded reviews do occur on a somewhat fre-
quent basis (24.0%), while disclosures on ongoing reviews represent more of a rare inci-
dent (7.5%). While rare though, the descriptive findings suggest that disclosures about 
ongoing reviews to a comparatively high proportion relate to reviews that eventually re-
sult in enforcement actions documented by error findings, as the 26 observations repre-
sent 15.1% of all error reviews, while the 39 disclosure observations for non-error reviews 
represent only 5.6% of all non-error reviews. 
  
                                                 
5  Appendix A reports examples for each disclosure category. 
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Table 2.2: Enforcement-related disclosures 









Error finding  26  172  15.1% 
No error finding  39  691  5.6% 
Total   65   863   7.5% 









Error finding  98  172  57.0% 
Out of which firms that already disclosed 
about ongoing review  16     
No error finding  109  691  15.8% 
Out of which firms that already disclosed 
about ongoing review  12       
Total  207  863  24.0% 
This table displays the respective amounts of enforcement-related disclosures for the four disclosure cases 
identified in Figure 1, and relates these amounts to the total number of enforcement reviews reported by 
the German enforcer FREP. Panel A reports findings for disclosures about ongoing reviews, and Panel B 
reports findings for disclosures about concluded reviews. Disclosure observations are gleaned from 
content analysis of annual reports (see sample selection in Panel A of Table 2.1), and error announcements 
are retrieved from the federal gazette (Panel B of Table 2.1). The number of 691 reviews with no error 
finding represents an approximation which we make for reasons of comparability, as detailed data is not 
available. We arrive at this number by taking the overall number of reviews with no error finding, which 
FREP in its activity reports states at 992 for the period 2005–2016, and adjusting it to the number of error 
announcements we use in our analyses (i.e., 172 out of 247, or 69.6%, see Panel B of Table 2.1). 
 
2.4.3 Characteristics of enforcement-related disclosures 
In a second step, we perform several content analyses of the enforcement-related disclo-
sures, and of the sub-sample of error announcements that relate to reviews on which dis-
closures were provided. Table 2.3 reports findings from analysing enforcement-related 
disclosures. With respect to the volume of these disclosures, Panel A reveals a substantial 
degree of variation in word count across all four disclosure categories. Disclosures by 
firms that were eventually censured are relatively larger on average, with a mean word 
count of 169 for disclosures on ongoing reviews (compared to 57 without an error find-
ing), and a mean word count of 395 for disclosures about reviews concluded with an error 
finding (compared to 73 without an error finding).  
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A detailed look at the respective narratives reveals that censured firms often repeat the 
detailed error findings as established by the enforcers, and how these findings were ad-
dressed, for example by restatements. On some occasions, firms also provide their own 
view on error findings, in particular when they feel the error finding was not substantiated. 
In contrast, non-censured firms in their disclosures do not have much scope for length, as 
their key message normally is confined to the very fact that a FREP / BaFin review took 
place without establishing errors, which as some firms note, speaks to the quality of the 
financial statements. For example, in its 2016 annual report, one firm, 4SC AG, notes: 
“The quality of 4SC’s accounting is underpinned by a FREP review of fiscal year 2015 
reports, which confirmed that the financial statements were correct”. While purely anec-
dotal, this evidence supports the notion that one motive for disclosures about concluded 
enforcement action is to signal to the market the high quality of firms’ financial reporting.
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Table 2.3: Content analyses: characteristics of voluntary enforcement disclosures 
Panel A: Volume (word count) of enforcement-related disclosures 
   Ongoing review (N=65)  Concluded review 
(N=207) 
          
              








          
Error finding  169  26  395  98           
No error finding  57  39  73  109                               
Panel B: Positioning of voluntary disclosure about enforcement reviews in the annual report 
         Ongoing review (N=65)  Concluded review (N=207) 
Segment of annual report  Error finding (N=26)  No error finding (N=39) 
 
Error finding (N=98)  
No error finding 
(N=109) 
         Obs.  Prop.  Obs.  Prop.  Obs. 
 Prop.  Obs.  Prop. 
Mandatory disclosure  36  100%  42  100%  158 
 94.6%  126  95.5% 
Report of the supervisory board  11  30.6%  27  64.3%  37 
 22.2%  56  42.4% 
Management report  13  36.1%  8  19.0%  52 
 31.1%  33  25.0% 
Notes  12  33.3%  7  16.7%  68 
 40.7%  30  22.7% 
Corporate governance report  0  0.0%  0  0.0%  1 
 0.6%  7  5.3% 
Voluntary disclosure  0  0.0%  0  0.0%  9 
 5.4%  6  4.5% 
Foreword of the management board  0  0.0%  0  0.0%  8 
 4.8%  6  4.5% 
Presentation of the firm   0  0.0%  0  0.0%  1 
 0.6%  0  0.0% 
Total   36   100%   42   100%   167   100%   132   100% 
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Table 2.3 cont’d:    Content analyses: characteristics of voluntary enforcement disclosures 
Panel C: Ex ante disclosure about enforcement reviews by board 
                   
   Ongoing reviews (N=65)      
   Error finding (N=26)  No error finding (N=39)      











Average no. of words 
     
Management board  15  57.7%  133  12  30.8%  132      
Supervisory board  6  23.1%  52  26  66.7%  19      
Both boards (MB/SB)  5  19.2%  364/58  1  2.6%  82/40      
Total    26  100%  169  39  100%  57                         
   Concluded reviews (N=207)      
   Error finding (N=98)  No error finding (N=109)      
   Obs.  Prop.  Average no. of words  Obs.  Prop.  Average no. of words      
Management board  61  62.2% 
 380  53  48.6%  89      
Supervisory board  11  11.2% 
 60  45  41.3%  38      
Both boards (MB/SB)  26  26.5% 
 498/74  11  10.1%  106/26      
Total   98  100% 
 395  109  100%  73      
This table reports findings from content analyses of annual reports and of the enforcement-related disclosures therein. Panel A reports average volume of enforcement-related 
disclosures, measured by the average number of words, for our four classes of disclosures. Panel B displays the positioning of the enforcement-related disclosures in the firms’ 
annual reports. Note that the number of observations in Panel B exceeds the number of respective disclosures as reported in Table 2.2, as firms on several occasions provide 
disclosures on one particular enforcement review in more than one section of the annual report. Panel C breaks down enforcement-related disclosures to the originating management 
institution, the management board, the supervisory board, or both. 
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Panel B of Table 2.3 provides a breakdown of enforcement-related disclosures to the sub-
sections of the annual report. These findings essentially reflect managerial decisions 
where to locate the enforcement-related disclosures, in particular in terms of including 
these disclosures into mandatory or voluntary subsections or reports. From the findings 
in Panel B of Table 2.3 it can be gleaned that in the vast majority of cases, managers 
decided to include enforcement disclosures in the mandatory, audited sections of the an-
nual report. Of a total of 377 (36+42+167+132) disclosure observations, only 15 (9+6), 
all of them relating to concluded reviews, were located in voluntary sections of the annual 
report. Also, the report of the supervisory board turns out to be an important disclosure 
channel to that end, in particular for firms that decided to inform on ongoing investiga-
tions that were eventually concluded without an error finding.  
Panel C of Table 2.3 breaks down the disclosure observations according to the board tier 
that effected disclosure, management board, supervisory board, or both. In the German 
two-tier board system, executive board members are in charge of disclosure decisions and 
are responsible for preparing compliant financial statements. However, supervisory board 
members, who act as agents to shareholders and stakeholders, may also choose to divulge 
pertinent information, in the report of the supervisory board which has to be made publi-
cally available according to German disclosure regulation. We argue that it is important 
and potentially insightful to distinguish these two disclosure sources, as the disclosure 
incentives of the supervisory board may deviate from those of the executives, given that 
it is the task of the supervisory board to monitor executives and financial reports.  
Findings in Panel C of Table 2.3 show that disclosure sources and content appear to vary 
substantially for the two groups of censured and uncensured firms. For disclosures about 
ongoing reviews, the findings suggest that the review outcome is somewhat correlated 
with the disclosure source. For disclosures about reviews that eventually result in unfa-
vourable outcomes (i.e., error findings); it is the management board who will in the ma-
jority of cases decide to reveal this private information (15 out of 26 cases). In contrast, 
for firms that are subject to an ongoing review, but where managers appear to see little 
risk of an error finding, the executive board is more likely to stick to its “right to be silent” 
(in two out of three cases), while the supervisory board opts to briefly report on the on-
going review in 26 out of 39 cases observed.  
Panel C of Table 2.3 also reveals some differences in the disclosure sources for concluded 
reviews, depending on the outcome. Unfavourable outcomes will in the majority of cases 
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be solely reported by the management board (61 out of 98 observations), while disclosure 
sources are more balanced for reviews with no error finding, with 53 disclosures effected 
by the management board alone, 45 by the supervisory board, and 11 jointly. 
2.4.4 Characteristics of enforcement reviews subject to disclosure 
Table 2.4 reports results from analysing the content of error findings pertaining to en-
forcement reviews that were covered by firm disclosures, 26 of which related to ongoing 
reviews, and 98 related to concluded reviews.6 Panel A of Table 2.4 documents that the 
time lag between the release of the erroneous financial statement and the publication date 
of the error announcement is quite substantial for censured firms, with some indication 
that potentially, those reviews that firms decided to disclose to the market while they were 
still under way were particularly contentious, taking 677 days on average, compared to 
566 days for reviews that were subject to firm disclosures only after the conclusion of the 
review, and 508 days for reviews that firms did not cover in their annual reports. 
Table 2.4: Content analyses: characteristics of enforcement reviews subject to disclosure 
Panel A: Average length of review (in days) 
  Ongoing review 
(N=26) 
 Concluded review 
(N=98) 
 Non-disclosure review 
(N=48) 
    
Error finding 677  566  508 
             
Panel B: Institution establishing error finding 
  Enforcement-related disclosures  
Full sample of error  
findings (N=172) 






  Obs.  Prop.  Obs.  Prop.  Obs.  Prop. 
FREP 14  53.8%  78  79.6%  130  75.6% 
BaFin 12  46.2%  20  20.4%  42  24.4% 
Total 26   100.0%   98   100.0%   172   100.0% 
This table reports findings from content analyses of error findings that were established for reviews that 
firms decided to report about while the review was on the way, or after the conclusion of the review 
(disclosure classes I and III in Figure 1). Panel A displays the average length (in days) of the respective 
reviews, and Panel B reports which institution established the error finding, the enforcement panel FREP 
(first tier), or the securities regulator BaFin (second tier).  
 
                                                 
6  Note that out of the 26 error announcements related to ongoing reviews, 16 error announcements are 
also included into the sample of 98 error announcements that relate to disclosures about concluded 
reviews (see Panel B of Table 2.2). 
Firm Disclosures about Enforcement Reviews 
 30 
Panel B of Table 2.4 breaks down disclosures about enforcement reviews that resulted in 
an error finding according to the institution which established the finding, the FREP (first 
tier) or BaFin (second tier). As noted in Section 2.2, BaFin will typically undertake a 
review if a firm did not agree with an error finding by the FREP in the first place. Hence, 
errors established by BaFin are reflective of relatively contentious reviews. It can be 
gleaned from Panel B that for the entirety of error findings, only one out of four (42 out 
of 172, or 24.4%) was established by BaFin. In contrast, almost one out of two firms (12 
out of 26, or 46.2%) that opted to report on ongoing reviews were eventually censured by 
BaFin, that is, they contested the initial findings of the FREP. 
Taken together, our exploratory findings document that enforcement-related disclosures 
indeed take place, indicating that this not a solitary phenomenon confined to only a few 
firms. At the same time, we observe that informing about ongoing reviews is a relatively 
rare disclosure strategy. However, where firms decide to divulge information about on-
going reviews, the review outcome is more often contentious. Also, we find disclosures 
about ongoing reviews to differ substantially with respect to size and disclosure location, 
when conditioning on the outcome of the review (error finding, no error finding). This 
indicates that users of financial statements may glean relevant information about potential 
outcomes of ongoing reviews from analysing pertinent disclosures. Also, this evidence is 
broadly consistent with managers using enforcement-related disclosures in a deliberate 
manner to convey information to market participants. This notion is further explored in 
the following Section 2.5. 
2.5 Additional analyses of motives for disclosures about ongoing reviews 
In this section, we shed more light on the characteristics and potential motives of firms 
that choose to adopt the disclosure strategy of revealing to the market information about 
ongoing enforcement reviews, and investigate the market recognition of those disclo-
sures. We conduct two sets of analyses: In Section 2.5.1, we conduct a determinants anal-
ysis to identify characteristics associated with disclosure decisions relating to ongoing 
enforcement reviews. In Section 2.5.2, we report and discuss findings from an event study 
analysis aiming to infer whether investors price prior enforcement-related disclosures 
upon announcements of erroneous financial statements. 
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2.5.1 Factors associated with disclosure decisions about ongoing enforcement re-
views 
2.5.1.1 Research design 
Our determinants analysis is motivated by the theoretical background in Section 2.3, as 
we attempt to investigate in the cross-section various characteristics that we expect to be 
associated with certain disclosure motives. We confine our analyses to the sample of dis-
closures about ongoing reviews because as outlined in Section 2.3, there are various po-
tential costs and benefits, and hence motives associated with these disclosures. Also, 
given the observability of enforcement-related disclosures and of firms that were eventu-
ally censured for erroneous accounting, we are able to conduct more revealing empirical 
analyses.7 
We analyse the determinants of firms’ disclosure decisions by estimating a logit regres-
sion model. Effectively, we determine whether and how certain firm and error character-
istics are associated with the likelihood for a firm to disclose information about an ongo-
ing enforcement review. Hence, this analysis compares the characteristics of type I firms 
in Figure 1 to those firms that were ultimately censured for erroneous accounting, but 
chose not to report about the review, that is, chose to “remain silent” while the review 
was under way. Panel B of Table 2.1 details how we arrive at the final sample of 163 
error announcements (firm observations), which comprises 22 disclosure firms, and 141 
non-disclosure firms. For this sample, we estimate versions of model (1): 
(1)                          𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 =  𝐵𝑖𝑔 4𝑖𝑡 +  𝐵𝑎𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡 +  𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 𝑆𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 +
𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 𝐿𝑎𝑔𝑖𝑡 + 𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠 𝑆𝑢𝑟𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑖𝑡 +
 ∑ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 +   
The dependent variable Disclosure equals one if a firm in a given year voluntarily dis-
closes information about an ongoing enforcement review, and zero otherwise. We include 
                                                 
7  The principal obstacle to empirical analyses of enforcement actions or, in this case, enforcement 
disclosures, is the very fact that, unless firms decide to divulge details on a voluntary basis, markets only 
learn that a review has been conducted if it results in an error finding. Hence, the comparable group of 
firms that were subject to an enforcement review, yet decided not to reveal this to the public, is not 
observable. 
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five test variables, Big 4, BaFin, Error Severity, Time Lag, and Earnings Surprise, and a 
vector of four control variables, Controls. 
The binary variable Big 4 indicates whether a firm was audited by a Big 4 auditor in the 
year of voluntary enforcement disclosure. As we deem Big 4 auditors to be potentially 
more aware of the potential risk accompanying an enforcement review, their clients may 
be more likely to disclose information about the ongoing enforcement review. 
The binary variable BaFin equals one if the error was established by the German securi-
ties regulator. It captures the notion that the perceived likelihood of being publicly cen-
sured for erroneous accounting potentially increases once FREP on the first tier estab-
lishes errors, but the firm chooses to contest this error finding, which results in the case 
being referred to BaFin for investigation on the second tier. Given this increased likeli-
hood of enforcement action, managers may be more inclined to divulge details about on-
going enforcement reviews to prepare the market for upcoming bad news. Also, managers 
under those circumstances may use disclosure to explain their own view and announce 
their disagreement with the steps undertaken by the enforcement institutions. 
We include the variable Error Severity, which is a compound variable including the 
amount of errors published in the respective error announcement and the errors' impact 
on return on equity and leverage in the erroneous financial statements. If a financial state-
ment contains a high amount of errors or more severe errors, managers are more likely 
aware of at least some of these errors and thus know of the higher probability of an ad-
verse outcome to the enforcement review under way. Hence, managers may be more 
likely to disclose information about the ongoing reviews if Error Severity is comparably 
high. 
Time Lag represents the number of days between the release of the erroneous financial 
statement and the error announcement. If this time span is relatively large, enforcement 
reviews might have taken longer than expected. Such delay, for instance, could result 
from a lack of cooperation by managers, indicating that these managers do not agree with 
the enforcement institutions on a specific accounting matter and therefore use ex ante 
disclosure in order to explain their own view as well as prepare the market for upcoming 
negative information. Consequently, we propose that managers may be more likely to 
disclose information about ongoing enforcement investigations that eventually result in 
error findings if Time Lag is high. 
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Our last variable of interest is Earnings Surprise, which takes the value of one for firm 
year observations where earnings exceeded prior year’s earnings, and zero otherwise. 
This variable captures positive earnings surprises and hence “good news”, in the spirit of 
Ball and Brown (1968).8 In line with Section 2.3, we conjecture that firms may seize this 
opportunity of good news to divulge to the market information of a potential error finding 
as a result of an ongoing review.  
Finally, we include four control variables in our regressions. Size equals the natural log-
arithm of total assets at the beginning of the year in question. Return on assets (ROA) is 
computed by dividing earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) by the average of total 
assets at the beginning of the year. Moreover, we incorporate Free Float in % and Lever-
age as total assets minus common equity divided by total assets at the beginning of the 
year of ex ante disclosure.  
Panel A of Table 2.5 summarises the definitions of all variables used in our determinants 
model. We collect the data for our variables from annual reports, error announcements 
and Thomson Reuters Datastream. 
  
                                                 
8  Given that the majority of firms is relatively small and not covered by analysts, we are unable to calculate 
a more sophisticated measure of Earnings Surprise, for example, analyst forecast error. 




Table 2.5: Variables measurement 
Panel A: Determinants model (Section 2.5.1) 
Variable name  Definition 
Disclosure 
 
Dummy variable indicating that a firm voluntarily discloses 
information relating to an ongoing enforcement review in the 
respective year, which eventually results in an error finding 
Big 4 
 
Dummy variable indicating that the firm was audited by a Big 4 auditor 
in the year of the ex ante disclosure 
BaFin 
 
Dummy variable indicating that the enforcement investigation was 
handed over to BaFin, who established the error finding. 
Error Severity* 
 
Compound variable including the number of errors established in the 
respective error announcement and the errors' impact on return on 
equity and leverage in the respective financial statements 
Time Lag* 
 
Number of days between the release of the erroneous financial 
statement and the error announcement 
Earnings Surprise 
 
Dummy variable indicating that a firm reported annual earnings in 
excess of prior year earnings 
Size* 
 




Return on assets (EBIT divided by average total assets) at the 
beginning of the year of ex ante disclosure 
Ownership 
 
Percentage of free float at the beginning of the year of ex ante 
disclosure 
Leverage*   Total assets minus common equity divided by total assets at the 
beginning of the year of ex ante disclosure 
Panel B: Market tests (Section 2.5.2) 
Variable name  Definition 
CAR 
 
Ranked cumulative abnormal returns (Corrado, 1989) in the 
[-2;2] event window around the error announcement 
Legal 
 




Compound variable including governance quality, earnings 
management and the incentives of management to inflate earnings 
Resources* 
 
Compound variable including firm growth, number of years the firm 
has been listed and firm complexity 
Change 
 
Dummy variable indicating whether a firm changed its auditor and/or 
restructured its top management between the balance sheet date of the 
erroneous financial statement and the error announcement 
This table summarises the variables used in the determinants analyses (Table 2.7) in Panel A, and the 
additional variables used in the market tests (Table 2.8) in Panel B.  
*Error Severity, Time Lag, Size, ROA, Leverage, Opportunism and Resources are winsorised at the 1% 
and 99% levels to reduce the impact of outliers. 
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2.5.1.2 Empirical findings 
Table 2.6 reports descriptive statistics (Panel A) and correlations for our variables (Panel 
B). Panel A shows that, on average, firms that choose to provide ex ante disclosures on 
ongoing enforcement investigations are more often investigated by BaFin (1% signifi-
cance level) and that Time Lag is higher (5% significance level) for these firms. Not sur-
prisingly, Panel B reveals a high positive correlation between Size and Big 4 (0.483) and 
a high positive correlation between BaFin and Time Lag (0.500).
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Table 2.6: Descriptives (determinants model) 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
  Disclosure sample  Non-disclosure sample  Difference  t-value  
Variable  mean  N  mean  N    
Big 4 
 
























































































Panel B: Correlations 
Variable    (1) 
 (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
Disclosure  (1)  1 
 
















   
















   
















   
















   
















   
















   
















   
















1   
Leverage   (10)   0.121   0.076   −0.023   0.021   0.140   0.008   0.154   −0.182   0.022   1 
This table displays the descriptives for the variables used in the determinants model in Table 2.7. Definitions of variables are reported in Table 2.5. In Panel B, bold letters indicate significance at the 10% level. The disclosure 
sample comprises all firms that voluntarily disclosed on an ongoing enforcement review that eventually resulted in an error announcement (n = 26 in Table 2.2). Due to missing data we lose four observations and, thus, 
arrive at a sample size of 22. The non-disclosure sample comprises all firms that did not voluntarily disclose on an ongoing enforcement review that eventually led to an error announcement (n = 172−26 = 146 in Table 2.4). 
Due to missing data we lose five observations, arriving at a sample of 141 non-disclosure firms. 
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The results of estimating our regression model (1) are presented in Table 2.7. We estimate 
one separate model for each of the five variables of interest plus controls and a full model 
(column 6) including all variables. In untabulated analyses, we re-estimate the model in-
cluding year and industry fixed effects to control for unobserved heterogeneity over time 
and industries, which yields very similar results. 
Results in Table 2.7 indicate that managers are more likely to disclose information about 
ongoing enforcement reviews if these investigations are carried out by BaFin. In model 
(2) as well as in the full model specification (6), the coefficient for the BaFin variable 
turns out significant on the 1% and 5% level, respectively. This suggests that managers 
are more likely to notify markets of ongoing enforcement reviews in their annual reports 
if the FREP forwards the investigation to BaFin. We propose two non-exclusive explana-
tions for this finding. First, managers will probably expect the likelihood of an error an-
nouncement to increase once BaFin takes over the investigation because the FREP al-
ready established an error. In this case, managers may use the voluntary disclosure as a 
means of preparing the stock market for imminent negative information. Second, and 
somewhat related, managers may decide to disclose information on the ongoing review 
in order to state their own view on the matter at hand, that is, to openly disagree with error 
findings established by the FREP. For example, in its 2006 annual report, Intertainment 
AG states that “the FREP informed us that the indemnification claims from litigation are 
overstated in the 2005 financial statements. The management does not agree with nor 
accept this finding as the FREP’s outlined reasons do not necessarily require a write-
down from the management’s point of view”.  
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The coefficient on Time Lag is positive and, in model (4), statistically significant at the 
5% level. This finding may reflect disagreement on specific accounting issues between 
the respective management and the FREP, or BaFin, indicating a highly contested review 
process. Similar to our interpretation of the role of BaFin reviews, even a contentious 
review procedure on the FREP level will alter management’s perception of error likeli-
hood, and hence create disclosure incentives. 
Our other three variables proxying for a Big 4 auditor, error severity, and earnings sur-
prise do not load in a meaningful way. This evidence speaks against Big 4 auditing firms 
specifically shaping or endorsing enforcement-related disclosures with their clients. Also, 
Table 2.7: Ex ante disclosure determinants 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Big 4 0.1849     0.1473 
 (0.33)     (0.22) 
BaFin  1.4732***    1.2203** 
  (2.84)    (2.14) 
Error Severity   −0.5547   −0.6131 
   (−0.87)   (−1.14) 
Time Lag    0.0024**  0.0014 
    (2.39)  (1.43) 
Earnings 
Surprise 
    −0.3479 −0.5881 
    (−0.70) (−1.06) 
Size 0.014 −0.0277 0.0089 −0.0247 0.0352 −0.105 
 (0.10) (−0.20) (0.07) (−0.15) (0.28) (−0.58) 
ROA −2.1556 −2.0469 −2.5579 −1.9305 −2.3576 −2.3621 
 (−1.35) (−1.17) (−1.60) (−1.03) (−1.49) (−1.19) 
Free Float −0.142 −0.2646 −0.1342 −0.184 −0.1055 −0.3016 
 (−0.18) (−0.33) (−0.17) (−0.23) (−0.13) (−0.37) 
Leverage −0.1394 −0.0504 −0.1973 −0.4552 −0.1812 −0.2473 
 (−0.13) (−0.05) (−0.19) (−0.40) (−0.17) (−0.24) 
Constant −1.9804 −1.8201 −1.8444 −2.6397 −1.9574 −1.3336 
 (−1.20) (−1.11) (−1.13) (−1.51) (−1.28) (−0.71) 
Pseudo R2 0.0187 0.0814 0.0272 0.0645 0.0221 0.1129 
N 163 163 163 163 163 163 
Clustered  
standard errors 
Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm 
This table displays coefficient estimates and t-statistics from estimating logit model (1) (Section 2.5.1). 
The regression model is based on all firms that were censured by the German enforcement mechanism 
between 2006 and 2016 (n = 172 in Table 2.1). Due to missing data we lose nine observations and arrive 
at a sample size of n = 163. The dependent variable is a binary variable indicating disclosure about an 
ongoing enforcement review in the annual report. Definitions of variables are reported in Table 2.5. t-
values are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. Standard errors are clustered by firm.  
Firm Disclosures about Enforcement Reviews 
 39 
the nature and, in particular, the severity of looming error findings appears not to be a 
driver of the decision to report about an ongoing review. Lastly, we find no evidence 
supporting the notion of managers strategically reporting about potentially bad news (an 
ongoing enforcement review) upon revelation of good news (a positive earnings surprise). 
2.5.2 Market reactions to error announcements 
2.5.2.1 Research design 
Our final analysis further explores one particular motive for disclosures about ongoing 
reviews: attempting to mitigate the market impact of a potential error finding by inten-
tionally disclosing information on an ongoing review. We conduct an event study and 
cross-sectional analyses of market reactions to the disclosure of error findings. Prior lit-
erature demonstrates that markets react negatively on average, consistent with error find-
ings conveying new, negative information. We build on that literature and explore market 
reactions for two sub-samples of error firms, those that did and those that did not provide 
ex ante disclosures. Effectively, we test whether prior disclosures about ongoing enforce-
ment reviews are factored into market expectations and hence effectively confound dis-
closures of error findings.  
Panel C of Table 2.1 details how we arrive at the sample of 139 error announcements for 
our univariate tests, and the sample of 105 announcements for the determinants model. 
We estimate short-window market reactions around the error announcement date follow-
ing the methodology suggested by Hitz et al. (2012) based on MacKinlay (1997), Bamber 
(1987) and Dechow et al. (1996). We confine our analyses to one return-based measure 
of market reactions, cumulative abnormal returns (CARs), which we calculate for three 
different event windows around the date of the publication of error findings: one day 
window [0], three days window [−1;1] and five days window [−2;2]. In addition to con-
ventional t-statistics, we compute event-study-specific t-statistics introduced by Brown 
and Warner (1985) and Corrado (1989). These tests also take into account information 
from the estimation window and thus deliver a more informative assessment of the market 
reactions’ significance. 
2.5.2.2 Empirical findings 
Panel A of Table 2.8 reports market reactions for the whole sample of error announce-
ments. Mean CARs are negative for all three event windows, with significance levels 
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varying depending on the test statistic. All in all, these findings are consistent with nega-
tive average market reactions to the publication of error announcements, as documented 
by Hitz et al. (2012).  
Table 2.8: Short-window market reactions 
Panel A: Full sample of error announcements 
      
  
Cumulative abnormal returns 
(in %) 
  Event window  [0] [−1;1] [−2;2] 
  Mean  −0.292 −0.709 −0.831 
  (t-statistic)  (−0.87) (−1.37)* (−1.45)* 
  N  139 125 118 
  Statistic following Brown and Warner (1985)  (−1.57)* (−2.37)*** (−1.37)* 
  Statistic following Corrado (1989)  (−1.21) (−2.34)** (−1.71)** 
Panel B: Sub-samples of error announcements with and without ex-ante disclosure 
        
Cumulative abnormal returns  
(in %) 
Disclosure 
Event window  [0] [−1;1] [−2;2] 
N  21 20 19 
Mean  −0.245 −1.131 1.494 
(t-statistic)  (−0.33) (−1.62)* (0.82) 
Statistic following Brown and Warner (1985)  (−0.54) (−0.92) (0.43) 
Statistic following Corrado (1989)  (−0.60) (−1.11) (0.16) 
No disclosure 
N  118 105 99 
Mean  −0.300 −0.629 −1.277 
(t-statistic)  (−0.81) (−1.04) (−2.20)** 
Statistic following Brown and Warner (1985)  (−1.47)* (−2.18)** (−1.68)** 
Statistic following Corrado (1989)  (−1.10) (−2.15)** (−1.94)** 
Mean difference  −0.055 0.502 −2.771 
(t-statistic)  (−0.06) (0.62) (−4.05)*** 
Panel C: Determinants of short-term market reactions to error announcements 
Variable   (1)   (2) 
Disclosure  0.444   2.184 
    (0.09)   (0.44) 
Variables of interest (Hitz et al., 2012)  Yes   Yes 
Controls  Yes     No 
R2  0.026   0.027 
N  105     105 
This table displays market reactions pertaining to error announcements (n = 139 in Table 2.1) for three 
short-term event windows. Sample sizes differ in these three event windows due to elimination of 
confounding events. Panel A reports market reactions for the entire sample of relevant error 
announcements, and Panel B reports market reactions separately for both sub-samples with and without 
ex-ante disclosure. Markets reactions are measured using cumulative abnormal returns. *, ** and *** 
indicate one-tailed significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. Panel C displays coefficient 
estimates and t-statistics from estimating the determinants model described in Section 2.5.2. Appendix B 
displays descriptive statistics and correlations of the variables used in these market based tests. 
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In Panel B of Table 2.8, we split the initial sample into two sub-samples: firms that 
adopted disclosures about ongoing enforcement investigations, and those that chose to 
“remain silent”. We do this to test whether prior disclosures about ongoing reviews are 
factored into market prices. If this is the case, investors price the market value implica-
tions of the expected error finding, multiplied with the positive likelihood of such an error 
finding which the disclosure communicates. Findings in Panel B of Table 2.8 indicate 
that the average market reaction turns out significantly negative for the sample of non-
disclosure firms only. This result is in line with the expectation that investors price dis-
closures about ongoing reviews, and that these disclosures mitigate the market impact of 
an eventual error announcement. 
In our final analysis, we employ a multivariate test to shed further light on the potential 
mitigating role of disclosures about ongoing reviews on the market reaction to the even-
tual publication of an error finding. To that end, we estimate a determinants model for 
market reactions to error announcements. This determinants model estimates the associ-
ation of several firm variables with ranked cumulative abnormal returns (following Cor-
rado, 1989) in the [−2;2] event window around error announcements. We include into the 
model as independent variables all the variables used by Hitz et al. (2012)9, which are 
defined in Panels A and B of Table 2.6. As our main variable of interest, we include as 
an additional explanatory variable Disclosure, which is a dummy variable indicating that 
a firm voluntarily disclosed information about the ongoing enforcement review that even-
tually resulted in an error finding. To support the notion of smaller market reactions due 
to confounding disclosures, we expect Disclosure to have a positive and significant effect 
on ranked cumulative abnormal returns. 
Panel C of Table 2.8 reports coefficient estimates for Disclosure. For both specifications 
of our determinants model, with and without control variables, we find a positive coeffi-
cient. However, these results are not significant at conventional levels. Taken together, 
our findings on market reactions provide weak evidence at best that disclosures on ongo-
ing enforcement reviews result in comparatively weaker market reactions compared to 
firms that embraced their “right to remain silent”. There are at least two explanations why 
these disclosures appear not to mitigate the market impact of error announcements in a 
                                                 
9  We include the main test variables used by Hitz et al. (2012): Error Severity, Legal and BaFin. Moreover, 
we include the same control variables as in Hitz et al. (2012): Opportunism, Resources, Change, Time 
Lag, Size, Leverage, Liquidity and Ownership. 
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meaningful way. For one thing, market participants may not regard this information as 
useful. If enforcement-related disclosures are not priced, then they present no effective 
means of influencing market valuation.  
Our second explanation relates to the non-disclosure firms and proposes that these firms 
did, in fact, disclose information on ongoing reviews too, or that such information was 
leaked via other channels. To test that explanation, we conducted an analysis of press 
coverage for all error announcements. We did so employing a keyword search (“FREP”, 
“review panel”), using the LexisNexis Database and the electronic archive of one major 
financial newspaper in Germany, the Handelsblatt. We find press coverage of an enforce-
ment review under way for only one out of the 26 disclosure firms. In comparison, out of 
the 146 non-disclosure firms, eight received press coverage about the review under way. 
While these findings are anecdotal at best, they suggest that information about ongoing 
reviews, at least in some cases, is leaked or intentionally communicated via means other 
than the annual report. This finding provides an additional explanation for the weak re-
sults of our market tests. More importantly, it hints at other disclosure channels for en-
forcement-related information which future research may investigate. 
2.6 Conclusion 
This paper presents exploratory evidence for a disclosure phenomenon that so far has not 
received attention in the literature: firm disclosures about enforcement reviews. We ex-
ploit the German institutional environment, where enforcement institutions are not only 
quite active but also relatively transparent, and where firms are mandated to systemati-
cally report errors established by enforcers to effect “adverse disclosure”.  
Our analyses reveal that enforcement-related disclosures take place on a rather regular 
basis, at least for concluded reviews, while disclosures about ongoing reviews only occur 
in one out of 13 cases on average. Detailed analyses of those firms that choose not to be 
silent and reveal to the market information on an ongoing enforcement review suggest 
that managers may deliberately adopt such a disclosure strategy and, in a related vein, 
that the format of the disclosure and its location in the annual report potentially convey 
information on the likely outcome of the review. Consistent with this, we find weak mar-
ket based evidence to support the notion that executives deliberately use disclosures on 
ongoing reviews to prepare markets for an adverse outcome.  
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Our analyses are subject to several limitations. First, for the most part, our analyses are 
exploratory in nature and do not shed light on any causal relations, for example, between 
(unobservable) managerial disclosure incentives and observable disclosure choices. Also, 
our findings are based on relatively small samples and thus do not lend themselves to 
general insights. That said, our results shed light on an interesting disclosure phenomenon 
and its variation on the firm-level. Given the nature of our findings, we are confident that 
future research into the area of enforcement disclosure promises interesting insights not 
only to researchers but to regulators and practitioners alike. One obvious path to take here 
is to shed further light on the motives and potential effects of disclosures about concluded 
enforcement reviews, in particular for firms which unveil that enforcement institutions 
established the high quality of financial statements. Another path is to further investigate 
how firms use channels other than the annual report to communicate enforcement-related 
information to the market, and the role of information intermediaries in this dissemination 
process.  
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2.7 Appendix 
Appendix A: Examples for different disclosure sub-samples from the annual reports (Eng-
lish translation by the authors) 
(1) Ongoing review with no error finding: Maschinenfabrik Berthold Hermle AG, 2008 
In addition, audit fees of 20 k Euro (prior year: 0 k Euro) accrued due to a review of the 
2007 consolidated financial statements by the Financial Reporting Enforcement Panel. 
(p. 60) 
 
(2) Ongoing review with error finding: FRoSTA AG, 2008 
The FREP (Financial Reporting Enforcement Panel) began conducting an indication-
based investigation of our financial statements, because we did not provide a segment 
report. 
As in prior years, the omission of the segment report resulted in a qualified audit opinion. 
We choose not to prepare a segment report as this would negatively affect our competitive 
position. An indication-based investigation has been initiated by the Financial Reporting 
Enforcement Panel because of the omitted segment report. This ongoing investigation has 
been subject to supervisory board discussions. (p. 29) 
 
(3) Concluded review with no error finding: Wilex AG, 2010 
Moreover, the audit committee oversaw the investigation of our 2009 financial statements 
by the Financial Reporting Enforcement Panel, which did not result in an error finding. 
(p. 18) 
 
(4) Concluded review with error finding: PARK & Bellheimer AG, 2010 
The Financial Reporting Enforcement Panel established that the consolidated 
management report of PARK & Bellheimer AG’s financial year 2009 was erroneous as 
the expected development of the group respectively the firm, including its material 
opportunities and risks, was not comprehensively forecasted for the following two years. 
The management report, in particular, did not include any remarks on the strained 
liquidity and profit situation of the group nor on the planned restructuring. (p. 41) 
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Last year’s financial statement was corrected because of FREP’s error finding. Originally, 
the debt waiver of a former affiliate had been recognised as a profit. Now, this transaction 
is directly recognised in equity due to the former affiliation of the firms. Thus, the prior 
year financial statement was restated with respect to several line items such as other 
operating income and bottom-line profit. (p. 31) 
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Appendix B: Descriptives of the market reaction determinants model 
Table 2.9: Descriptives of market reaction determinants 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean 
Standard 
deviation Median Min. Max. N 
Disclosure 0.162 0.370 0 0.000 1.000 105 
Components of Error Severity 
 
     
   Error Amount 3.771 3.696 2 1 22 105 
   Impact ROE −0.081 0.208 0.000 −0.880 0.030 105 
   Impact Leverage 0.020 0.058 0.000 −0.010 0.260 105 
Legal 0.286 0.454 0 0 1 105 
BaFin 0.210 0.409 0 0 1 105 
Components of Opportunism 
   Violations 0.590 0.494 1 0 1 105 
   Remuneration 0.228 0.218 0.200 0.000 0.810 105 
   Discretionary Accruals −0.003 0.175 0.003 −0.562 0.671 105 
Components of Resources 
 
     
   Firm Growth 0.228 0.608 0.060 −0.380 3.090 105 
   Years Listed 14.381 8.443 13 1 42 105 
   Complexity −0.102 1.770 −0.069 −3.584 4.961 105 
Change 0.619 0.488 1 0 1 105 
Time Lag 516.067 209.810 468 222 1057 105 
Size 12.283 2.445 12.110 8.410 16.600 105 
Leverage 0.661 0.286 0.640 0.180 1.410 105 
Liquidity 0.820 0.208 0.900 0.162 1.000 105 
Ownership 0.540 0.314 0.530 0.000 1.000 105 
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Table 2.9 cont'd:      Descriptives of market reaction determinants 
Panel B: Correlations               
Variable 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Disclosure (1) 1            
Error Severity (2) −0.1196 1           
Legal (3) −0.1063 0.1500 1          
BaFin (4) 0.2184 −0.0756 0.0370 1         
Opportunism (5) 0.0229 −0.0856 −0.1977 0.2283 1        
Resources (6) −0.0412 −0.1257 0.1088 −0.1521 0.0205 1       
Change (7) 0.1318 0.0316 −0.0248 0.1629 0.1206 0.1334 1      
Time Lag (8) 0.2574 −0.0532 −0.1323 0.5248 0.1413 −0.1326 0.2649 1    
 
Size (9) 0.0190 −0.3593 −0.2932 0.1945 0.5400 0.0455 0.2105 0.2182 1    
Leverage (10) 0.1189 0.2037 0.0507 −0.0907 −0.1378 0.1703 0.1483 0.0931 −0.0590 1   
Liquidity (11) 0.0687 −0.2110 −0.2317 −0.0683 0.3406 −0.1196 0.0360 −0.0581 0.4551 −0.2305 1  
Ownership (12) 0.0476 −0.1147 0.0109 0.0310 0.2120 0.0240 −0.1438 −0.0641 0.0779 −0.0742 0.2237 1 
This table displays descriptive statistics for the variables used in the determinants model in Table 2.8, Panel C. Definitions of variables are reported in Table 2.5. In Panel B, bold 
letters indicate significance at the 10% level. 
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3 Auditor Conservatism in the Presence of Financial Reporting Enforcement 
Henning Schnack and Andreas Hellmann 10,11 
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Abstract: This paper provides evidence on the influence of potential enforcement re-
views of the client’s financial statements by financial reporting enforcement institutions 
on auditors’ decision making. Specifically, we examine whether the likelihood of an en-
forcement review would influence auditors’ decisions to require more conservative ac-
counting choices from their clients. Moreover, we test if past experiences with such en-
forcement reviews lead auditors to be more conservative. Lastly, we examine whether 
higher-rank auditors, due to their higher responsibility and liability, are more likely to be 
influenced than lower-rank auditors. The results of an experiment with 72 auditors indi-
cate that the higher likelihood of an enforcement review is not associated with more con-
servative decision making by auditors. However, auditors who were affected by enforce-
ment reviews in the past tend to make more conservative accounting choices. Our findings 
do not suggest that higher-rank auditors employ higher levels of conservatism as com-
pared to lower-rank auditors. 
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3.1 Introduction 
This study examines the impact reviews of the client’s financial statements by enforce-
ment bodies have on the decision making of auditors, more specifically on their conserv-
atism. Enforcement bodies are governmental or private agencies that have the authority 
to review audited financial statements of listed corporations. Enforcement, in general, 
describes the supervision of listed firms by such agencies with the objective of ensuring 
that accounting standards are complied with. 
Enforcement is largely a national matter and in some countries enforcement has a long 
tradition. In the United States (U.S.), for example, the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion (SEC) has been carrying out enforcement of accounting rules since 1937 (Feroz et 
al., 1991). In many member states of the European Union, on the other hand, enforcement 
is a relatively new phenomenon. The implementation of enforcement mechanisms in the 
EU was mandated in 2005 concurrently with the adoption of International Financial Re-
porting Standards (IFRS). While the United Kingdom (U.K.) and some other EU member 
states already had enforcement institutions set up, Germany and other countries did not 
have enforcement institutions prior to 2005 (H. B. Christensen et al., 2013). 
However, enforcement bodies vary across countries in terms of structure, procedures and 
competencies. For example, enforcement is carried out by a stock exchange regulator in 
the United States, Australia, China and Japan and by a private-sector review panel in the 
United Kingdom. The SEC conducts reactive investigations, proactive surveillance, and 
issues advance clearance, whereas the Financial Reporting Review Panel in the United 
Kingdom does not have the authority to provide advance clearance. 
Despite differences in structure, procedures and competencies, enforcement bodies serve 
two main functions. Firstly, the preventive function is deemed to prevent financial state-
ment preparers from engaging in incorrect, or even fraudulent, accounting behaviour in 
the first place. Secondly, the sanctioning function punishes firms for errors made in their 
financial statements. For this purpose, enforcement bodies can utilise at least two sanction 
mechanisms: monetary penalties and the publication of error findings. As error announce-
ments constitute adverse publicity for the respective firm, they are a means of the “name 
and shame” mechanism which is a prominent tool of enforcement’s sanctioning function 
(Hitz et al., 2012). 
The extant enforcement literature focuses largely on the sanctioning function and, specif-
ically, on the capital market effects of enforcement’s sanctioning actions (e.g., Ebner et 
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al., 2015; Hitz et al., 2012) and of the presence of enforcement institutions (Barth and 
Israeli, 2013; H. B. Christensen et al., 2013; Ernstberger et al., 2012). Hitz et al. (2012), 
for instance, find that the publication of error announcements as a direct result of enforce-
ment reviews leads to negative market reactions. H. B. Christensen et al. (2013) show 
that the introduction of IFRS for listed firms in the EU coincided with significant positive 
capital market effects (increases in liquidity), particularly in those EU member states that 
had concurrently implemented the mandate to install enforcement institutions. Moreover, 
prior research shows that error announcements established by enforcers lead to enhanced 
turnover of members of the board of directors (Johnstone et al., 2011); audit committee 
members (Carver, 2014; Srinivasan, 2005); top management (Arthaud-Day et al., 2006; 
Collins et al., 2009; Desai et al., 2006; Land, 2010; Wang and Chou, 2011); and audit 
teams (Brocard et al., 2018). However, uncertainty persists as to what fully drives capital 
market effects that are associated with the presence of enforcement. It is important to 
understand the influence of enforcement institutions on the behaviour of individuals, such 
as financial statement preparers and auditors, as this might help regulators in evaluating 
the outcome of their efforts.  
While most studies focus largely on the sanctioning function, research on the preventive 
function is scarce. For this reason, we examine the direct effects of the presence of an 
enforcement body, that is, the likelihood of an enforcement review of the client’s financial 
statements, on the decision making of auditors. We focus our analyses on auditors as they 
potentially have the power to make their clients change financial reporting choices before 
financial statements are released. Thus, auditors may play a crucial role in supporting and 
underpinning the preventive function of enforcement mechanisms. As enforcement’s 
“name and shame” mechanism holds reputational risks for auditors, it is very likely that 
auditors are very much aware of its presence and take its potential harm into consideration 
when conducting an audit. Thus, the presence of an enforcement mechanism may exert 
increased pressure on auditors, possibly, in turn, leading them to be more conservative 
with clients and allowing less aggressive accounting practices. 
In this context, we define conservatism as “the inclusion of a degree of caution in the 
exercise of the judgements needed in making the estimates required under conditions of 
uncertainty” (Mora and Walker, 2015). This conservative behaviour may eventually lead 
to less erroneous financial statements and, thus, a positive outcome of the preventive 
function. This is important as these direct effects on auditors’ decision making may fur-
ther support the efficacy of enforcement mechanisms. Thus, the potential of an overall 
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improvement in audit and accounting quality in the presence of an enforcement mecha-
nism, in fact, may originate from more rigorous decision making by the auditor. This 
would be a significant achievement of enforcement’s preventive function, with auditors 
directly influencing their clients’ financial statements if they feel that their accounting 
choices are too aggressive (Hackenbrack and Nelson, 1996). It is important to investigate 
this matter as the impact of enforcement on individual behaviour might help in under-
standing and explaining already established capital market effects. 
The aim of this paper is to examine enforcement’s preventive function via the influence 
enforcement reviews of client’s financial statements may have on auditors’ conservatism. 
Specifically, we examine whether the likelihood of an enforcement review of the client’s 
financial statements may influence auditors to require more conservative accounting 
choices from their clients. Moreover, we test whether auditors who were affected by en-
forcement reviews in the past tend to make more conservative accounting choices. In 
addition, we examine whether the efficacy of the preventive function may be influenced 
by the hierarchical level of auditors. Specifically, we examine whether higher-rank audi-
tors, due to their higher reputation, responsibility and liability, are more likely to be in-
fluenced in their decision making by the likelihood of enforcement reviews of the client’s 
financial statements than lower-rank auditors. This is important as higher-rank auditors 
are the ones making more significant decisions and reviewing lower-rank auditors’ work 
(Nelson and Tan, 2005). 
To test our hypotheses, we carry out an experiment with 72 auditors. The experiment 
employs a between-subjects design where the participants have to choose between a con-
servative or an aggressive accounting choice after reading an audit case. The case material 
describes a client in the pharmaceutical industry who faces a lawsuit with an uncertain 
verdict. All information is kept equal across the two groups of participants except for the 
likelihood that the client’s financial statements will be subjected to an enforcement re-
view. This represents our manipulated independent variable and is described as being 
either high or low depending on which group the participants are randomly assigned to. 
After reading the audit case, the participants are asked to state whether they would require 
the client to recognise a provision for litigation costs or to disclose a contingent liability 
in the notes. Recognition of the provision represents the more conservative choice in this 
scenario and disclosure of a contingent liability is the more aggressive accounting choice. 
The collected data is analysed with logit regression models. 
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Our results suggest that the likelihood of an enforcement review alone does not have a 
significant effect on auditors’ behaviour. Auditors do not require more conservative ac-
counting choices from their clients when the likelihood of being subject to an enforcement 
review is high. Moreover, we cannot find significant evidence suggesting that higher-rank 
auditors would employ more conservative decision making than lower-rank auditors. 
However, auditors who were affected by enforcement reviews in the past do employ more 
conservative decision making. Hence, in order to strengthen enforcement’s preventive 
function, it may be necessary to increase the frequency of such reviews.  
Our study contributes to prior literature in two ways. Firstly, we contribute to the broad 
literature stream on enforcement of accounting standards (e.g., Brocard et al., 2018; H. 
B. Christensen et al., 2013; Hitz et al., 2012). Most prior studies implement empirical 
research designs and many regard post-error announcement effects on either real man-
agement decisions or capital market reactions. These studies focus on the sanctioning 
function of enforcement mechanisms. However, prior literature on whether enforcement 
directly influences accounting choices made by managers or auditors is scarce. In order 
to examine the efficacy of enforcement’s preventive function, we provide a pre-error an-
nouncement perspective that experimentally investigates the impact of enforcement re-
views on auditors’ decision making. Secondly, we contribute to the conservatism litera-
ture and, more specifically, to the stream of conservatism literature that deems regulation 
to be a driving force of conservatism (Watts, 2003a) as enforcement represents an out-
come or an integral part of regulation. Watts (2003b) expressed a need for more research 
in regulation-driven conservatism. We aim to answer this call by providing an experi-
mental approach that explores the impact of regulation on the behaviour of auditors as 
opposed to other conservatism research that investigates archival time-series or cross-
sectional data and conservatism measures such as the asymmetric timeliness measure 
(Basu, 1997).13  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 3.2 provides a review of prior 
literature on auditors’ decision making and develops our hypotheses. Section 3.3 outlines 
the research design. In Section 3.4, we present and discuss our experimental findings. 
Section 3.5 concludes the paper. 
                                                 
13  Basu (1997) interprets conservatism “as resulting in earnings reflecting ‘bad news’ more quickly than 
‘good news’”. Thus, he constructs a regression equation that estimates how strongly earnings reflect 
good news and bad news, respectively, measured by stock returns. The higher the reflection of bad news 
in earnings, the more conservative the underlying accounting. 
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3.2 Literature review and hypotheses development 
3.2.1 Influence of enforcement reviews of clients’ financial statements on auditor 
conservatism 
Our aim is to examine enforcement’s preventive function via the influence enforcement 
reviews of client’s financial statements may have on auditors’ conservatism. This is im-
portant as conservative auditor behaviour has a direct impact on the reporting choices in 
the financial statements under audit (Hackenbrack and Nelson, 1996). Thus, we expect it 
to be a determining factor of accounting quality on which enforcement may have an ef-
fect. Accordingly, auditor conservatism is an important construct to examine in evaluat-
ing the efficacy of enforcement’s preventive function. 
An important factor that may influence auditors’ conservatism is accountability, in the 
sense of being responsible for the outcome of the audit and potentially having to explain 
decisions to clients, colleagues, superiors or oversight bodies such as enforcement agen-
cies. This accountability is inherent in auditing through the hierarchical review process 
(Messier Jr et al., 1992). As auditors are subject to codes of conduct and ethics, they are 
well aware of the presence of accountability in their daily work environment (Emby and 
Gibbins, 1987; Gibbins and Emby, 1984; Peecher et al., 2013). Hence, accountability may 
inflict pressure on individuals as the consequences of not following codes of conduct or 
ethics may include disciplinary proceedings such as expulsion (Preston et al., 1995; Ve-
layutham, 2003). Experimental evidence shows that, when accountable for their deci-
sions, auditors are less likely to give unqualified audit opinions (Lord, 1992) and will 
process information more thoroughly and carefully before coming to a decision (Johnson 
and Kaplan, 1991). This shows that accountability may have an impact on auditors’ de-
cisions to require financial statement adjustments from clients. In addition, prior research 
shows that such adjustment decisions can be affected by other variables such as misstate-
ment size, size of the client, subjectivity, impact on current-year income and precision 
(Nelson et al., 2005; A. Wright and S. Wright, 1997). 
However, auditors take several risks into account when deciding about the necessity of 
financial statement adjustments, namely, the risk of client loss, reputation risk (Rich et 
al., 1997; Skinner and Srinivasan, 2012) and litigation risk (Kida, 1980; Krishnan and 
Krishnan, 1997). Managers’ accounting choices are not random, and it is likely that cer-
tain accounting choices have a specific purpose for the firm or the manager, such as man-
aging earnings upwards to meet earnings targets or to increase one’s own performance-
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related remuneration (Healy and Wahlen, 1999). Therefore, clients will not be content 
with auditors suggesting a multitude of adjustments and might consider hiring a different 
auditor in the future (Hatfield et al., 2011; A. Wright and S. Wright, 1997). Thus, the 
apparent client pressure on auditors could potentially encourage them to refrain from re-
quiring financial statement adjustments. Prior literature on auditor independence, in fact, 
shows that auditors in high client pressure situations are more likely to insist only on 
small adjustments in clients’ financial statements as opposed to auditors in low client 
pressure situations who are shown to insist on a higher level of adjustments (Hatfield et 
al., 2011). Moreover, Nelson and Kinney Jr (1997) show in an experimental study that 
the risk of client loss appears to make auditors deal with ambiguous loss probabilities less 
conservatively. Their findings suggest that auditors are more likely than clients to avoid 
references to contingent losses in order not to harm their relationship in case these refer-
ences are shown to have been unnecessary in hindsight.14 Clients might also try to influ-
ence auditors’ judgments through ingratiation and, as suggested in prior research, may be 
successful in doing so (Robertson, 2010). 
However, closely related to the risk of client loss is the reputational risk to which auditors 
are exposed, as clients will be interested in hiring an auditor with a reputation for con-
ducting high-quality audits. For instance, if an audit firm was involved in auditing a firm’s 
financial statements which eventually were censured by an enforcement institution, this 
would have a negative impact on the audit firm’s reputation and potentially drive other 
clients to end their relationship with that audit firm. Studies by Weber et al. (2008), Cahan 
et al. (2009) and Kläs and Werner (2014) suggest that such spill-over effects exist with 
regard to auditor reputation. In fact, managers state that reputation is one of the main 
factors they take into consideration when deciding which auditor to hire; especially, firms 
that stand out due to significant visibility on capital markets, that is, firms with high ana-
lyst following, press coverage and institutional ownership, value auditors with prime rep-
utations (Barton, 2005). Therefore, auditor reputation should not only be of concern for 
clients but also for the auditors themselves, possibly leading them to produce high-quality 
audits and therefore potentially outweighing the risk of client loss. 
                                                 
14  Nelson and Kinney Jr (1997) did not look at contingent losses from the perspective of being a less 
conservative decision option among others. Their research design required participants to choose 
whether or not to disclose contingent losses. 
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Momentous declines in reputation can result from litigation. A significant stream of liter-
ature explores the effects of litigation or fraud risk (Brazel et al., 2014) on auditor deci-
sions. Results indicate that auditors will engage in more conservative behaviour if they 
expect litigation or client risk to be high. In prior studies, this conservatism was repre-
sented either by the decision to choose the more conservative of two accounting choices 
in a setting where client risk was high (Hackenbrack and Nelson, 1996) or by decreases 
in abnormal accruals when litigation risk was deemed to be high (Cahan and Zhang, 
2006). The probability of requiring clients to carry out financial statement adjustments is 
even more pronounced when litigation risk is high while, at the same time, the risk of 
client loss is low (Farmer et al., 1987), supporting the idea of the extent of the deep con-
nection between the different risk components. Similarly, in settings with only small liti-
gation risk, auditors might still prefer conservative accounting choices to avoid harming 
their reputation. Research shows that, in the Japanese setting with basically no litigation 
risk for the auditor, a client’s accounting fraud still holds great reputational damage for 
the auditor (Skinner and Srinivasan, 2012). Furthermore, reputation loss can result from 
government inspections at an auditor’s client which, in turn, can also provoke economic 
losses (Firth, 1990).  
Auditors influence their clients by applying more conservative accounting choices in 
cases of high client litigation risk, especially if the client’s financial performance is poor 
(Chung et al., 2003). Importantly, auditors are more conservative after audit failure has 
occurred (Fafatas, 2010; Sun et al., 2016) and while they are under investigation by a 
supervisory enforcement agency for potential audit failure at a different client (Bannister 
and Wiest, 2001). This represents a post-effect or a simultaneous effect of enforcement 
investigations. Moreover, DeFond et al. (2018) find that Big 4 offices tend to issue more 
going-concern reports to clients in distress if they are located in close proximity to SEC 
regional offices. DeFond et al. (2018) indicate that this close proximity makes the audit 
offices more aware of SEC enforcement, which may induce a conservative bias. 
As outlined above, there are many risk factors (i.e., risk of client loss, reputation risk and 
litigation risk) that may influence auditors’ decision making and potentially put signifi-
cant pressure on them. Hence, these factors may lead auditors to employ conservative 
decision making. Importantly, prior literature shows that these risk factors are connected 
to enforcement actions. Brocard et al. (2018) find that firms that were censured by an 
enforcement agency have an increased probability of changing auditors, indicating that 
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enforcement influences the risk of client loss. Moreover, prior studies show that enforce-
ment actions may result in reputation loss (Rollins and Bremser, 1997) and increased 
litigation risk (Bonner et al., 1998). Consequently, the likelihood of a client’s financial 
statements being reviewed by an enforcement agency may affect an auditor’s perception 
of his or her exposure to the described risk factors. Therefore, we expect that enforcement 
reviews of client’s financial statements influence auditors’ conservatism and formulate 
the following hypothesis. 
H1:  Auditors are more likely to require conservative accounting choices from their 
clients when the probability of an enforcement review of the client’s financial 
statements is high. 
3.2.2 Influence of past enforcement reviews of clients’ financial statements on audi-
tor conservatism 
H1 is concerned with auditors’ expectations of potentially upcoming enforcement re-
views of client’s financial statements and the associated risks. Furthermore, auditors’ 
prior experiences with such reviews may also have an impact on auditor conservatism. 
That is because auditors who were involved in prior reviews of client’s financial state-
ments may have experienced potential consequences firsthand. Prior literature has shown 
that, once enforcement reviews have been conducted and sanctions have been imposed 
on firms or auditors, capital market effects (e.g., Hitz et al., 2012) as well as real effects 
on both firm managers (e.g., Arthaud-Day et al., 2006; Collins et al., 2009; Desai et al., 
2006) and auditors occur. Brocard et al. (2018) propose that error announcements by the 
German enforcement agencies reveal information about the auditor and cause harm to 
the auditor’s reputation. Their findings show that this loss of reputation and trust of the 
client in the auditor’s work results in an increased probability of subsequent auditor 
changes by censured firms. In a similar vein, Mande and Son (2012) investigate the com-
parable case of financial restatements in the U.S. American setting. They also find sub-
sequent auditor changes after firms had to announce restatements. These findings indi-
cate that auditors potentially face severe consequences from error announcements. 
Hence, it is likely that auditors employ more caution once they have been affected by an 
enforcement review and consequently require more conservative accounting choices 
from their clients in order not to be harmed by possible future enforcement reviews. 
Therefore, we formulate our second hypothesis as follows. 
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H2: Auditors who were affected by enforcement reviews of client’s financial 
statements in the past require more conservative accounting choices from their 
clients. 
3.2.3 Joint influence of enforcement reviews and hierarchical level on auditor con-
servatism 
Prior research has identified a variety of individual factors that may influence auditors’ 
decision making. An important dimension that may influence the quality of an audit is 
the hierarchical level of the auditor (e.g., Abdolmohammadi and Wright, 1987; Ramsay, 
1994). Auditors at higher hierarchical levels are likely to differ from auditors at lower 
hierarchical levels in several ways, for example, the experience, responsibility and per-
sonal traits that allowed them to move up the hierarchy in the first place, and thus may 
have different decision-making processes. 
Prior research suggests that auditors with a higher level of experience apply more con-
servatism in planning audit efforts and the allocation of man-hours (S. Wright and A. 
Wright, 1997) than less experienced auditors. Even though experience and hierarchical 
level are separate constructs, generally, they are closely related. Therefore, these findings 
may indicate that higher-rank auditors, in general, may utilise more conservative decision 
making compared to lower-rank auditors. We aim to explore whether this expectation 
also holds when regarding single accounting choices and not only when planning audit 
efforts in general. This finding and those outlined above might stem from a higher repu-
tational risk, especially for audit partners, and a higher level of responsibility relating 
partly to maintaining client relationships and potentially to being personally liable, indi-
cating a higher level of responsiveness to the risk factors previously outlined in the de-
velopment of H1. Therefore, we expect higher-rank auditors to make more conservative 
accounting choices than lower-rank auditors. They are likely to be more affected by the 
existence of an enforcement mechanism and show a higher preference for conservative 
accounting behaviour when the likelihood of an enforcement review is high compared to 
lower-rank auditors. Hackenbrack and Nelson (1996) already hint at the potentially higher 
sensitivity to client pressure of auditors on a higher hierarchical level. They state that 
“audit partners may be (…) more sensitive to litigation exposure” than individuals on 
lower hierarchical levels. Consequently, we expect them also to be more sensitive to pres-
sure inflicted by an enforcement regime than auditors on lower hierarchical levels. 
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Thus, we expect the hierarchical level of auditors within the firm to be an important factor 
influencing their behaviour towards enforcement and, hence, it may have an increasing 
effect on auditor conservatism. We expect this due to the increased responsibility and 
liability faced by auditors on higher hierarchical levels and therefore the potentially 
higher responsiveness to enforcement risk. It is important to investigate this effect as it 
would indicate a strong efficacy of enforcement’s preventive function. This stems from 
an enforcement effect being more meaningful if it influences higher-rank auditors more 
strongly than lower-rank auditors. They are the ones making more significant decisions 
and, therefore, they might be more likely to promote conservatism and, accordingly, en-
forcement’s preventive function. We formulate our last hypothesis as follows. 
H3:  The effect of the likelihood of enforcement reviews on auditors’ conservatism 
is stronger for higher-rank auditors than for lower-rank auditors. 
3.3 Research method 
3.3.1 Overview and design 
To test our hypotheses, we conducted an experiment with 72 auditors. The experiment 
employed a between-subjects design which is related to the work of Hackenbrack and 
Nelson (1996) who investigate the effect of engagement risk on auditor conservatism. 
The participants were supplied with an audit case (see Appendix) and, after carefully 
reading the case material, were expected to choose between a conservative and an aggres-
sive accounting choice. The accounting choices are generally the same as used in 
Hackenbrack and Nelson (1996), however, the underlying accounting matter is different. 
All case information was kept equal between subjects, except for the likelihood of being 
subject to an enforcement review, which is our manipulated variable of interest. The prob-
ability of being reviewed was described as either high or low. Based on the audit case at 
hand, participants had to decide whether to recognise a provision for litigation costs or to 
disclose a contingent liability in the notes. In this case, recognition is regarded as the more 
conservative choice, while disclosure in the notes is the more aggressive choice as in 
Hackenbrack and Nelson (1996). The participants were informed that the client decided 
to choose the more aggressive reporting method.  
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3.3.2 Subjects 
After pilot testing our experiment with five practitioners15, we undertook the experiment 
with 72 auditors who worked in Australia. All participants were sourced from Qualtrics, 
LLC. Prior studies in auditing that have used Qualtrics LLC’s services for data collection 
include B. E. Christensen et al. (2014), B. E. Christensen et al. (2016) and T. A. Lambert 
et al. (2017). Holt and Loraas (2018) test and support the suitability of auditors sourced 
from Qualtrics for experimental studies. It was important to the credibility and validity of 
our results to use practising auditors as subjects in our experiment. Recruiting auditors as 
participants leads to smaller samples due to their lower availability than, for instance, 
when recruiting students. Importantly, students would most likely not fully grasp the im-
plications that enforcement reviews have on an auditor. To be able to test our second 
hypothesis, auditors on all hierarchical levels were approached. Participants were ran-
domly assigned to the different scenarios with the likelihood of being reviewed by an 
enforcement agency as either high or low. 
3.3.3 Procedure and stimulus 
Data was collected between September 2017 and November 2018. The participants were 
provided with an online questionnaire which was sent by email. It comprised three parts. 
In the first part, participants were introduced to the stimulus, including introductory re-
marks on the broad research topic, audit case materials and excerpts of the relevant inter-
national accounting standard (IAS) 37. In the questionnaire’s second part, participants 
were asked to decide, based on the given case information, which accounting treatment 
they would require from the fictitious client and to justify their decision. The third part of 
the questionnaire considered manipulation checks and sought information on gender, ed-
ucational background, and work experience.  
We chose a fictitious firm for our stimulus to mitigate familiarity biases in participants. 
The client was described as a manufacturer and distributor of pharmaceutical products 
                                                 
15  Prior to the administration of the experiment, a pilot test of the experimental stimulus and questionnaire 
was conducted to ensure that they were understandable, logically articulated, readable and appropriate 
in layout. The pilot study was trialed on five auditing practitioners. One practitioner was a partner of a 
Big 4 audit firm. Four auditing practitioners (Junior Auditors and Senior Auditors) also held casual 
academic positions at our university. All participants were approached by one of the authors and asked 
to complete the research instrument. Following this, the participants provided extensive face-to-face 
feedback to one of the authors. The five practitioners did not participate in the main experiment. 
Amendments made to the experimental stimulus and questionnaire after the pilot test included re-
phrasing and shortening some sentences that were perceived as too complex and/or vague, and swapping 
the order of certain questions to improve their logical flow. 
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that faced a lawsuit after a substantial number of customers fell ill after consuming one 
of its products. The case material revealed that the lawsuit had two potential outcomes 
(Lewis, 1980). The client either had to settle and pay $5,000,000 or would have no liabil-
ity at all. However, uncertainty persisted about the probabilities of these potential out-
comes. The stakeholders involved were not able to quantify these probabilities and ex-
pressed their uncertainty, allowing for subjective decision making by the participants who 
were then charged with the audit of provisions for litigation costs. They were informed 
that the annual report might be subject to review by an enforcement agency. The proba-
bility of such a review was either high or low, depending on the group to which the par-
ticipants were randomly assigned. After the review, the enforcement agency was author-
ised to establish errors and enforce their disclosure. 
The participants were next provided with excerpts of IAS 37 “Provisions, Contingent 
Liabilities and Contingent Assets”, which is the relevant standard in this case. In IAS 
37.14, the cases in which provisions shall be recognised are explained. The information 
provided on the audit case made it relatively clear that under IAS 37 a provision would 
have to be recognised if it was “more likely than not that a present obligation exists at the 
end of the reporting period”. The evidence, however, was unclear about this likelihood, 
leaving room for the participants’ subjectivity. 
Finally, the participants learned that the client decided not to recognise a provision for 
litigation costs to avoid violating restrictive debt covenants. A contingent liability should 
be disclosed instead. After receiving all this information, each participant was asked to 
decide whether to require the client to recognise a provision for litigation costs or to dis-
close a contingent liability in the notes instead, as suggested by the client.  
We employed three manipulation checks to ensure that the participants were aware of the 
presence of the enforcement agency and the likelihood of being reviewed. Moreover, it 
was crucial to our design that the participants had the same impression of which reporting 
method was the more conservative one. Therefore, we used the questionnaire to specifi-
cally ask the participants which accounting choice they thought was more conservative, 
whether an enforcement agency was present and how high the likelihood of an enforce-
ment review was. We employed these questions after the participants already decided for 
an accounting choice in order not to influence their decision by being able to guess the 
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research question at hand. The final sample included only participants who successfully 
passed all our manipulation checks.16 
3.3.4 Data analysis 
3.3.4.1 Sample characteristics 
Table 3.1 depicts details on the characteristics of our sample and their distribution across 
the two experimental conditions. Importantly, the entire sample (N=72) consists of pro-
fessionally certified auditors who work in Australia. 90% of the participants have lived 
in Australia for more than five years. The distribution across the two experimental con-
ditions is balanced for most characteristics, except for the distribution of male and female 
auditors. Moreover, slightly more men than women participated in our experiment - 41 
men versus 31 women. This is consistent with empirical data by Ittonen and Peni (2012) 
who show that the profession has more male than female auditors. Of the 72 participants 
included in the final sample, 30 had been affected by enforcement reviews in their pro-
fessional life in the past, indicating that enforcement is not only perceived by auditors but 
they may also have experienced its personal work-related effects. 45.8% of our partici-
pants hold a Master’s degree or higher and, on average, are very experienced in auditing 
(44.4% of our participants have been working in the audit industry for more than five 
years). The auditors’ high level of education and experience substantiates the validity of 
the results presented in this paper. These auditors can be expected to fully understand the 
audit case at hand, to be familiar with the accounting issue and to analyse all relevant 
information in their decision process, including, most importantly, the likelihood of an 
enforcement review. Finally, information on the current positions held by the participants 
in their respective firms shows that our sample is very diverse in that aspect, thus allowing 
us to test our second hypothesis. 
  
                                                 
16  In total, 198 participants took part in the study. 126 participants did not pass all three manipulation 
checks and were screened out. This rather stringent condition is consistent with previous studies such as 
Lambert et al. (2017). As a result, the final sample included 72 participants who successfully passed all 
manipulation checks. 
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Table 3.1: Distributions of sample characteristics across the two experimental conditions 
      Experimental conditions 
        Full sample (N=40)   
Low review 
likelihood   
High review 
likelihood 
Professional certification      
CA, CPA or equivalent  72  36  36 
Country of residence       
Australia    72  36  36 
Years lived in country of residence      
Entire life    36  17  19 
20 years or more   13  6  7 
15-19 years   4  1  3 
10-14 years   5  3  2 
5-9 years    7  3  4 
less than 5 years   7  6  1 
Gender         
Male    41  23  18 
Female    31  13  18 
Affected by enforcement review in the past     
Yes    30  13  17 
No    42  23  19 
Highest academic qualification      
Bachelor's degree   39  19  20 
Master's degree   29  15  14 
Doctorate    4  2  2 
Work experience in auditing       
0-2 years    16  8  8 
3-5 years    24  10  14 
6-9 years    14  9  5 
More than 10 years   18  9  9 
Current position at respective firm      
Junior auditor   26  12  14 
Senior auditor   25  13  12 
Audit manager   18  10  8 
Audit partner   3  1  2 
This table displays sample characteristics and their distribution across the two experimental conditions 
of our subjects, including professional certification, country of residence, years lived in the country of 
residence, gender, being affected by an enforcement review in the past, academic qualifications, work 
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3.3.4.2 Questionnaire data analysis 
In order to test our hypotheses, we conduct a logit regression analysis. We control for 
certain personality characteristics of auditors and investigate whether our results are in-
fluenced by these characteristics. Table 3.2 summarises the variables used in the logit 
regression models. Our basic model is depicted below. Depending on the hypothesis we 
are testing, certain independent variables are added to the model. 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑖 =  𝐸𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 +  ∑ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖 + 𝑖 
Conservatism is the dependent dummy variable which indicates whether or not a partici-
pant decided to require the client to make the conservative accounting choice. It takes the 
value “1” if conservative accounting behaviour was required and “0” if not.17 Our main 
test variable is Enforcement. It is a dummy variable indicating the likelihood of being 
subject to an enforcement review (“1” = enforcement review likelihood is high; “0” = 
enforcement review likelihood is low).  
To test H1, we estimate the basic logit regression model from above including only our 
main test variable Enforcement and the controls (model (1)). Moreover, to test H2 we 
specify model (2) where we implement the variable Affected in addition to Enforcement. 
Affected is a dummy variable indicating that a participant has been affected by an enforce-
ment review in the past. We expect auditors who were affected by enforcement reviews 
in the past to employ more conservative decision making. Finally, to test H3 we estimate 
model (3), where Hierarchy and the interaction term Hierarchy*Enforcement are added 
to the basic logit model. Hierarchy is a dummy variable indicating that a participant is an 
audit manager or higher in his/her firm.18 We expect auditors on higher hierarchical levels 
to be more conservative and to be more affected by the likelihood of an enforcement 
review as described in H3. 
The control variables are defined as follows. Settlement Probability represents the prob-
ability of a settlement needing to be paid by the client as estimated by the participants. 
                                                 
17  Measuring Conservatism with a binary variable is in line with Hackenbrack and Nelson’s (1996) 
research design and appears more appropriate than using a continuous variable, e.g., a required amount 
of a provision for litigation costs. In order to employ a continuous variable, the audit case material would 
need to be much more detailed. A longer and more complex audit case could undermine the 
understandability of the case and, hence, jeopardise the experiment’s results. 
18  We also carried out our analyses with different scales of Hierarchy. For instance, we rescaled Hierarchy 
so it indicates that a participant is a senior auditor or higher. The results do not change when measuring 
this variable differently. Moreover, replacing Hierarchy with variables dependent on being the lead 
auditor at a current or a past mandate does not change the results either. 
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We include this control variable as we deem it crucial to our experimental design that the 
participants estimate the likelihood of such a settlement to be roughly around 50%. 
Strongly diverging estimations could influence the accounting choice and, thus, we need 
to control for this factor. Next, we include the control variable Task Experience that ac-
counts for how familiar a participant is with the audit task at hand and how frequently 
he/she works on such accounting issues. We arrive at Task Experience by merging the 
two variables Familiarity and Frequency. Familiarity measures the degree to which a 
participant is familiar with the audit task at hand - provisions for litigation costs - while 
Frequency measures the degree to which the participant works on such audit tasks on a 
regular basis. Both variables are measured using a seven-point Likert scale ranging from 
“not at all familiar”/”not at all frequent” to “highly familiar”/“highly frequent”. Further-
more, we include Work Experience, which is a binary variable indicating that a participant 
has been working in the auditing profession for at least two years.19 Education is a dummy 
variable indicating that the participant holds a Master’s Degree or higher. Gender is a 
binary variable that has the value “1” if the participant is male. Finally, we include two 
control variables that represent specific character traits of the participants. Agreeableness 
and Conscientiousness are both based on the Mini-International Personality Item Pool-
Five-Factor (IPIP) Scales of personality (Donnellan et al., 2006). We arrive at these 
measures by asking the participants to indicate the accuracy with which certain statements 
describe them on a five-point Likert scale from “Very Inaccurate” to “Very Accurate”. 
Agreeableness represents the degree to which a participant is likely to agree with someone 
else to keep a harmonious relationship. In our setting, we expect participants with higher 
Agreeableness to be more likely to concur with the client’s accounting choice and, there-
fore, that they will not require conservative accounting from the client. Conscientiousness 
generally describes how likely someone is to follow their inner sense of what is right. 
Therefore, we expect participants with high Conscientiousness to be more likely to re-
quire conservative accounting choices from the client. 
  
                                                 
19  We also carried out our analyses with different scales of Work Experience. For instance, we rescaled 
Work Experience so it indicates that a participant has been working in the auditing profession for at least 
five years. The results do not change when measuring this variable differently. 
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Table 3.2: Variables measurement – determinants of conservative disclosure choices 
Variable name   Definition 
Conservatism  Dummy variable indicating that a participant decided to require 
the client to make a conservative disclosure choice 
Enforcement  Dummy variable indicating the likelihood of being subject to an 
enforcement review ("1" = high; "0" = low) 
Hierarchy  Dummy variable indicating that a participant is an audit 
manager or higher in his/her firm 
Affected  Dummy variable indicating that a participant has been affected 
by an enforcement review in the past 
Settlement Probability  Probability of a settlement needed to be paid to clients as 
estimated by participant 
Familiarity  Degree to which the participant is familiar with the audit task at 
hand 
Frequency  Degree to which the participant works on comparable audit tasks 
on a regular basis 
Work Experience  Dummy variable indicating that a participant has been working 
in the auditing profession for at least two years 
Education  Dummy variable indicating that a participant holds a Master's 
Degree or higher 
Gender  Dummy variable indicating the gender of a participant ("1" = 
male; "0" = female) 
Agreeableness 
 
Degree to which the participant is likely to agree to someone 
else; this variable is based on the Mini-IPIP Scales of personality 
developed by Donnellan et al. (2006) 
Conscientiousness 
  
Degree of a participant's conscientiousness or sense of duty; this 
variable is based on the Mini-IPIP Scales of personality 
developed by Donnellan et al. (2006) 
This table summarises the variables used in the logit regression model. 
 
3.4 Results and discussion 
3.4.1 Descriptive statistics and correlations 
Table 3.3 displays the descriptive statistics of the variables used in our logit regression 
models. It is worth noting, for instance, that our participants are relatively experienced, 
with 76% of the participants having worked in the audit industry for two years or more 
and 29% being audit managers or higher in their respective firms. More importantly, the 
mean estimated Settlement Probability is 45.96% and the median is 50%. This shows that 
our experimental design was successful in creating an ambiguous scenario in which the 
auditors estimate the probability of the requirement of a settlement to be approximately 
50%. This is important to our study as we need an ambiguous case where the “correct” 
accounting choice is not distinctly identifiable. Correlations of the variables at hand are 
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displayed in Table 3.4. For instance, we find a significant positive correlation between 
Task Experience and Work Experience (0.3162). 
Table 3.3: Descriptive statistics of conservative disclosure choices 
Variable  Mean  
Standard 
deviation 
 Median  Min.  Max.  N 
Conservatism 
 
0.63  0.49  1.00  0.00  1  72 
Enforcement 
 
0.50  0.50  0.50  0.00  1  72 
Hierarchy 
 
0.29  0.46  0.00  0.00  1  72 
Affected 
 
0.42  0.50  0.00  0.00  1  72 
Settlement  
Probability  




7.85  3.48  8.00  2.00  14  72 
Work Experience  0.76  0.43  1.00  0.00  1  72 
Education  0.46  0.50  0.00  0.00  1  72 
Gender 
 
0.58  0.50  1.00  0.00  1  72 
Agreeableness 
 
13.40  2.86  13.00  8.00  20  72 
Conscientiousness   13.61   2.95   13.00   7.00   20   72 
This table displays the descriptives for the variables used in the determinants model in Table 3.6. 
Definitions of variables are reported in Table 3.2. 
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Table 3.4: Correlations of conservative disclosure choices. 
     
Variable   (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Conservatism (1) 1                     
Enforcement (2) -0.0287 1          
Hierarchy (3) -0.0710 -0.0306 1         
Affected (4) 0.4801 0.1127 0.2014 1        
Settlement Probability (5) 0.0429 -0.1598 -0.0918 -0.0320 1       
Task Experience (6) 0.2315 -0.0040 0.2407 0.2657 -0.0079 1      
Work Experience (7) 0.1773 0.0327 0.2129 0.3372 0.0019 0.3162 1     
Education (8) 0.1943 -0.0279 0.2683 0.0707 0.0595 0.0165 0.1176 1    
Gender (9) 0.0436 0.1690 -0.0155 -0.0286 -0.1320 0.0442 0.0608 -0.0141 1   
Agreeableness (10) -0.1628 -0.0049 0.0058 -0.3677 0.0632 -0.1692 -0.2089 0.0168 -0.0686 1  
Conscientiousness (11) -0.1715 -0.1613 0.0435 -0.3015 0.0640 -0.1528 0.0937 0.1793 -0.0064 0.3995 1 
This table displays the correlations for the variables used in the determinants model in Table 3.6. Definitions of variables are reported in Table 3.2. Bold letters indicate 
significance at the 10% level. 
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3.4.2 Testing the influence of enforcement on auditor conservatism (H1) 
Table 3.5 reports participants’ accounting choices depending on what likelihood of an 
enforcement review they are randomly assigned to. The data in Table 3.5 shows that, 
when the enforcement review likelihood was low, 23 of the 36 auditors (63.88%) decided 
to require the client to recognise a provision. When the enforcement review likelihood 
was high, a similar amount of auditors (22 of the 36 auditors; 61.11%) required this con-
servative accounting behaviour from their clients. Given that the number of auditors mak-
ing conservative decisions is almost the same in both groups, this already hints at our first 
hypothesis not being supported. 
Table 3.5: Selected disclosure choices 
Likelihood of enforcement review 
Low  High 
Provision  Contingent liability  Provision  Contingent liability 
23  13  22  14 
This table displays the amounts of participants that decided to either recognise a provision or disclose a 
contingent liability in the notes depending on whether the likelihood of being subject to an enforcement 
review was low or high. 
 
As depicted in Table 3.6 and described in 3.3.4.2, we estimate a total of three different 
logit regression models with Conservatism being the dependent variable and 
Enforcement, Affected and Hierarchy*Enforcement being the independent variables of 
interest. Firstly, we test H1 in model (1) and in contrast to our expectation as well as 
indicated by the descriptive results in Table 3.5, we find no significant relationship be-
tween Conservatism and Enforcement. Even after controlling for a variety of variables, 
the higher likelihood of an enforcement review appears not to be related to conservative 
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Table 3.6: Determinants of conservative disclosure choices 
Variable   (1)   (2)   (3) 
Enforcement  -0.2773  -0.5797  -0.4805 
  (-0.51)  (-0.95)  (-0.71) 
Affected    2.6824***  
 
    (3.19)  
 
Hierarchy      -1.3832 
      (-1.55) 
Hierarchy*Enforcement      0.4149 
      (0.34) 
Settlement Probability  0.0050  0.0086  0.0036 
  (0.39)  (0.58)  (0.27) 
Task Experience  0.1009  0.0893  0.1333 
  (1.19)  (0.89)  (1.48) 
Work Experience  0.5904  -0.2175  0.8166 
  (0.89)  (-0.29)  (1.15) 
Education  0.9821*  1.1144*  1.3199** 
  (1.78)  (1.72)  (2.15) 
Gender  0.2204  0.4362  0.2319 
 
 (0.40)  (0.72)  (0.42) 
Agreeableness  -0.0320  0.0651  -0.0295 
  (-0.31)  (0.56)  (-0.27) 
Conscientiousness  -0.1523  -0.0848  -0.1606 
 
 (-1.45)  (-0.71)  (1.48) 
Constant  1.1719  -1.3991  1.2169 
  (0.61)  (-0.60)  (0.60) 
Pseudo R2  0.11  0.26  0.15 
N  72  72  72 
This table displays coefficient estimates and t-statistics from a logit model. The regression model is based 
on the responses of 72 auditors to our online questionnaire. The dependent variable is a binary variable 
indicating that a participant decided to require the client to make a conservative accounting choice. 
Definitions of variables are reported in Table 3.2. t-values are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * 
indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Our results show that, on average, auditors already employ conservative behaviour re-
gardless of the enforcement risk. The risk factors outlined earlier that drive auditors’ con-
servatism (e.g., reputation risk and litigation risk) are possibly already strong enough to 
promote a certain level of conservatism that cannot be increased by enforcement scrutiny. 
Moreover, auditors might be influenced by their firm’s internal training, which could pro-
mote conservatism as well as professional codes of conduct and ethics. The latter expla-
nation is supported by Ng and Tan’s (2003) findings that auditors are more likely to opt 
for the conservative accounting choice in the presence of authoritative guidance in this 
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direction. Moreover, those who choose to become auditors, in general, might be more 
conservative in nature. Hence, enforcement supervision and the likelihood of being sub-
ject to an enforcement review alone seemingly are not a potential means to increase au-
ditor conservatism nor eventually accounting quality.  
3.4.3 Testing the influence of being affected by enforcement reviews in the past on 
auditor conservatism (H2) 
Table 3.7 shows the number of participants per disclosure choice based on whether they 
were affected by an enforcement review in the past. Interestingly, 27 of the 30 participants 
who were directly affected by an enforcement review in the past decided to require the 
client to recognise a provision for litigation costs (i.e., the more conservative choice). On 
the other hand, participants who had not been affected by an enforcement review before 
show a more balanced distribution of disclosure choices. In this group, 18 participants 
required the recognition of a provision, whereas 24 participants approved the disclosure 
in the notes. This suggests that past experiences with enforcement reviews may be asso-
ciated with more conservative decision making by the auditors. 
Importantly, the number of participants who had experiences with enforcement in the past 
is quite similar in both treatment conditions. Hence, the suggested association between 
past experiences with enforcement and conservative decision making is not likely to be 
attributed to the allocation of participants. In the group with participants who were af-
fected by enforcement reviews in the past, 17 participants were exposed to the high like-
lihood of an enforcement review (approximately 47%). Of those participants who have 
never been affected by an enforcement review in the past, 19 participants were exposed 
to the high likelihood of an enforcement review (approximately 53%).  
Table 3.7: Selected disclosure choices depending on past enforcement experiences 
Affected by enforcement review in the past 
Yes  No 
Provision  Contingent liability  Provision  Contingent liability 
27  3  18  24 
This table displays the number of participants who decided to either recognise a provision or disclose a 
contingent liability in the notes depending on whether they were affected by an enforcement review in 
the past. 
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In model (2) of Table 3.6, we include the variable Affected, indicating that a participant 
was affected by an enforcement review in the past. We find a significant positive associ-
ation at the 1% level between Affected and Conservatism. This indicates that auditors who 
were subject to an enforcement review in the past employ more conservative decision 
making. Thus, we find supportive evidence for H2. In conjunction with our findings with 
regard to H1, this suggests that the presence of an enforcement agency and more specifi-
cally the likelihood of an enforcement review of the client’s financial statements does not 
lead to more auditor conservatism, however, once reviews are conducted and auditors are 
directly confronted with the risks associated with enforcement reviews this may promote 
conservatism. Hence, our findings suggest that past experiences with enforcement re-
views do increase auditor conservatism, while the sheer expectations of what might be 
associated with such a review do not. As such, to strengthen enforcement’s preventive 
function, it may be necessary to enhance the frequency of enforcement reviews. 
3.4.4 Testing the joint influence of enforcement and hierarchical level on auditor 
conservatism (H3) 
We test our third and final hypothesis by estimating model (3) as depicted in Table 3.6, 
which includes the variable Hierarchy and the interaction term Hierarchy*Enforcement. 
We find a positive coefficent for the interaction term, indicating that for higher-rank au-
ditors conservatism increases stronger with enforcement review likelihood than for lower-
rank auditors. However, these results are not significant and, therefore, we do not find 
supportive evidence for our third hypothesis (H3). Thus, higher-rank auditors and their 
decision making are not significantly more influenced by the likelihood of an enforcement 
review than their lower-rank peers. 
3.5 Conclusion 
In this experimental study, we investigate enforcement’s preventive function via the in-
fluence enforcement reviews of client’s financial statements may have on auditor’s deci-
sions. More precisely, we examine whether the likelihood that the client’s financial state-
ments are being subjected to an enforcement review has an impact on conservatism in 
auditors’ decision making. To test this, we carry out an experiment with 72 auditors who 
had to choose between a conservative or an aggressive accounting choice after reading an 
audit case outlining that the client’s financial statements may be subjected to an enforce-
ment review.  
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We find that a higher likelihood of enforcement reviews of client’s financial statements 
is not related to auditors employing more conservative accounting decisions. Our descrip-
tive results, in fact, show that auditors already employ conservative decision making re-
gardless of how high the likelihood of an enforcement review is. Potentially, professional 
codes of conduct and ethics as well as the risk factors auditors are exposed to (i.e., litiga-
tion risk, risk of client loss and reputation risk) already condition auditors in their decision 
making. Firms’ internal training might further promote conservatism, thus employing suf-
ficient pressure on auditors. Moreover, those who choose to become auditors, in general, 
might be more conservative in nature. Therefore, we conclude that the indirect effects of 
enforcement on accounting quality via auditors are potentially fairly weak in the context 
of enforcement reviews of the client’s financial statements. Enforcement effects on ac-
counting quality, hence, appear to stem more from the direct effects on firm managers 
who prepare the accounts. 
Interestingly, however, our findings show that auditors who were affected by enforcement 
reviews of a client’s financial statements in the past employ more conservative decision 
making than those who have never had to deal with enforcement reviews in their careers. 
Apparently, enforcement supervision does not have a significant effect on auditors’ con-
servatism until an auditor was directly confronted with a review of a client’s financial 
statements and has experienced the associated consequences firsthand. This indicates that 
the preventive function of enforcement starts becoming effective once auditors directly 
experienced the risks associated with an enforcement review of the client’s financial state-
ments, which hints at the possibility of promoting conservatism through increasing the 
frequency of enforcement reviews. Finally, we do not find significant differences between 
higher-rank auditors’ conservatism and lower-rank auditors’ conservatism. 
The results of this study should be viewed in light of certain limitations. First, our audit 
case described an accounting issue in the context of the pharmaceutical industry, so gen-
eralisation to other industries may be limited. Second, we were only able to procure 72 
auditors, which may have impacted our observations when implementing an interaction 
term to test the third hypothesis. We encourage future research that employs larger sample 
sizes, where possible. Third, we did not distinguish between auditors who are working 
for larger or smaller firms. As it is possible that workplace culture is influencing auditors’ 
judgments, we encourage future research to examine how workplace culture may influ-
ence auditors’ conservatism in the context of our study. Finally, our sample consists of 
auditors working in Australia, so generalisations to other countries may be limited. Future 
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research may examine whether cultural differences will impact auditors’ judgments in the 
context of our study.  
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3.6 Appendix 
Appendix A: Research instrument  
The following shows the audit case and questionnaire the participants of the experiment 
were presented with. 
Introduction  
The purpose of this study is to understand the relationship between firms, auditors and 
enforcement bodies in the preparation and publication of financial statements. After being 
presented with an audit case and the relevant accounting standard, you will be asked to 
make an accounting choice and answer several related questions. Please answer all ques-
tions as close to practice as possible by checking the most applicable box or filling in the 
blanks. All participation is voluntary and anonymous and the data will be handled strictly 
confidential. By continuing this survey, you give your consent for participation. 
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Audit case & accounting issue 
You are conducting the audit of Pharma Ltd (client), which is a major and well-diversified 
manufacturer and distributor of pharmaceutical products. Pharma Ltd. has been in the 
market for 20 years and maintains a financial position near the industry average. The 
client is listed on a regulated stock exchange, has to report under International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS) and its audited financial statements are subject to the surveil-
lance of a supervisory enforcement body.  
The client currently faces a lawsuit as a substantial number of customers fell ill after 
consuming “Artogin”, which is one of Pharma’s products designed to lower blood pres-
sure. Through the solicitors’ representation letters, you are informed that the product lia-
bility suit has two potential outcomes. The client would either have to settle and pay 
$5,000,000 or would have no liability at all. There have been comparable cases in the past 
where the client was forced to settle. However, in just as many cases the charges were 
dropped. Thus, the client agrees that it is very difficult to predict the likelihood of either 
outcome. To eliminate any danger of biased assessments, your auditing firm retained its 
own highly regarded counsel Jennifer Hardman to provide advice on the two possible 
outcomes. In her analyses, Jennifer specifically focused on competitors’ lawsuits within 
the same industry and concludes that with the information at hand it is not possible to 
narrow down the probabilities. 
With the audit report due to be signed and released in five days’ time, the audit of provi-
sions for litigation costs needs to be finalised. The annual report might be subject to re-
view by the enforcement agency. The likelihood of such a review is expected to be 
low/high (depending on what group the participant was randomly assigned to) this year. 
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Applicable accounting standard & potential reporting methods 
In this specific case, IAS 37 “Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent Assets” 
is the relevant standard. Below you will find extracts of the standard. Do not take any 
other potentially relevant accounting standards into account in this matter. 
IAS 37.14 explains in which cases provisions shall be recognised. It states: “A provision 
shall be recognized when: 
(a) An entity has a present obligation (legal or constructive) as a result of a past event; 
(b) it is probable that an outflow of resources embodying economic benefits will be 
required to settle the obligation; and 
(c) a reliable estimate can be made of the amount of the obligation. 
If these conditions are not met, no provision shall be recognized”. 
IAS 37.16 states: “In rare cases, for example in a lawsuit, it may be disputed either 
whether certain events have occurred or whether those events result in a present obliga-
tion. In such a case, an entity determines whether a present obligation exists at the end of 
the reporting period by taking account of all available evidence, including, for example, 
the opinion of experts. The evidence considered includes any additional evidence pro-
vided by events after the reporting period. On the basis of such evidence: 
(a) where it is more likely than not that a present obligation exists at the end of 
the reporting period, the entity recognizes a provision (if the recognition criteria 
are met); and 
(b) where it is more likely that no present obligation exists at the end of the 
reporting period, the entity discloses a contingent liability, unless the possibility 
of an outflow of resources embodying economic benefits is remote (see paragraph 
86)”. 
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The client’s accounting choice 
The client’s CFO Patrick Pierce informs you that the firm’s restrictive debt covenants 
require the firm to stay below a 2:1 debt-to-equity ratio. Currently, the client has almost 
reached this threshold of 2:1 and recognising a provision would lead to a violation of the 
debt covenants. The client decided not to recognise a provision for litigation costs. A 
contingent liability is being disclosed instead. Patrick argues that this treatment is justified 
as it cannot be clearly decided whether it is more likely than not that a present obligation 
exists at the end of the accounting period. Patrick is confident that the firm will not have 
to settle in the respective case.  
You now have to decide whether you agree with the client’s reporting method or require 
the firm to recognise a provision for litigation costs. 
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Additional information 
 There have been numerous discussions between members of the audit team and 
all appropriate client staff to evaluate the probability that a present obligation 
exists at the end of the accounting period. No additional insights resulted from 
these discussions. 
 The client’s management was very outspoken and straightforward throughout the 
entire audit. Thus, there is no additional information available beyond that already 
supplied in the case. 
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1. Which accounting choice would you require from the client?  
(Select only one.) 
Recognise a provision for litigation costs 
Disclosure of a contingent liability in the notes 
 








3. With the given information, how high do you estimate the probability of a settlement 
to be? Please provide a percentage value. 
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4. Which accounting choice did you think was more conservative?  
(Select only one.) 
Recognise a provision for litigation costs 
Disclosure of a contingent liability in the notes 
 
5.  Did an enforcement regime exist that potentially reviews audited financial 
statements?   





6.  How high is the likelihood of an enforcement review expected to be in the given year?  





7. Have you ever been personally affected by an enforcement investigation in your 
professional life?   




8. Have you ever been personally involved in enforcement-related consulting in your 
professional life?   




9. How familiar are you with the audit task in the case – provisions for litigation costs?   
Not at all     Highly 
familiar      familiar 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
       
 
10.  How frequently have you worked on such audit tasks before – provisions for litigation 
costs?   
Not at all     Highly 
frequent      frequent 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7  
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11.  Your Gender  












14.  Which culture do you most identify with? 
(Select only one.) 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
Anglo/European 
Chinese and North Asian 







15. How long have you lived in the country, in which you currently work? 
(Select only one.) 
All my life 
20 years or more 
15 – 19 years 
10 – 14 years 
5 – 9 years 
less than 5 years 
 
16.  Your Highest Academic Qualification 
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18. Your Work Experience as an Auditor 




More than 10 years 
 
19. Which of the following best describes your current position in your firm?  






20. Are you a Chartered Accountant (CA), Certified Public Accountant (CPA) or 
equivalent? 
(Select only one.) 
Yes 
No 
Other                                        
 
21. Are you currently the auditor in charge for an audit engagement of your firm?  




22. Have you ever been the auditor in charge for an audit engagement in the past?  
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23.  For each of the following statements, please indicate the likelihood that you would 
engage in the described activity or behaviour if you were to find yourself in that 


























your tastes are 
different from 
those of a 
friend. 




on a major 
issue. 
O O O O O O O 
Choosing a 
career that you 
truly enjoy over 
a more secure 
one. 
O O O O O O O 
Speaking your 
mind about an 
unpopular issue 
in a meeting at 
work. 
O O O O O O O 
Moving to a 




O O O O O O O 
Starting a new 
career in your 
mid-thirties. O O O O O O O 
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24.  For each of the following statements please indicate the accuracy with which they 
describe you. Provide a rating from very inaccurate to very accurate using the 
















O O O O O 
I get chores 
done right away. 
O O O O O 
I feel others’ 
emotions. 
O O O O O 
I like order. 
O O O O O 




O O O O O 
I often forget to 
put things back 
in their proper 
place. 
O O O O O 
I am not really 
interested in 
others. 
O O O O O 
I make a mess 
of things. 
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enforcement changes are significantly and positively associated with accounting conserv-
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ver, I find weak evidence that firms with weak corporate governance are more profoundly 
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4.1 Introduction 
In this paper, I investigate the association between substantive changes in accounting en-
forcement and conditional accounting conservatism. A broad stream of literature corrob-
orates the importance of enforcement bodies and their actions which mainly involve re-
viewing audited financial statements and imposing sanctions such as enforcing the pub-
lication of error findings. This importance mainly constitutes itself in capital market ef-
fects but also in direct effects on the decision making of involved stakeholders. For in-
stance, H. B. Christensen et al. (2013)22 find that the introduction of International Finan-
cial Reporting Standards (IFRS) for listed firms in the European Union (EU) coincided 
with significant increases in liquidity, mainly in those countries which had concurrently 
carried out substantive changes in their enforcement regulation by either installing new 
enforcement bodies or increasing the power of those already in existence. Moreover, sev-
eral studies explore the consequences of enforcement actions (e.g., Brocard et al., 2018; 
Hitz et al., 2012) which represents an investigation of enforcement’s sanctioning function. 
Hitz et al. (2012), for instance, find negative market reactions following error announce-
ments established by enforcers in the German setting. 
While a large amount of evidence shows that IFRS adoption and substantive changes in 
enforcement regulation are associated with capital market effects, evidence is scarce and 
inconclusive on the effects on accounting properties, such as conservatism, or on the com-
parability of accounting across jurisdictions, which might drive the observed capital mar-
ket effects. Prior studies do not unanimously support the notion that financial reporting 
and disclosure regulation lead to more transparency and comparability nor that positive 
economic consequences will follow (Brüggemann et al., 2013; Leuz and Wysocki, 2016). 
Given the lack of consistent findings on enforcement’s effects on accounting properties, 
this paper examines the role of enforcement in shaping accounting conservatism. Con-
servatism is regarded as the most influential principle of valuation in accounting (Sterling, 
1970) and it is estimated to have influenced accounting practice for at least five centuries 
(Basu, 1997). Basu (1997) defines conservatism in accounting as “the accountant's ten-
dency to require a higher degree of verification to recognize good news as gains than to 
recognize bad news as losses”. Thus, the greater the difference in the degree of verifica-
                                                 
22  Below, I refer to the H. B. Christensen et al. (2013) study as CHL (2013). 
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tion required for gains versus losses, the greater the conservatism. It is likely that enforce-
ment institutions particularly target discretionary accounting choices, such as the recog-
nition of provisions or intangibles, leading to more conservative accounting behaviour. 
Hence, this would be associated with less aggressive accounting choices and less errone-
ous and fraudulent financial reporting. For instance, Watts (2003b) points out that con-
servatism “is critical to constraining manipulation and fraud” as it decreases the leeway 
for manipulation of accounting numbers. More conservative accounting choices, as a re-
sponse to enforcement, would thus also indicate the efficacy of enforcement’s preventive 
function as this function aims to decrease fraudulent and erroneous accounting in the first 
place. Conservatism theory developed by Watts (2003a) hints at enforcement potentially 
being a source of conservative accounting behaviour. I aim to investigate this relationship 
and expect that a strengthening of accounting enforcement is associated with an increase 
in conservatism.  
I expect a positive association between the strengthening of enforcement and conservative 
accounting choices based on two explanations for accounting conservatism brought for-
ward by Watts (2003a): regulation and contracting. Firstly, Watts (2003a) elaborates that 
regulators are more likely to be criticised if firms overstate net assets than if they under-
state them. For instance, Enron and similar accounting scandals placed significant pres-
sure on regulators as it is argued quite often that their loose regulation leads firms to 
exploit loopholes or vague standards. Thus, regulators may seek to impose more con-
servative accounting rules in order to prevent such criticism. The implementation of en-
forcement bodies can be regarded as an increase in regulation in the financial reporting 
environment, and thus it is likely that accounting conservatism increases as a result of 
such regulation. Consequently, regulation will influence managers’ decision making and 
accounting choices. With enforcement bodies reviewing already audited financial state-
ments, firm managers will most likely be influenced in their decision making towards a 
higher level of conservatism. As shown by Hitz et al. (2012), enforcement releases are 
associated with significant negative market reactions for the respective firms. Thus, man-
agers have a direct incentive to prevent such error announcements and therefore employ 
more conservatism in their accounting decisions. In a way, conservatism acts as an insur-
ance against adverse publicity and penalties associated with enforcement releases. 
Secondly, in line with Watts’ (2003a) contracting explanation for conservatism and 
agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), enforcement bodies represent monitoring 
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mechanisms that aim to reduce agency costs. This stems from enforcement reviews serv-
ing as “secondary audits”. Audits, in turn, are seen as typical monitoring devices which 
increase conservatism by reducing managers’ leeway and incentives to manipulate ac-
counting numbers or to report in an overly aggressive manner. Therefore, enforcement 
should reduce agency conflicts and incentivise managers to report more conservatively. 
In conclusion, the theories presented herein suggest that substantive changes in enforce-
ment regulation are associated with increasing accounting conservatism, which represents 
my first hypothesis. 
If such an enhancement of conservatism represents increasing accounting quality, this 
could explain positive capital market effects around substantive enforcement changes. 
Moreover, García Lara et al. (2011, 2014, 2016) find that accounting conservatism leads 
to a higher efficiency of the allocation of capital and reduced levels of information asym-
metry and cost of capital.23 As these were some of the main objectives of the EU’s IAS 
Regulation (Regulation (EC) No. 1606/2002), which mandated the adoption of IFRS as 
well as the introduction of enforcement institutions, increased conservatism due to sub-
stantive enforcement changes would indicate that enforcement serves as a significant 
channel in achieving the regulator’s objectives. Findings would therefore not only be rel-
evant to managers and auditors but especially to regulators in order to evaluate the 
achievement of the goals they set for themselves when mandating both IFRS adoption 
and the implementation of enforcement mechanisms. 
Enforcement agencies also represent external corporate governance mechanisms. 
Amongst others, Ahmed and Duellman (2007) and Badia et al. (2017) provide evidence 
that governance mechanisms, in their cases namely boards of directors, institutional own-
ership, and audit environment, have an influence on conservatism. I aim to build on this 
evidence by testing my second hypothesis. As enforcement does not only represent an 
outcome of regulation but also a corporate governance mechanism, it likely influences 
accounting conservatism in yet another manner. In line with prior literature, firms with 
                                                 
23  Their findings suggest that conservatism improves investment efficiency in both settings prone to 
overinvestment and settings prone to underinvestment (Bushman et al., 2011; Francis and Martin, 2010; 
García Lara et al., 2016). Thus, conservatism improves the efficient allocation of capital. Furthermore, 
García Lara et al. (2014) find that conservatism leads to decreases in information asymmetries between 
firm insiders and outside equity investors. One of the channels through which conservatism decreases 
information asymmetries may be limiting earnings management as proposed by García Lara et al. (2014). 
Related to this, Ernstberger et al. (2012) show that the introduction of an enforcement institution in 
Germany led to decreasing levels of earnings management. Hence, it is likely that enforcement improves 
the information environment by increasing accounting conservatism. Moreover, García Lara et al. (2011) 
show that conservatism is associated with lower cost of capital. 
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strong corporate governance should employ more conservative accounting. Therefore, 
firms with weak corporate governance may still have more leeway to increase conserva-
tism once reasons for doing so substantiate themselves. They could consequently show a 
stronger treatment effect from substantive changes in enforcement. On the other hand, 
firms with weak corporate governance may also not be that aware of enforcement or have 
other more pressing issues to worry about. Hence, with this cross-sectional hypothesis I 
test the rather open question whether firms with weaker/stronger corporate governance 
are affected more intensely by enforcement changes than firms with stronger/weaker cor-
porate governance and thus employ more conservative accounting choices. This could 
imply that strong enforcement institutions may atone for other corporate governance 
mechanisms’ shortcomings. 
My research design builds on the identification approach of CHL (2013) who construct a 
data set containing whether and when substantive enforcement changes occurred in 56 
IFRS (e.g., Germany and Australia) and non-IFRS adoption countries (e.g., Japan and the 
United States) from 2001 to 2009. CHL (2013) exploit the staggered implementation of 
enforcement regimes across countries, which is plausibly exogenous and creates natural 
control groups to separate IFRS and enforcement effects as best as possible. I use and 
extend parts of this identification strategy and replicate the data set with yearly data to 
carry out my analyses. For instance, to include events that are more recent my data set 
also covers the substantive change in enforcement regulation in Austria in 2013. In a 
difference-in-differences design, I estimate multivariate regressions for different country 
samples, where the influence of Enforcement, a binary variable indicating all firm-years 
following substantive changes in enforcement, on Conservatism is examined. Conserva-
tism is measured by C_Score, a firm-year measure of accounting conservatism introduced 
by Khan and Watts (2009)24 that is based on Basu’s (1997) conservatism measure.25 
C_Score measures the incremental timeliness of bad news over good news and as Khan 
                                                 
24  This measure has been widely accepted and used in the literature as well (more than 1000 citations as of 
January 2019). Ettredge et al. (2012) provide evidence that supports the validity of C_Score as a measure 
of earnings conservatism. 
25  As of January 2019, this paper was cited more than 4500 times. Ryan (2006) calls it “easily one of the 
most influential papers in accounting research in the past decade”. There are a few papers that criticise 
Basu’s measure. Dietrich et al. (2007) as an extreme example state that since earnings cause returns, and 
not the other way around, return-based measures of asymmetric timeliness are biased. However, for 
instance Ball et al.’s (2013) and Ettredge et al.’s (2012) results support the validity of the Basu measure 
and Ball et al. (2013) show that Dietrich et al.’s (2007) claims are based on misconceptions of the model. 
Taken together, the Basu (1997) measure is certainly widely accepted and used in accounting research 
(e.g., Zhang, 2008; LaFond and Watts, 2008; LaFond and Roychowdhury, 2008; Huijgen and Lubberink, 
2005). 
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and Watts (2009) show is a linear function of the firm variables Size, Market to Book 
Ratio and Leverage allowing for the estimation of firm-year values. 
Moreover, I source data on corporate governance ratings from Aggarwal et al.’s (2011) 
data set. For the sub-sample of firms with corporate governance ratings at hand, I run the 
same regression as described above and examine whether the influence of enforcement 
on accounting conservatism is different for firms with weak corporate governance than 
for firms with strong corporate governance. 
Findings indicate that, in fact, substantive changes in enforcement lead firms to employ 
more conservative accounting choices. I find this only for a sample of non-IFRS countries 
though. For the IFRS sample I do not find a significant association between substantive 
changes in enforcement and conditional conservatism. This may suggest that firms re-
porting under IFRS have less leeway to make more conservative accounting choices as a 
response to enforcement changes. Moreover, I find weak evidence suggesting that en-
forcement’s effect on conservatism is more pronounced for firms with weak corporate 
governance than for firms with strong corporate governance. 
This study contributes to the literature on consequences of enforcement on accounting 
behaviour and accounting properties as well as the literature on accounting conservatism 
and its determinants as it is the first study to distinctly regard the influence of enforcement 
on accounting conservatism. It is closely related to André et al.’s (2015) study, which 
investigates the impact of mandatory IFRS adoption on conditional conservatism and al-
ready hints at enforcement playing a moderating role in this relationship without, how-
ever, explicitly regarding enforcement as a potential driver of accounting conservatism. I 
advance their work by focusing primarily and directly on the role enforcement plays in 
potentially increasing accounting conservatism in a difference-in-differences design with 
two different treatment and control groups and staggered changes in enforcement. These 
changes in enforcement are indicated by a binary variable as opposed to their broad meas-
urement of enforcement strength using the Brown et al. (2014) index which also covers 
the strength of the audit environment. Their study, furthermore, has several research de-
sign issues that result in a lack of construct and internal validity, which makes it difficult 
to empirically isolate the effects of IFRS reporting and enforcement on accounting con-
servatism.  
More specifically, my study contributes to the literature that focuses on regulation being 
one of the driving forces of conservatism in accounting. Watts (2003b) pronounced a need 
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for more research especially in the field of regulation-driven conservatism and I follow 
this call. I also add to the literature on enforcement’s preventive function. The preventive 
function, which aims to prevent erroneous accounting, deserves to receive attention as in 
an ideal scenario accounting errors or even fraud should be prevented in the first place. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 4.2, I provide a review of 
prior literature on enforcement and its effects both on capital markets and the decision 
making of involved stakeholders and subsequently develop my hypotheses. Section 4.3 
outlines the research design, while Section 4.4 presents and discusses my empirical find-
ings. Section 4.5 concludes the paper. 
4.2 Literature review and hypotheses development 
4.2.1  Literature review 
When regarding the impact enforcement bodies and their actions have on firms, I differ-
entiate between capital market effects and what I call direct effects. The latter effects 
regard the decision making of different stakeholders such as managers, supervisory 
boards and auditors. Firstly, I review the literature on capital market effects of enforce-
ment, which may at least partly be driven by effects on decision making. 
The implementation or strengthening of enforcement agencies has positive capital market 
effects according to the literature. For instance, CHL (2013) find that the introduction of 
IFRS for listed firms in the European Union coincided with significant increases in li-
quidity, particularly in those EU member states which had concurrently implemented the 
mandate to install enforcement institutions. Moreover, Ernstberger et al. (2012) supply 
evidence that in the case of Germany the introduction of the new two-tier enforcement 
regime in 2005 resulted in significant increases in stock liquidity and market valuation 
for the firms that fall under the enforcement bodies’ scrutiny. These positive capital mar-
ket effects appear to be associated with the presence of enforcement institutions. 
Once enforcement bodies start investigating firms’ financial statements and publish error 
findings, which is one of the potential sanctioning mechanisms of enforcement, this will 
result in negative market reactions for the respective firms, thus achieving the aim of 
enforcement’s sanctioning function. Hitz et al. (2012) examine in an event study design 
the effect such error announcements have on returns, liquidity and bid-ask spreads of 
censured German firms. They find consistent significant negative market reactions with 
regard to all three of these measures. In other words, managers have incentives to avoid 
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being censured by enforcement bodies as this would harm the firm’s position on the cap-
ital market as well as the firm’s and the managers’ reputation and wealth. 
With regard to direct effects, a broad stream of literature shows that enforcement actions 
hold more than just negative capital market reactions for the decision makers involved. 
Several studies suggest that enforcement actions lead to an increased turnover in top man-
agement at the censured firms (e.g., Desai et al., 2006; Collins et al., 2009; Land, 2010; 
Wang and Chou, 2011). Arthaud-Day et al. (2006), for instance, find that CEOs and CFOs 
of firms that had to file material financial restatements26 are more than twice as likely to 
leave their firms as their counterparts in a matched sample of firms. Moreover, Johnstone 
et al. (2011) show that increased turnover of members of the board of directors and audit 
committee members can be associated with enforcement reviews. Carver (2014) and 
Srinivasan (2005) also find increased audit committee member turnover after accounting 
restatements. Lastly, auditors can be affected too by what in this sense should rather be 
called second order effects than direct effects. Brocard et al. (2018) and Mande and Son 
(2012) find that firms tend to change audit firms after being censured by an enforcement 
body. 
Prior literature hence shows that enforcement has both capital market and direct effects 
for firms and other involved parties and points out why they should try to avoid being 
censured by enforcement bodies. It is worthwhile to investigate whether this results in 
more conservative accounting choices by managers, which would be an effect on decision 
making André et al. (2015) already hint at by suggesting that a decrease in conservatism 
associated with IFRS adoption is smaller for countries with strong enforcement regimes. 
More conservative accounting could stem from both managers’ accounting decisions in 
the first place and from auditors requiring more conservative accounting choices from 
their clients. Either way, such findings would support the efficacy of enforcement’s pre-
ventive function in line with previous studies (Ernstberger et al., 2012; Schmidt, 2005). 
                                                 
26  In this context, it is important to point out that financial restatements, even though they are closely linked 
to enforcement reviews and error announcements, might have more severe consequences than error 
announcements and hence the findings described above need to be compared with caution. However, the 
related findings presented herein are relevant to the research question at hand because in many countries 
error announcements published by enforcers go hand in hand with restating the erroneous accounts in 
the following financial statements.  
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4.2.2 Hypotheses development 
Watts (2003a) developed a theory on the explanations for accounting conservatism. Ac-
cording to his theory, the four explanations for the existence of accounting conservatism 
are: contracting, taxation, litigation and regulation. In my setting, the contracting and the 
regulation explanations appear most relevant.27 The regulation explanation states that as 
regulators potentially run into “more criticism if firms overstate net assets than if they 
understate net assets” (Watts, 2003a), they favour conservative behaviour and thus im-
pose regulation that leads to conservative accounting. The implementation of enforce-
ment bodies can be regarded as an increase in regulation in the financial reporting envi-
ronment, and thus it is likely that accounting conservatism increases as a result of such 
regulation. As enforcement bodies review already audited financial statements, most 
likely firm managers will be influenced in their decision making towards a higher level 
of conservatism. This might stem from managers employing more conservative account-
ing choices as an insurance against adverse publicity and penalties in connection with 
error announcements. If an enforcement mechanism preferred more conservative finan-
cial statements, it would be rational for firms to make more conservative accounting 
choices in an attempt to reduce the likelihood of enforcement intervention. 
Several studies already supply evidence on the connection between regulation and con-
servatism (e.g., García Lara et al., 2009b). For instance, Bushman and Piotroski (2006) 
find that firms in countries with higher levels of regulation, in their setting represented by 
strong investor protection and high quality judicial systems, employ more conservative 
financial reporting. Moreover, Ball et al. (2000) examine the levels of conservative ac-
counting in different common law countries (Australia, Canada, the U.K. and the U.S.). 
They find that accounting in the U.K., which has less regulation28 than the other sample 
countries, is significantly less conservative. 
                                                 
27  I present the remaining explanations here. Links between taxation and financial reporting generate 
incentives for conservative accounting as the asymmetric recognition of gains versus losses allows 
managers to reduce taxes’ present value and thus increase firm value. Shareholder litigation can also be 
viewed as a source of conservatism as the overstatement of net assets increases potential litigation costs. 
Under conservatism net assets are regularly understated, which results in lower expected litigation costs. 
In certain legal environments with high risk of shareholder litigation, this might already hint at the 
potential influence of enforcement bodies on accounting conservatism as enforcement reviews and error 
releases increase litigation risk in such environments (e.g., the U.S.). 
28  Ball et al. (2000) state that U.K. financial markets are “primarily self-regulating”. For instance, the 
United Kingdom does not have a “regulatory body comparable to the SEC in the US”. 
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In a similar vein as the studies from above, Watts’ (2003a) regulation explanation already 
hints at enforcement potentially promoting more conservative accounting. However, as 
eventually it is a manager’s and not a regulator’s decision whether or not to prepare more 
conservative accounts, it is also necessary to build on the contracting explanation. This 
explanation points at conservatism being a means of mitigating agency conflicts and op-
portunistic managerial behaviour. Agency theory, as developed, in particular, by Jensen 
and Meckling (1976), suggests that the separation of ownership and control in public 
corporations leads to agency costs due to information asymmetries between the manager 
(agent) and the shareholders (principals) of the firm. Adverse selection as well as moral 
hazard issues arise from such information asymmetries. Importantly, a manager might 
use her advantageous position of superior information to maximise her own self-interests 
at the principals’ expense. Hence, a principal or an investor in the firm has a demand for 
both bonding and monitoring activities in order to reduce information asymmetries and 
the resulting agency costs. 
Bonding activities aim at aligning an agent’s interests with those of the principal for in-
stance by linking remuneration contracts with firm performance. In my setting, however, 
monitoring activities are of more interest. Beaver (1998) states “that the less informed 
investor would have a demand for information that would monitor the behaviour of the 
more informed manager”. He further suggests that audits are one form of such infor-
mation. An audit essentially controls the manager’s behaviour at least with regard to the 
correct application of accounting standards. Moreover, it aims at uncovering fraud or the 
manipulation of accounting numbers and thus helps to prevent such behaviour in the first 
place and thereby also promotes conservatism. I argue that enforcement represents a “sec-
ondary audit” as enforcement bodies conduct reviews of already audited financial state-
ments. Therefore, enforcement can also be defined as a monitoring mechanism that aims 
at controlling managers’ behaviour with the interest of investors in mind. Thus, substan-
tive changes in enforcement should increase accounting conservatism. 
Closely related to my research is the study by André et al. (2015), which investigates 
whether IFRS adoption in the EU had an influence on accounting conservatism. Their 
results suggest that the adoption of IFRS in the EU led to a decrease in conservatism. The 
authors also find that the decrease in conservatism due to IFRS adoption was higher in 
countries with low quality audit environments and weak enforcement of compliance with 
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accounting standards. Even though their research design does not allow for the exact con-
clusion29, a possible takeaway from their study might be that strong enforcement may 
increase accounting conservatism and the implementation of enforcement bodies itself 
may lead to an increase in conservatism. This notion goes along with the conservatism 
and agency theory described above and my research aim. Thus, I investigate the following 
hypothesis: 
H1: Substantive changes in enforcement regulation are associated with more 
conservative accounting choices. 
In a similar vein, enforcement agencies represent external corporate governance mecha-
nisms, which according to prior literature also promote conservatism in financial report-
ing (e.g., García Lara et al., 2007; Jayaraman, 2012; García Lara et al., 2009a; Ramalin-
gegowda and Yu, 2012; Vyas, 2011). For instance, both Ahmed and Duellman (2007) 
and Beekes et al. (2004) establish that more independent boards of directors, proxying 
stronger corporate governance mechanisms, result in more conservative accounting by 
the respective firms. Moreover, Badia et al. (2017) find that corporate governance mech-
anisms, namely institutional ownership and audit environment, have a significant positive 
effect on conservatism. In a more general approach, García Lara et al. (2007), taking both 
internal and external corporate governance characteristics into account, show that firms 
with stronger corporate governance employ more accounting conservatism than firms 
with weaker corporate governance. They base their expectations and findings on the no-
tion that “adequate corporate governance results in better monitoring of the manage-
ment”, which in line with the development of my first hypothesis would be associated 
with more conservatism. 
                                                 
29  André et al. (2015) do not explicitly regard enforcement as a potential driver of accounting conservatism. 
They expect it to be more of a mitigating variable that softens the IFRS effect on conservatism. In their 
design, it is not possible to look at the impact of enforcement by itself as they use the Brown et al. (2014) 
index which does not only measure the strength of an enforcement regime but also the quality of the 
audit environment. This index rather covers the strength of the general regulatory environment on 
financial reporting. I, on the other hand, explicitly regard the implementation or strengthening of 
enforcement institutions represented by a dummy variable. The study of André et al. (2015) furthermore 
has several research design issues that result in a lack of construct and internal validity. They compare 
accounting conservatism in the European Union before and after the mandatory adoption of IFRS 
without an appropriate control group. Thus, they are potentially looking at a sheer time series effect or 
an effect that might be driven by concurrent regulatory changes within the EU. It is not possible to 
empirically isolate the effects of IFRS reporting and enforcement in their design. 
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Based on this stream of literature, however, it remains an open question how the account-
ing conservatism of firms with different corporate governance strength is affected by sub-
stantive changes in enforcement. Possibly, firms with strong corporate governance al-
ready employ fairly conservative accounting and, therefore, have little leeway to be even 
more conservative when an enforcement change occurs. Firms with weak corporate gov-
ernance, on the other hand, potentially still have the possibility to increase accounting 
conservatism. Taken together, this would suggest that firms with weak corporate govern-
ance increase their accounting conservatism more once substantive enforcement changes 
occur. However, firms with weak corporate governance may not be that aware of enforce-
ment to be affected by increased regulation. Hence, I formulate my cross-sectional second 
hypothesis in an open way: 
H2: The influence of substantive changes in enforcement on accounting 
conservatism depends on a firm’s corporate governance strength. 
4.3 Research design 
4.3.1 Identification strategy 
I use and extend the work of CHL (2013) to identify countries where substantive enforce-
ment changes occurred irrespective of IFRS adoption in order to separate IFRS and en-
forcement effects as best as possible. CHL (2013) construct a data set containing whether 
and when substantive enforcement changes occurred in 56 IFRS and non-IFRS adoption 
countries from 2001 to 2009. The extensive data set displays the staggered introduction 
or strengthening of enforcement institutions for a global sample and also contains a large 
control sample without changes in enforcement. The given variation in IFRS adoption as 
well as enforcement changes and a set of fixed effects help CHL (2013) to overcome 
many of the typical issues of IFRS and enforcement research. For instance, the clustering 
in calendar time of IFRS adoption and enforcement changes mostly being directly tied to 
IFRS adoption make it difficult to empirically isolate their effects. Moreover, the effects 
of IFRS adoption and substantive changes in enforcement could mutually reinforce each 
other. 
I arrive at two different treatment groups to investigate. Treatment group (I) consists of 
all the countries in CHL’s (2013) data set that have substantive enforcement changes sev-
eral years after IFRS adoption plus Austria, which implemented an enforcement mecha-
nism in 2013, and thus is not included in CHL’s (2013) data set. This treatment group’s 
potential enforcement effects might be dependent on prior IFRS adoption. However, as 
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the enforcement changes occurred several years after and not bundled with IFRS adop-
tion, IFRS and enforcement effects are expected to be separated for the most part. In order 
to take prior IFRS adoption out of the equation, I introduce Treatment group (II). This 
group consists of non-IFRS-adopting countries with substantive enforcement changes. 
Each of these treatment groups needs to be compared to a different set of control coun-
tries. Treatment group (I) is compared to Control group (I), which consists of IFRS-adopt-
ing countries that did not have substantive enforcement changes within the time frame 
under investigation. Together, Treatment group (I) and Control group (I) form the IFRS 
sample. Treatment group (II) is compared to countries that did not adopt IFRS nor carry 
out substantive enforcement changes in the defined time frame (Control group (II)). Treat-
ment group (II) and Control group (II) constitute the Non-IFRS sample.  
I establish these control groups by matching potential countries from CHL’s (2013) se-
lection based on the Kaufmann et al. (2009) index for regulatory quality measured as of 
2003.30 Table 4.1 displays the composition of Treatment groups (I) and (II) and the re-
spective control groups. Based on the work of CHL (2013), I know the exact quarter in 
which the enforcement changes occurred. This allows me to include another level of var-
iation into my analyses. This is the variation in the publication of the first annual report 











                                                 
30  Equal to CHL (2013), I use the 2003 values of the regulatory quality index because I regard a similar 
time frame as they do in their study. 
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Table 4.1: Composition of treatment and control groups 
Panel A: IFRS countries with or without following enforcement changes  
           
Treatment Group (I)  Control Group (I) 














           
Sweden  2005  2007  1.69  New Zealand  1.71 
           
Lithuania  2005  2007  1.10  Czech Republic 1.12 
           
Ireland  2005  2007  1.66  Switzerland  1.63 
           
Hungary  2005  2008  1.08  Italy  1.02 
           
Hong Kong  2005  2008  1.76  Denmark  1.79 
           
Turkey  2006  2008  0.08  Philippines  -0.06 
           
Luxembourg  2005  2009  1.94  Singapore  1.84 
           
Austria  2005  2013  1.52  Australia  1.60 
           
Panel B: Non-IFRS countries with or without following enforcement changes 
           
Treatment Group (II)  Control Group (II)   











           
Japan  2005  0.99  Taiwan  0.94   
           
Chile  2009  1.48  United States  1.48   
           
This table displays the composition of the two country groups under investigation as well as the respective 
control groups. Treatment Group (I) in Panel A consists of countries that had enforcement changes several 
years after IFRS adoption. This group is compared to a control group of countries which adopted IFRS 
but had no substantive enforcement changes in the regarded timeframe. Treatment Group (II) includes 
countries with substantive enforcement changes but without IFRS adoption and is compared to a control 
group of countries with neither enforcement changes nor IFRS adoption in the regarded time frame (Panel 
B). Countries were matched based on the regulatory quality index developed by Kaufmann et al. (2009). 
  
The Role of Enforcement in Shaping Conservative Accounting Choices 
 99 
Table 4.2: Variation in first annual report after enforcement change 
Country 
 
Enforcement change by 
quarter 
 
First annual report after  
enforcement change 
     
Sweden & Ireland   Q3/07  Q4/07 - Q3/08 
     
Lithuania  Q4/07  Q1/08 - Q4/08 
     
Hungary & Turkey  Q1/08  Q2/08 - Q1/09 
     
Hong Kong  Q3/08  Q4/08 - Q3/09 
     
Luxembourg  Q4/09  Q1/10 - Q4/10 
     
Austria  Q2/13  Q3/13 - Q2/14 
     
Japan  Q3/05  Q4/05 - Q3/06 
     
Chile  Q2/09  Q3/09 - Q2/10 
          
This table displays the different countries subject to a substantive change in enforcement and the 
respective calendar quarter of the enforcement change. Moreover, this table depicts the variation in the 
date of publication of the first annual report under the new enforcement regime for the firms in the 
respective countries. 
 
When carrying out my analyses, I regard the last two years prior to substantive enforce-
ment changes and the first two years in the presence of a new or a strengthened enforce-
ment regime. If I chose a longer time frame, I would face problems of overlapping with 
the date of IFRS adoption in Treatment group (I). For the control countries, I regard the 
same years as for the matched counterparts. My yearly panel regression model estimating 
the association between Enforcement and Conservatism looks as follows: 
(1) 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝐸𝑛𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡 +  𝛽2𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 +  ∑ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 +
∑ 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠  +  𝑒𝑖𝑡 
In line with my first hypothesis, I expect a positive association between Enforcement and 
Conservatism. I expect to find this association for both the IFRS sample and the Non-
IFRS sample. To test my second hypothesis, investigating whether the role substantive 
changes in enforcement play in shaping conservative accounting choices depends on a 
firm’s corporate governance strength, I carry out a sub-sample analysis based on Ag-
garwal et al.’s (2011)31 data set on corporate governance ratings. This data set contains 
                                                 
31  Aggarwal et al. (2011) investigate whether institutional investors have an impact on corporate 
governance. They analyse firms’ portfolio holdings from 23 countries from 2003 to 2008 and find that 
international institutional ownership is positively associated with firm-level governance. 
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corporate governance ratings for firms from 23 countries from 2003 to 2008. Their gov-
ernance measure 𝐺𝑂𝑉41 is based on 41 individual governance-related firm attributes. In 
this analysis, I only look at the countries with substantive enforcement changes: Treat-
ment groups (I) and (III), namely Sweden, Lithuania, Ireland, Hungary, Hong Kong, Tur-
key, Luxembourg, Austria, Japan and Chile. As Lithuania, Hungary, Turkey, Luxem-
bourg and Chile are not included in the Aggarwal et al. (2011) data set and the relevant 
years for Austria (enforcement change was in 2013) are missing in the mentioned data 
set, I carry out my analysis with the sub-sample of firms from Sweden, Ireland, Hong 
Kong and Japan. I estimate regression model (1) for this sample including the variable 
Governance and the interaction term Enforcement*Governance. 
4.3.2 Variables measurement 
When investigating accounting conservatism, researchers generally differentiate between 
balance sheet and earnings conservatism (García Lara and Mora, 2004). Balance sheet or 
unconditional (news-independent) conservatism indicates a persistent understatement of 
book value of shareholders’ equity (Feltham and Ohlson, 1995). Earnings or conditional 
(news-dependent) conservatism, on the other hand, is reflected by earnings recognising 
bad news timelier than good news (Basu, 1997).32 In my analyses, I focus on conditional 
conservatism which is less noisy and the more prominent measure in the literature. More-
over, the introduction of IFRS represented a major shock to balance sheets and thus also 
to the variables that ought to measure unconditional conservatism such as market to book 
ratio. IFRS and enforcement effects would therefore be hard if not impossible to disen-
tangle in an analysis regarding unconditional conservatism. 
Basu (1997) derives his well-spread conservatism definition from the old accountants’ 
rule “anticipate no profits but anticipate all losses” (e.g., Bliss, 1924) and hence defines 
conservatism in accounting as “the accountant's tendency to require a higher degree of 
verification to recognize good news as gains than to recognize bad news as losses”. Thus, 
he constructs a regression equation that estimates how strongly earnings reflect good 
news and bad news, measured by stock returns. The higher the reflection of bad news in 
                                                 
32  The terminology for basically the same constructs varies greatly throughout the conservatism literature. 
Richardson and Tinaikar (2004) speak of ex-post and ex-ante conservatism, while Chandra (2011) 
defines the very same ideas as news-dependent and news-independent conservatism. Beaver and Ryan 
(2005) deliver the terminology of conditional and unconditional conservatism. 
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earnings, the more conservative the underlying accounting. His cross-sectional regression 
is specified as 
𝑋𝑖 =  𝛽1 +  𝛽2𝐷𝑖 +  𝛽3𝑅𝑖 +  𝛽4𝐷𝑖𝑅𝑖 +  𝑒𝑖  
where i indexes the firm, X is earnings, R is returns (measuring news), D is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 when R < 0 and equal to 0 otherwise, and e is the residual. 𝛽3 represents 
the good news timeliness measure referred to as G_Score by Khan and Watts (2009). The 
measure of incremental timeliness for bad news over good news, or conservatism, is 𝛽4 - 
referred to as C_Score by Khan and Watts (2009). 
The Basu (1997) conservatism measure, which is the most widely used conservatism 
measure in the literature (Ryan, 2006), can be estimated either for a firm by using a time-
series of firm-years or for an industry-year by using a cross-section of firms in the indus-
try. With this approach, however, it is not possible to estimate a firm-year measure of 
accounting conservatism. Therefore, I need to carry out my analyses with C_Score, a 
firm-year measure of accounting conservatism introduced by Khan and Watts (2009), 
which builds on the Basu (1997) measure. This requires data on firm size (Size), market 
to book ratio (M/B) and leverage (Lev) as Khan and Watts (2009) show that both G_Score 
and C_Score are linear functions of these firm-specific characteristics. Moreover, they 
describe these variables “as summary measures of the four Watts (2003a) factors (con-
tracting, litigation, taxation and regulation) that drive conservatism”. Size is measured as 
the natural logarithm of the market value of equity, while M/B is the market value of 
equity divided by the book value of equity. Finally, Lev is measured as total assets minus 
book value of equity divided by book value of equity. 
𝐺_𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 = 𝛽3 =  𝜇1 +  𝜇2𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 +  𝜇3𝑀/𝐵𝑖 +  𝜇4𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖 
𝐶_𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒 = 𝛽4 =  𝜋1 +  𝜋2𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 +  𝜋3𝑀/𝐵𝑖 + 𝜋4𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖 
These linear functions for G_Score (𝛽3) and C_Score (𝛽4) in a next step need to be sub-
stituted into the original Basu model from above: 








+ (𝛿1𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 +  𝛿2
𝑀
𝐵 𝑖




+  𝑒𝑖  
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This equation also includes additional terms in the last parenthesis. Khan and Watts 
(2009) explain that these terms are needed as the regression model includes interaction 
terms between firm characteristics and returns. Thus, it is necessary to control for these 
firm characteristics separately. Finally, I solve the brackets and unitise the coefficients to 
arrive at the following extended equation: 
𝑋𝑖 =  𝛽1 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑅𝑖 +  𝛽4𝑅𝑖𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 +  𝛽5𝑅𝑖
𝑀
𝐵 𝑖
+  𝛽6𝑅𝑖𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖 + 𝜷𝟕𝐷𝑖𝑅𝑖
+  𝜷𝟖𝐷𝑖𝑅𝑖𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 + 𝜷𝟗𝐷𝑖𝑅𝑖
𝑀
𝐵 𝑖
+  𝜷𝟏𝟎𝐷𝑖𝑅𝑖𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖 + 𝛽11𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 +  𝛽12
𝑀
𝐵 𝑖
+  𝛽13𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖 + 𝛽14𝐷𝑖𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 +  𝛽15𝐷𝑖
𝑀
𝐵 𝑖
+  𝛽16𝐷𝑖𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑖 +  𝑒𝑖  
This regression model is estimated on a yearly basis across all firms to arrive at the coef-
ficients in bold 𝛽7 to 𝛽10 for each year. These coefficients are then substituted into the 
C_Score equation and applied to the yearly data on firm size (Size), market to book ratio 
(M/B) and leverage (Lev) to arrive at a firm-year value of C_Score indicating accounting 
conservatism. 
Furthermore, regression model (1) includes Enforcement as the main independent varia-
ble of interest. This is a binary dummy variable that equals “1” in all firm-years ending 
after substantive changes in enforcement. Enforcement represents an interaction term of 
the two main effects Post and Treat in my difference-in-differences design, where Post 
is a binary variable indicating firm-years after substantive changes in enforcement for 
both the treatment group where the changes occurred and the matched control countries 
without these changes. Treat is a binary variable indicating all firm-years in countries 
where substantive changes in enforcement took place. To test my second hypothesis, I 
include the dummy variable Governance, which indicates whether a firm’s corporate gov-
ernance rating in the Aggarwal et al. (2011) data set is lower than the sample’s median. 
However, in the case at hand 660 observations have a corporate governance rating equiv-
alent to the median. Therefore, I estimate the regression model in two different ways. 
Firstly, I include these observations and assign them to the low corporate governance 
firms and once I omit these 660 observations. Khan and Watts (2009) propose to directly 
control for the inputs of C_Score in the regression (Size, M/B and Leverage). Finally, 
industry, country and year fixed effects are added to the regression model. Due to the 
country fixed effects Treat drops out of the regression. However, the inclusion of year 
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fixed effects does not cause Post to drop out of the regression due to the staggered en-
forcement changes and matching of control countries, which results in some years being 
in the post period for some countries while being in the pre period for others. Standard 
errors are clustered at firm-level. Table 4.3 summarises the variables used in the regres-
sion analyses. 
Table 4.3: Variables measurement 
Variable name   Definition 
Conservatism  C_Score (firm-year measure for conditional conservatism based on Khan 
and Watts, 2009) 
Enforcement 
 Dummy variable indicating all firm-years ending after a substantive 
change in enforcement in the respective country 
Post 
 
Dummy variable indicating all firm-years ending after a substantive 
change in enforcement in treatment countries and all firm-years ending 
after the same ficticious treatment date in the control countries 
Size  Natural logarithm of the market value of equity 




Total assets minus book value of equity divided by book value of equity 
Dummy variable indicating whether a firm’s corporate governance rating 
based on the Aggarwal et al. (2011) data set is lower than the sample’s 
median corporate governance rating 
This table summarises the variables used in the regression analyses. All continuous variables are winsorised 
at the 1% and 99% levels to reduce the impact of outliers. 
 
4.4 Results and discussion 
4.4.1 Sample selection 
Based on the treatment and control groups defined above, Table 4.4 displays how I arrive 
at the different samples for my analyses. The IFRS sample consists of IFRS-adopting 
countries with following enforcement changes (Treatment group (I)) and without follow-
ing enforcement changes (Control group (I)). Treatment group (II) consists of non-IFRS 
countries that had substantive enforcement changes and is compared to Control group (II) 
comprising countries that neither adopted IFRS nor had substantive changes in enforce-
ment in the defined time frame. Treatment group (II) and Control group (II) form the 
Non-IFRS sample. 
For all samples, I delete firm-years pertaining to shortened fiscal years. I do that because 
I need to use earnings data when estimating the conditional conservatism measure 
C_Score. Earnings data would, hence, be biased if I chose to include shortened fiscal 
years. Moreover, firm-years with missing data, those pertaining to financial institutions 
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and those including negative values for total assets or book value of equity are deleted 
from my samples. Finally, I exclude non-IFRS-adopting firms from the IFRS sample.33
                                                 
33  In the EU/EEA only countries listed on EU-regulated markets fall under the scrutiny of enforcement 
mechanisms. These are the very firms that also have to adopt IFRS. As the sample potentially also 
comprises voluntary IFRS adopters who are not subject to enforcement scrutiny, my approach is a 
simplified one. Ideally, I would like to work with lists published by the European Securities and Markets 
Authority (ESMA), which specify all countries on regulated markets in the EU in a given year. However, 
these lists are not obtainable anymore for some of the years included in my research design. Therefore, 
I work with the explained simplification in my sample selection process as other studies do too (e.g., 
André et al., 2015). I address potential concerns in a robustness test using the ESMA lists of the years 
of enforcement changes I do have available under the assumption that the firms listed on the EU-
regulated market segments did not change dramatically in the years surrounding the enforcement 
changes. 
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group (II)       
          
Firm-years in relevant time frame  10281  16524   17959  38761 
          
./. Shortened fiscal years  13  54   59  61 
          
./. Missing data  1977  2755   2327  9365 
          
./. Financial institutions  1507  3072   1429  5889 
          
./. Negative total assets or book value of equity  269  448   134  3781 
          
./. Non-IFRS firm-years in EU/EEA countries  328  71   -  - 
          
= Final no. of firm-year observations  6187  10124   14010  19665 
          
  IFRS sample I   Non-IFRS sample 
          
N  16311   33675 
                  
This table displays how I arrive at the different samples for my regression models. For the two treatment groups and their respective 
control groups I source from Thomson Reuters Datastream all firm-years of the included countries in the relevant time frame. Then I 
delete shortened fiscal years, firm-years with missing data, those pertaining to financial institutions and those with negative total assets 
or book value of equity. Moreover, for the IFRS sample I delete firm-years in EU/EEA countries where IFRS were not adopted by the 
firms as this suggests these firms are not listed on EU-regulated markets and hence do not fall under the enforcement regimes. Treatment 
group (I) and Control group (I) together represent the IFRS sample, while Treatment group (II) and Control group (II) combined represent 
the Non-IFRS sample. 
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4.4.2 Descriptive statistics 
Tables 4.5 and 4.6 report descriptive statistics and correlations for the variables used in 
my regression analyses. In both tables, Panels A and B display the figures for the two 
different samples: the IFRS sample and the Non-IFRS sample. Interestingly, it can be 
seen from Panel B in Table 4.5 that only in the Non-IFRS sample the mean of 
Conservatism is positive, whilst it is negative in the IFRS sample. This goes along with 
André et al.’s (2015) finding that the adoption of IFRS decreases conditional conserva-
tism. The standard deviation of Conservatism is the highest in the IFRS sample (0.047). 
This might stem from the fact that, in comparison to the other sample, the IFRS sample 
is more diverse with respect to the countries included therein. It is the only sample that 
comprises both countries from inside and outside the EU/EEA. 
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Table 4.5: Descriptive statistics of variables used in the regression models 
Panel A: Descriptives IFRS sample  
                  
    Mean        
                   
  N  
Entire 
sample 
 Treatment group 
(I) 
 Control group 
(I) 
 Difference  Median  Min  Max  
Std.  
dev. 
                   
Conservatism  16311  -0.015 




                   





 0.000  0.000  1.000  0.397 
                   
Post  16311  0.487  0.515272  0.470132  −0.045140***  0.000***  0.000  1.000  0.500 
                   
Size  16311  11.475  11.727130  11.320730  −0.406397***  11.197***  7.992  15.991  2.211 
                   
M/B  16311  2.839  2.358837  3.103290  0.774066***  1.296  0.292  19.220  4.377 
                   
Leverage  16311  0.396  0.438010  0.370137  −0.067870***  0.401***  0.027  0.801  0.235 
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Table 4.5 cont'd.:      Descriptive statistics of variables used in the regression models 
 
Panel B: Descriptives Non-IFRS sample 
                 
    Mean       
                  
  N  
Entire 
sample 
 Treatment group 
(III) 
 Control group 
(III) 
 Difference  Median  Min  Max  
Std. 
dev. 
                   
Conservatism  33675  0.002  0.000286  0.003622  0.003363***  −0.000  −0.005  0.028  0.008 
                   
Enforcement  33675  0.212       
 0.000  0.000  1.000  0.409 
                   
Post  33675  0.501  0.509850  0.494024  -0.015826***  1.000***  0.000  1.000  0.500 
                   
Size  33675  12.046  12.088870  12.015450  −0.073424***  11.895***  8.834  15.797  1.914 
                   
M/B  33675  2.250  1.798379  2.571206  0.772827***  1.486***  0.458  8.969  2.134 
                   
Leverage  33675  0.487  0.518986  0.463386  −0.055600***  0.493***  0.116  0.860  0.217 
                                  
This table displays the descriptives for the variables used in the regression models in Table 4.7 for each sample in question separately. Moreover, the results of mean and median 
difference tests for the variables used in the regression models are reported. Definitions of variables are reported in Table 4.4. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels, respectively.  
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Table 4.6: Correlations of variables used in the regression models 
Panel A: Correlations IFRS sample 
               
    (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
               
Conservatism  (1)  1           
               
Enforcement  (2)  0.1785  1         
               
Post  (3)  -0.0477  0.5061  1       
               
Size  (4)  −0.0113  0.0213  0.0746  1     
               
M/B  (5)  −0.5259  −0.0975  0.1015  0.3294  1   
               
Leverage  (6)  0.1470  0.0869  0.0317  0.2101  0.0359  1 
               
Panel C: Correlations Non-IFRS sample 
               
    (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
               
Conservatism  (1)  1           
               
Enforcement  (2)  −0.1090  1         
               
Post  (3)  0.3088  0.5183  1       
               
Size  (4)  0.1658  0.0276  0.0438  1     
               
M/B  (5)  0.1382  −0.0851  0.0462  0.1559  1   
               
Leverage  (6)  0.0601  0.0628  -0.0188  0.0579  0.1013  1 
                              
This table displays the correlations of the variables used in the regression models in Table 4.7 for each 
sample in question separately. Definitions of variables are reported in Table 4.3. Bold letters indicate 
significance at the 10% level. 
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4.4.3 Multivariate analyses 
Testing hypothesis 1 
The results of my main analyses are displayed in Table 4.7, which reports coefficient 
estimates and t-statistics from estimating regression model (1) for the two different sam-
ples at hand. The dependent variable hence in both models is Conservatism, indicating 
the level of conditional conservatism in a firm’s accounting measured by C_Score. In line 
with my first hypothesis, I find a significant positive association between Enforcement 
and Conservatism for the Non-IFRS sample (1% significance level). However, for the 
IFRS sample I do not find a significant association between Enforcement and Conserva-
tism. Thus, it appears as if substantive enforcement changes lead firms to employ more 
conservative accounting only in countries where IFRS are not mandated. Possibly, IFRS 
adoption did not only decrease conditional conservatism as suggested by André et al. 
(2015) but also limit the leeway firms have in changing their level of conservatism. 
Hence, firms in IFRS jurisdiction may not be able to respond as conservatively to sub-
stantive changes in enforcement as firms in non-IFRS jurisdictions. 
The control variables Size, M/B and Leverage as well as the Constant load in strongly 
significant ways throughout the models, which is line with prior literature using C_Score 
as a measure of conditional conservatism (e.g., André et al., 2015). This is not surprising, 
however, as these exact same control variables are used when estimating C_Score, which 
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Table 4.7: The effect of enforcement on accounting conservatism 
Variable    
(IFRS  
sample) 
    
(Non-IFRS 
sample) 
Enforcement  -0.0009   0.0008*** 
  (-1.23)   (7.84) 
Post  0.0057***   -0.0006*** 
  (4.07)   (-5.25) 
Size  0.0045***   -0.0004*** 
  (28.00)   (39.78) 
M/B  −0.0007***   0.0000 
  (−5.57)   (1.34) 
Leverage  −0.0161***   0.0036*** 
  (−13.37)   (44.60) 
Constant  −0.0464***   −0.0063*** 
  (−23.83)   (−46.30) 
Adj. R2  0.75   0.75 
N  16311   33675 
Fixed effects  
Country, year, 
 industry 
  Country, year, 
industry 
Clustered standard errors   Firm     Firm 
This table displays coefficient estimates and t-statistics from estimating regression 
model (1) for the two different samples derived in Table 4.4. The dependent variable 
is Conservatism measured by C_Score. Definitions of variables are reported in Table 
4.3. t-values are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The models include country, year and 
industry fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by firm.  
 
Testing hypothesis 2 
Table 4.8 displays coefficient estimates and t-statistics from estimating regression model 
(1) for the Aggarwal et al. (2011) sub-sample on corporate governance ratings once when 
including the observations where the governance rating is equal to the sample’s median 
(1) and once when omitting these observations (2), which is supposed to underpin the 
results’ robustness. In both interaction models, the coefficient of Enforcement represents 
the effect of Enforcement on Conservatism for firms with high corporate governance rat-
ings. This effect is not significant in either model. The interaction term’s coefficient, 
however, is positive and significant at the 5% level in both models. To evaluate the effect 
of Enforcement on Conservatism for firms with low corporate governance ratings the sum 
of the two coefficients of Enforcement and Enforcement*Governance needs to be 
regarded. In model (1) this results in the enforcement effect on conservatism being 
stronger for firms with weak corporate governance at the 10% significance level, while 
The Role of Enforcement in Shaping Conservative Accounting Choices 
 112 
this relation is significant at the 5% level in model (2). In conjunction, this suggests that 
the enforcement effect on conservatism is slightly positive for weak corporate governance 
firms, while it is not significant for strong corporate governance firms. However, the ro-
bustness of these results is limited as I was not able to find equivalent significant results 
when adding a control group without enforcement changes in untabulated analyses. More-
over, the economic significance is fairly low. 
Table 4.8: Enforcement’s effect on accounting conservatism depending on a firm’s govern-
ance strength 
Variable    (1)   (2) 
Enforcement  −0.0000  0.0000 
  (−0.38) 
 (0.12) 
Governance  −0.0000***  −0.0001*** 
  (−2.91)  (−3.52) 
Enforcement*Governance  0.0001**  0.0001** 
  (2.17)  (2.12) 
Size  −0.0001***  −0.0001*** 
  (−15.31)  (−10.02) 
M/B  0.0001***  0.0001*** 
  (7.03)  (4.98) 
Leverage  0.0003***  0.0003*** 
  (9.74)  (6.34) 
Constant  0.0014***  0.0015*** 
  (18.58)  (12.64) 
Adj. R2  0.76   0.76 
N  2023  1363 
Fixed effects  Country, year, industry  Country, year, industry 
Clustered standard errors   Firm   Firm 
This table displays coefficient estimates and t-statistics from estimating regression model (1) for a sub-
sample of firms derived from Aggarwal et al.'s (2011) corporate governance rating data set. All these 
firms are listed in countries that underwent substantive enforcement changes. Model (2) excludes firms 
where the governance rating is equal to the median. The dependent variable is Conservatism measured 
by C_Score. Definitions of variables are reported in Table 4.3. t-values are reported in parentheses. ***, 
**, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The models include country, 
year and industry fixed effects and standard errors are clustered by firm.  
 
4.5 Robustness check for hypothesis 1 
As outlined in Chapter 4.3, I exclude non-IFRS-adopting firms from the IFRS sample. I 
do this as in the EU/EEA only countries listed on EU-regulated markets fall under the 
scrutiny of enforcement mechanisms. These are the very firms that also have to adopt 
IFRS. However, as the sample potentially also comprises voluntary IFRS adopters who 
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are not subject to the supervision of an enforcement regime, my approach is a slightly 
simplified one. Ideally, one would work with lists published by the European Securities 
and Markets Authority (ESMA), which specify all countries on regulated markets in the 
EU in a given year. However, these lists are not obtainable anymore for some of the years 
included in my research design. Therefore, I work with the explained simplification in 
my sample selection process as other studies do too (e.g., André et al., 2015). It is worth-
while noting that the potential inclusion of such firms who are not subject to enforcement 
scrutiny in my treatment sample would rather bias the sample in a way that would work 
against finding significant results. As I did, in fact, not find a significant association be-
tween substantive changes in enforcement and conditional accounting conservatism for 
the IFRS sample, it is important to address the sample selection concerns in a robustness 
check. I do this using the ESMA lists of the years of enforcement changes, which I do 
have available (2007-2015), to arrive at a revised IFRS sample. I do this under the as-
sumption that the firms listed on the EU-regulated market segments did not change dra-
matically in the years surrounding the enforcement changes, which are not covered by the 
2007-2015 ESMA lists. This reduces the size of IFRS sample I to 15,409 firm-year ob-
servations. Results are displayed in Table 4.9. Again, I find no significant association 
between substantive enforcement changes and conditional conservatism, supporting the 
results of my previous analyses. 
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Table 4.9: Robustness check 
Variable    (IFRS sample I) 
Enforcement  -0.0009 
  (-1.00) 
Post  0.0052*** 
  (3.18) 
Size  0.0048*** 
  (25.53) 
M/B  −0.0007*** 
  (−4.70) 
Leverage  −0.0212*** 
  (−14.10) 
Constant  −0.0586*** 
  (−23.53) 
Adj. R2  0.75 
N  15409 
Fixed effects  
Country, year, 
industry 
Clustered standard errors   Firm 
This table displays coefficient estimates and t-statistics 
from estimating regression model (1) for the IFRS 
sample from Table 4.4 after deducting firms not listed 
on EU-regulated markets as indicated by the ESMA 
lists of the years with the substantive enforcement 
changes. The dependent variable is Conservatism 
measured by C_Score. Definitions of variables are 
reported in Table 4.3. t-values are reported in 
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The models 
include country, year and industry fixed effects. 
Standard errors are clustered by firm.  
 
4.6 Conclusion 
This paper delivers evidence on the role of substantive changes in enforcement in shaping 
firms’ accounting conservatism. In line with prior literature, I hypothesise and find at 
least for a sample of non-IFRS countries that substantive enforcement changes are signif-
icantly and positively associated with C_Score, a firm-year measure of conditional con-
servatism. I do not find this association for a sample of IFRS-adopting countries though, 
suggesting that IFRS adoption may limit a firm’s leeway in making conservative account-
ing choices. Hence, firms in IFRS countries would not be able to respond to substantive 
changes in enforcement as conservatively as firms in non-IFRS countries. As more con-
servative accounting choices are expected to result in less erroneous or less fraudulent 
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accounting, my findings suggest that enforcement’s preventive function is efficient 
throughout the regarded non-IFRS countries.  
Moreover, the findings can be interpreted as enforcement having several other positive 
effects. As García Lara et al. (2011, 2014, 2016) find that increased levels of accounting 
conservatism are associated with a higher efficiency in the allocation of capital, reduced 
levels of information asymmetry and lower cost of capital, enforcement’s association with 
conservatism subsequently also promotes these positive developments. 
Furthermore, I find weak evidence that firms with weak corporate governance show a 
more pronounced increase in accounting conservatism following substantive changes in 
enforcement than firms with strong corporate governance. However, the robustness and 
economic significance of these results is limited and, therefore, they need to be interpreted 
with caution. 
My study is subject to several limitations. First and foremost, I use a slightly simplified 
approach in the selection process of the IFRS sample, which cannot entirely rule out the 
possibility of some firms being included that are not subject to the enforcement changes 
at hand. I carry out a robustness test to address these concerns. Another limitation lies in 
the fact that I was not able to carry out the analysis for my second hypothesis across the 
entire samples I used in my analyses regarding the first hypothesis. Due to data availabil-
ity constraints, I had to run a sub-sample analysis, which might not fully be generalisable 
across all regarded jurisdictions. Lastly, whether or not to make conservative accounting 
choices remains an endogenous managerial decision influenced by a number of other fac-
tors which cannot be observed nor fully ruled out. 
Future studies should look at the influence of enforcement changes on unconditional con-
servatism once appropriate settings are identified. Furthermore, it would be highly inter-
esting and relevant to shed further light on how enforcement’s association with conserv-
atism may result in higher efficiency of capital allocation, reduced cost of capital, de-




5.1 Summary of major findings 
While capital market effects associated with enforcement regulation and enforcement ac-
tions have been extensively studied in the literature (e.g., Ernstberger et al., 2012; Hitz et 
al., 2012; H. B. Christensen et al., 2013), this thesis identifies several gaps in the literature 
on the direct effects of enforcement on the decision making of financial statement prepar-
ers and auditors and aims to help fill these gaps. The broad majority of studies investigat-
ing the direct effects of enforcement regard post-error announcement effects; that is, they 
examine the effects that enforcement actions and sanctions have on the stakeholders in-
volved (e.g., Arthaud-Day et al., 2006; Srinivasan, 2005; Johnstone et al., 2011; Brocard 
et al., 2018). However, little is known about the direct effects on stakeholders’ decision 
making before enforcement institutions even take action. Therefore, this thesis aims to 
shed light on these effects by investigating the role that ongoing enforcement reviews, the 
likelihood of being subject to an enforcement review, and substantive changes in enforce-
ment regulation play in managers’ and auditors’ disclosure and accounting choices. For 
instance, this thesis examines the voluntary disclosure of firm managers on ongoing and 
concluded enforcement reviews which has not previously been investigated in the litera-
ture. Moreover, this thesis mainly focuses on the role enforcement plays in shaping both 
auditor and accounting conservatism, thereby contributing to the literature on enforce-
ment’s effects on accounting properties (e.g., Ernstberger et al., 2012). It is important to 
add to this literature stream as many argue that the evidence brought forward in this field 
of research to date is scarce and inconclusive (Brüggemann et al., 2013; Leuz and 
Wysocki, 2016; Hitz et al., 2018). 
The main findings indicate that: (1) managers deem information on ongoing and con-
cluded enforcement reviews valuable for investors and disclose it deliberately in line with 
their strategic incentives; (2) auditor conservatism is not increased by enforcement until 
the individuals have actually been involved in a review; and (3) substantive changes in 
enforcement regulation may lead firms to prepare more conservative accounts. In conclu-
sion, enforcement appears to have direct effects on the decision making of financial state-
ment preparers and auditors. Managers are influenced in their disclosure decisions and in 
their accounting choices, while auditors are influenced in what accounting choices they 
require from their clients. The latter finding, however, only constitutes itself if auditors 
were directly affected by enforcement in the past. 
Conclusions 
 117 
The thesis uses three different methodological approaches to address the research ques-
tions in the respective studies. In the first study (Chapter 2), content analyses of hand-
collected annual reports and error announcements display what steps are openly taken by 
managers in response to enforcement reviews. The experimental approach of the second 
study (Chapter 3) supports the internal validity of the thesis, while external validity is 
attained through the archival empirical approach of the third study (Chapter 4), which 
analyses large cross-country data sets obtained from commercial databases such as Thom-
son Reuters Datastream. 
Contributing to the literature streams on voluntary disclosure and its incentives (e.g., Lev 
and Penman, 1990; Skinner, 1994; Botosan, 1997) and on enforcement actions (e.g., Hitz 
et al., 2012), the first study of this thesis delivers exploratory evidence for a disclosure 
phenomenon that to date has not been investigated. Content analyses of annual reports of 
all firms subject to the German enforcement mechanism from 2006 to 2016 establish the 
existence of voluntary disclosures about ongoing and concluded enforcement reviews. 
Such disclosures occur on a regular basis for concluded reviews (one out of four cases), 
while they represent a rarer incident for ongoing reviews (one out of 13 cases). Detailed 
analyses of firms that choose to share with the market information on ongoing reviews 
indicate that managers may deliberately utilise such disclosures led by their own strategic 
incentives. The format of the disclosures as well as their locations in the annual report 
possibly carry information on an enforcement review’s likely outcome. Finally, the study 
finds weak evidence of managers using voluntary disclosures on ongoing enforcement 
reviews to prepare the market for adverse news. The findings provide insights into an 
interesting, as yet unexplored disclosure phenomenon and its variation at the firm level 
as well as insights into the direct effects of enforcement on managers’ disclosure deci-
sions. 
As with all studies presented in this thesis, the second study contributes to the broad lit-
erature stream on the enforcement of accounting standards (e.g., Ernstberger et al, 2012; 
Hitz et al., 2012; H. B. Christensen et al., 2013). However, this study also contributes to 
the literature on auditors’ decision making and more specifically on auditor conservatism 
(e.g., Hackenbrack and Nelson, 1996; Nelson and Kinney Jr, 1997) by conducting an 
experiment with 72 practising auditors. The findings suggest that auditors, on average, 
already employ conservative decision making, irrespective of the likelihood of an en-
forcement review. Other potential risk factors such as litigation risk or reputation risk 
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already lead them to make more conservative choices. Moreover, professional codes of 
conduct and ethics as well as firms’ internal training might promote conservatism. Im-
portantly, the study’s findings show that those auditors who were directly affected by 
enforcement reviews in the past are significantly more likely to make conservative ac-
counting choices. 
The third study contributes to the literature streams on enforcement’s impact on account-
ing properties (e.g., Ernstberger et al., 2012), on conditional conservatism (e.g., Khan and 
Watts, 2009; Garcìa Lara et al., 2014) and most specifically on the impact of regulation 
on conditional conservatism (e.g., André et al., 2015). In a broad cross-country setting, 
this study uses archival data and multivariate analyses to investigate whether substantive 
changes in enforcement regulation are associated with increasing conditional conserva-
tism. Findings indeed suggest that stronger enforcement regulation is associated with 
higher conservatism. These findings only substantiate themselves in a sample of non-
IFRS jurisdictions. Moreover, firms with weak corporate governance are more affected 
in their conservatism than firms with strong corporate governance. The latter finding sug-
gests that enforcement may atone for the weaknesses of other corporate governance 
mechanisms. 
5.2 Implications 
The studies presented in this thesis each have their own important implications which, 
taken together, lead to greater general insights into the role that enforcement plays in the 
financial reporting environment. Moreover, the second study and the third study provide 
insights into the efficacy of enforcement’s preventive function which aims at preventing 
erroneous and fraudulent accounting. 
The first study shows that managers deem information on enforcement reviews to be rel-
evant for investors and, therefore, voluntarily disclose such information in line with spe-
cific strategic considerations. For instance, some managers may carry out such disclosure 
to prepare capital markets for adverse news. This indicates that managers are aware of 
the risks that enforcement holds for them and their firms. They respond to the associated 
risks with an adjustment of their own disclosure strategies; that is, their decision making 
is directly influenced by ongoing and concluded enforcement reviews. Such an increase 
in transparency should benefit investors and strengthen capital markets. 
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The second study finds that the likelihood of an enforcement review does not have a sig-
nificant impact on auditor conservatism. However, if auditors were directly affected by 
enforcement actions in the past, they tend to employ more conservative decision making. 
Hence, auditors seemingly need to experience enforcement and its implications and risks 
before it actually influences their decisions. If an increase in auditor conservatism was 
desirable, a potential way for this to be achieved would be to increase the frequency of 
enforcement actions. In this way, more auditors would eventually have had their own 
experiences with enforcement which would seem to lead them to employ more conserva-
tive decision making. More conservatism on the part of auditors would represent a means 
to achieve enforcement’s preventive function as it may lead to less erroneous or aggres-
sive accounting choices. 
Finally, according to the third study substantive changes in enforcement regulation seem-
ingly increase accounting conservatism. The study’s findings show that enforcement 
plays an important role when firm managers make accounting choices. As conservative 
accounting should help prevent erroneous and fraudulent accounting, the findings indi-
cate the efficacy of enforcement’s preventive function at least throughout the observed 
non-IFRS countries. As García Lara et al. (2011, 2014, 2016) find that conservatism is 
associated with efficient capital allocation and reduced information asymmetry and cost 
of capital, the findings of this study also suggest that enforcement may be an efficient 
supportive channel in achieving such positive capital market effects. 
Taken together, the findings of this thesis show that enforcement, in fact, influences the 
decision making of both firm managers and auditors with respect to disclosure and ac-
counting choices. Seemingly, managers are influenced more strongly and more directly 
than auditors. While accounting conservatism seemingly increases with substantive 
changes in enforcement regulation, auditor conservatism may be increased by raising the 
frequency of enforcement reviews. Hence, the evidence presented herein emphasises the 
relevance of strong enforcement in the financial reporting environment. To support the 
consistent and efficient application of accounting standards and to prevent erroneous or 
even fraudulent accounting numbers, it appears essential that strong enforcement bodies 
frequently carry out reviews of financial statements. Thus, this thesis delivers evidence 





As outlined in the respective chapters, the findings presented in this thesis are subject to 
several limitations. For instance, the analyses presented in the first study are exploratory 
and descriptive in nature. Hence, they do not provide insights into any causal relationships 
such as between unobservable managerial disclosure incentives and observable disclosure 
choices. Moreover, the results of this study rely on comparably small samples. Caution is 
advised when trying to derive general insights from these findings.  
The second study’s main limitation is also with respect to the relatively small sample size 
which is the result of the need to have auditors as participants as only they could fully 
grasp the implications of the audit case employed in this experimental study. However, 
in the trade-off between quantity and quality, in this case, one surely should favour quality 
and, hence, the preference was a small sample of auditors rather than a large sample of 
students who would be easier to source but who would not yield such informative data. 
Moreover, the study did not distinguish between auditors from different cultural back-
grounds or between auditors who are working for larger or smaller firms. Consequently, 
as with all experiments, another typical issue concerns the generalisability of the results. 
An experimental design will also never be able to completely mimic actual audit tasks 
and simulate all factors that are relevant in the decision-making process. Thus, while hav-
ing high internal validity, the study may lack external validity and, hence, it remains un-
certain how the findings apply in the real world. 
However, external validity is provided to the thesis by the third study. Nevertheless, this 
final study also has a few limitations especially with respect to the sample selection. 
Firstly, the sample selection process for the main analyses is slightly simplified. Firms 
located in countries that adopted IFRS prior to the defined time frame comprise the IFRS 
sample which is broken down into Treatment group (I) (countries with enforcement 
changes) and Control group (I) (countries without enforcement changes). It is not possible 
to rule out that some firms in Treatment group (I) were not subject to the substantive 
enforcement change. The resulting bias may work against finding significant results in 
the study. However, this limitation is addressed in a robustness test. Another limitation 
lies in the fact that, due to data availability constraints, it was not possible to run the 
analyses for testing Hypothesis 2 with the same sample used for testing Hypothesis 1. 
Hence, the findings with regard to Hypothesis 2 might not be generalisable to all juris-
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dictions investigated in the rest of the study. Finally, managers’ accounting choices re-
main endogenous in nature, and may be influenced by a variety of factors which cannot 
always be observed. Therefore, they cannot be ruled out either.  
5.4 Avenues for future research 
The findings of the studies included in this thesis point to several future research oppor-
tunities. In general, it still appears worthwhile to further investigate the direct effects of 
enforcement on the decision making of involved stakeholders in order to understand how 
these direct effects may drive capital market effects associated with enforcement, as es-
tablished in previous literature (e.g., Ernstberger et al., 2012; H. B. Christensen et al., 
2013). This thesis adds to the literature on the direct effects of enforcement by investigat-
ing the effects on managers’ and auditors’ disclosure and accounting choices. However, 
this fruitful literature stream still needs to be, and can be, broadened as discussed below. 
Each study included herein points to specific narrower avenues for future research. 
The first study established the existence of a disclosure phenomenon that to date has not 
been investigated. Hence, great potential lies in exploring this novel angle of enforcement 
research. As this study largely focused on voluntary disclosures about ongoing reviews, 
an interesting future research opportunity may be to investigate the motives and effects 
of voluntary disclosures about concluded reviews, especially for those firms stating that 
a concluded review without an error finding establishes the high quality of the firm’s 
financial statements. Moreover, it seems promising to investigate channels other than the 
annual report which firms could use to disclose information on enforcement reviews to 
investors. Related to this, information intermediaries might play a role in the dissemina-
tion process and their role should therefore also be examined in future research. 
As the second study does not find a significant association between the likelihood of an 
enforcement review and auditor conservatism, future research should further investigate 
how other related factors, as outlined in the study, influence conservatism. For instance, 
these factors include different risk factors such as reputation risk, and firm-internal fac-
tors, such as codes of conduct and ethics or employee training. Furthermore, it may be 
worthwhile for future research to investigate whether cultural differences impact auditors’ 
decision making in the context of the presented study. 
Lastly, the third study of this thesis investigates the association between substantive 
changes in enforcement regulation and conditional conservatism. Future research should 
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examine the association between such enforcement changes and unconditional conserva-
tism. In the current study, appropriate settings were unable to be located in which to con-
duct such analyses. However, once such settings are identified, this appears to be an ob-
vious path for future studies. Moreover, related to the findings of García Lara et al. (2011, 
2014, 2016), further research should seek to develop insights into how enforcement’s 
effect on conservatism may support efficient capital allocation, and reduce information 
asymmetry as well as the cost of capital.
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